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Maria Korusiewicz
On a Sunny Day, under a Tree, Chatting: 
Towards the Aesthetics of the Everyday
So it came to this: I am sitting under the tree,
Beside the river,
On a sunny morning.
It’s a trivial event
And history won’t claim it.1
Sitting beside a river, on a sunny day, for no particular 
reason and with no clear purpose, without having to 
have “the arid plain behind me” and “London Bridge 
falling down”2 before my eyes, or cleaning the kitchen on 
a chilly morning or chatting with the friends over a cup 
of hot cappuccino still appears to be an untrustworthy 
experience, unauthenticated by philosophical tradition, 
almost awkward in the perspective of the legacy of 
modernity with its divorce between the kingdom of art and 
aesthetic perception and the realm of the everyday. The 
tradition of modern Western aesthetics has not prepared 
us for such a trivial event, although on numerous occasions 
– in the works of Anthony Ashley Cooper, the 3rd Earl 
of Shaftesbury, Francis Hutcheson or Archibald Alison 
and finding its epitome in the Kantian philosophy – it did 
1 Wisława Szymborska, “Może być bez tytułu,” in Wisława 
Szymborska, Wiersze (Lesko: Bosz, 2003), p. 16. Translation mine.
2 T.S. Eliot, “The Waste Land,” in T.S. Eliot, The Waste Land and 
Other Poems (New York: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich), p. 47.
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embrace the territory much wider than the artistic object, 
reaching towards the aesthetics of the beautiful, the 
picturesque and the sublime to be found in our environment 
– in nature. 
Aesthetics, an offspring of modern rationality, was 
originally supposed to be a discursive discipline, “a younger 
sister of logic”.3 Kant’s contribution, revolving around the 
idea of disinterestedness and distance of a subjective, yet 
necessary and universal, judgment of taste, left us with the 
world divided into the separate realms, where the aesthetic 
was separated from the scientific, the ethical, and, most 
importantly, from the praxis of life. The rift was deepened 
by the Hegelian idealism, where the proper object of 
philosophical reflection was primarily a work of art, a lofty 
product of the spirit. Aesthetic thought, still resonant of 
the Platonic visions, claimed the idea of representation, 
constructing the order of being and its evocation, 
recapturing or illumination in art. Representation, 
perceived as creating an image that stands in ‑between, on 
the island position, transgressing both the sphere of thought 
and the sphere of the world, was considered a  distinct 
plane and activity. Thus, the issue of the position of art in 
reference to other human activities was usually resolved 
in favour of aesthetic isolation. Its foundation was “a belief 
in ontological discreteness of aesthetic perception and the 
corresponding removal of art objects from the other objects 
and activities that surround us.”4
However, since the 1960s, this arbitrary position, almost 
automatically accepted by the successive generations, has 
seemed to be fading away, imperceptibly turning into one 
more black -and -white sketch on the estimable pages of 
the history of Western thought. Rediscovering its half -for- 
gotten origins under the thin paving of theory isolating the 
3 Franciszek Chmielowski, “Filozofia, estetyka, metafizyka,” 
Diametros 3 (March 2005), p. 10.
4 Arnold Berleant, Re ‑thinking Aesthetics: Rogue Essays on Aesthet‑
ics and The Arts (Hampshire: Ashgate Publishing Limited, 2004), 
p. 59.
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aesthetic zone within the temple of art, aesthetics reaches 
toward the glimmering abundance of life itself recognizing 
its interrelatedness and processuality, elusiveness and 
ambience. The autonomous and self -contained term 
aesthetics seeks support of the adjectives in order to move 
forward: we would rather talk of pragmatic aesthetics, 
engaged aesthetics, cognitive aesthetics, functional aesthetics, 
everyday aesthetics, practical aesthetics, or social aesthetics, 
or direct our attention to the particular aspects of reality 
and develop, among others, the aesthetics of violence, 
power, or politics, the aesthetics of the environment, built 
and natural, of public spaces or, so appropriate today, the 
aesthetics of ruins. This broadened perspective has revealed 
the power lingering within the aesthetic: the judgments 
of taste, conditioned by culture, politics, ideology and 
religion, and shaped by emotional needs, appear to be 
less subjective than the Kantian philosophy claimed. Our 
aesthetic sense can be guided or even manipulated to serve 
a specific agenda. On the other hand, we are more and more 
aware of the fact that it is aesthetic attraction and emotional 
attachment that enable us to cultivate a respectful attitude 
to the world around us.5
Art as the model of an aesthetic object 
The expansion of the scope of aesthetics has been 
interwoven into the major changes in the Western 
approach to what is, epitomizing the progress in science and 
decompartmentalization of reality perceived as processual, 
interrelated and dynamic. In the dust of the falling towers of 
metaphysics, the only way out seemed to be the reorientation 
of philosophy and a great ontological comeback – into the 
greening territories of direct experience threatening us with 
temporality and ruled by the principles of uncertainty.
5 Yuriko Saito, Everyday Aesthetics (Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 2007), p. 72.
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This altered – considerably humbler – worldview has 
opened up new perspectives for the dialogue between non- 
Western traditions and Western philosophy, encouraging 
the tendencies familiar to the Eastern thought: the radical 
turn to the human subject as the source of power to find 
a proper dwelling in the world; the processes of melting 
down the firm “I” of the modern idealistic philosophy 
into the multiplicity of drives or aggregates; the emphasis 
on the phenomenological “presentness” resulting in the 
re -evaluation of experience as both the source of and the 
guide to an understanding of the world.6 
The new paradigm has also manifested itself in the 
expanded scope of what we perceive and appreciate as art. 
Having torn down the conventional genre boundaries, the 
limitations of the self -contained identity and the traditional 
forms of presentation and reception, art has literally become 
frameless, blurring the established standards of the aesthetic 
evaluation. The new functions of art have required both 
art and artists to acquire new virtues – the increased self-
awareness, the courage of a  mythical warrior and the 
sharpness of sight, since art should not only be able to keep 
pace with the human journey into the core of our existence 
but it also has to move forward to the vanguard and become 
not so much the answer as the precious Promise of an answer 
to the persistent asking about the Sense. This impossible 
task has involved the permanent revolution in the name 
of the truth concealed within the world but “setting” itself 
in a work of art. (“The nature of art would then be this: 
the truth of beings setting itself to work. […] The art work 
opens up in its own way the Being of beings.”7) Thus, art 
6 Cf. Maria Korusiewicz, “Between the Fields of Fear and Gardens 
of Compassion: The Approach to Nature in Western and Japanese 
Tradition,” in Civilisation and Fear: Anxiety and the Writing of the 
Subject, eds. Wojciech Kalaga and Agnieszka Kliś (Cambridge: 
Cambridge Scholars Publishing, 2012).
7 Martin Heidegger, “Origin of the Work of Art,” in Art and Its 
Significance, ed. Stephen David Ross (Albany, NY: SUNY Press, 1994), 
pp. 259, 261.
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has grown to the status of discourse, opening the space of 
freedom explored by arbitrary artistic choices. 
However, freedom and autonomy have also brought about 
some perturbing consequences, almost transparent for the 
audiences. The barriers set by the traditional perception 
of the ethical or the moral as inherent in art have melted 
down allowing for harsh diagnoses.8 In spite of its shrill 
sonority, art has come before the abyss of silence becoming 
the “pitiless art” of Paul Virilio.9 The reality of the “outside” 
world has once more become just an inexhaustible reservoir 
of resources, used or disregarded at the whim of an artist 
rarely burdened with any concern except the final artistic 
vision.10 Art, despite its ostensible “mixing” with reality, 
breaking through all the barriers of the past and being 
apparently embedded in the lambency of life, in fact never 
loses its distinctiveness, its own narration. John Cage’s 1952 
composition 4’33”, performed in the absence of deliberate 
sound, has served as the illustration of this distinctiveness 
 8 Art employing the Heideggerian concept of aletheia – the 
concealed truth that requires unconcealment, unearthing – has been 
fated to the indifference and anaesthetization of a surgeon’s instrument 
cutting into the body of our existence (Walter Benjamin’s term, p. 534), 
and brutalization of means (Andrzej Zybertowicz, Poznanie i przemoc: 
stadium z nie ‑klasycznej filozofii wiedzy (Toruń: Uniwersytet Mikołaja 
Kopernika, 1995). Contemporary debates eagerly place modernism with 
its visions of transformation of the world, revolution and rebirth at 
the foundation of fascist concepts (Cf. Roger Griffin, Modernism and 
Fascism. The Sense of a Beginning under Mussolini and Hitler [London: 
Palgrave, MacMillan, 2007]) developing much older statements: 
“Instead of being based on ritual it begins to be based on another 
practice – politics.” Walter Benjamin, “The Work of Art in the Age of 
its Technical Reproductibility,” in Art and Its Significance, ed. Stephen 
David Ross (Albany, NY: SUNY Press, 1994), p. 529. 
 9 Cf. Paul Virilio, Art and Fear (Continuum: New York, 2006).
10 Freedom in its best form should be founded as a moment of 
construction of one’s identity in relation to the context of the world. 
Cf.  Maria Korusiewicz, “Czy pozwolić bytowi być, czyli zapiski 
o rytuałach wolności w sztuce,” in Rytuały codzienności, eds. Anna 
Węgrzyniak and Tomasz Stępień (Katowice: Wydawnictwo WSZOP, 
2008), p. 72.
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for the last six decades. Within the time frame of four 
minutes and thirty three seconds the everyday with all its 
implications is cut out of its context and raised to the meta- 
level, becoming a complex semiotic entity. 
The distinctiveness of art was paralleled by the 
distinctiveness of aesthetics seen as the philosophy of 
art. Its famous “crisis”11 repeatedly proclaimed in the 
twentieth century was just another name for the quest for 
more efficient demarcation lines that would preserve the 
separation of art from the factual. Aesthetics, overlooking 
the importance of the world beyond art, failed to account 
for the major part of our aesthetic life. The wide range of 
propositions, from the formalism of Clive Bell and Edward 
Bullough and “art -as -experience” of John Dewey to Arthur 
Danto’s powerful idea of “the artworld,” Monroe Beardsley’s 
contribution, or the texts presented in the bulky anthologies 
edited by Joseph Margolis and William Kennick,12 despite 
the crucial differences in the construction of aesthetic 
paradigms, revolved around the work of art as a model 
object of aesthetic appreciation. As Berleant and Carlson 
state:
At one extreme is the old idea of disinterested 
contemplation of the sensuous and formal 
11 One of the most influential publications on the subject was 
Kryzys estetyki, ed. Maria Gołaszewska (Kraków: PWN/Uniwersytet 
Jagielloński, 1983). 
12 Cf.: Clive Bell, Art (London: Chatto and Windus, 1914); Edward 
Bullough, “ ‘Psychical Distance’ as a Factor in Art and as an Aesthetic 
Principle,” British Journal of Psychology 5 (1912): 87–117; John Dewey, Art 
as Experience (1934), vol. 10 of The Later Works, 1925–1953, ed. Jo Ann 
Boydston (Carbondale: Southern Illinois University Press, 1987); Arthur 
Danto, “The Artworld,” Journal of Philosophy 61, no. 19 (1964): 571–584; 
George Dickie, Aesthetics, An Introduction (New York: Pegasus, 1971); 
Monroe C. Beardsley, Aesthetics: Problems in the Philosophy of Criticism 
(New York: Harcourt Brace & World, 1958); Philosophy Looks at the 
Arts; Contemporary Readings in Aesthetics, ed. Joseph Margolis (New 
York: Charles Scribner’s Sons, 1962); Art and Philosophy; Readings in 
Aesthetics, ed. William Kennick (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1964).
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properties of isolated and solitary objects of art 
and, on the other, the new paradigm of emotionally 
and cognitively rich engagement with cultural 
artifacts, intentionally created by designing 
intellects, informed by both art historical 
traditions and art critical practices, and deeply 
embedded in a complex, many -faceted artworld.13
Today, at the beginning of the new century, what 
seems to be a challenge for Western art appears to be an 
almost natural path for aesthetics; the transgression of 
its established boundaries is a  pending process. So, we 
have left, as Arnold Berleant argues, “the beautifully cut 
diamond of an art object in order to immerse ourselves 
in its environment discovering its aesthetic dimension.”14 
Challenging traditional theory, Berleant postulates the 
need of aesthetics that would be open to both art and the 
non -art. Wolfgang Welsch, discussing similar issues, goes 
even further, suggesting that aesthetics that would embrace 
the full scope of human sensuality and human experience 
should place the aesthetic at the foundation of human 
existence in the world.15 However, according to the majority 
of scholars,16 in order to succeed, it needs its criteria, 
objectives and hierarchy of values to be redefined with 
respect to the variety of fields of interests, in which neither 
the distinctive space of the artworld nor the communication 
13 Arnold Berleant and Allen Carlson, Introduction to The Aesthetic 
of Natural Environments, eds. Arnold Berleant and Allen Carlson 
(Toronto: Broadview Press, 2004), p. 13.
14 Arnold Berleant, Prze ‑myśleć estetykę, trans. Maria Korusiewicz 
and Tomasz Markiewka, (Kraków: Universitas, 2007), p. 10.
15 Cf. Wolfgang Welsch, Estetyka poza estetyką, trans. Katarzyna 
Guczalska (Kraków: Universitas, 2005).
16 Christopher Dowling has proposed a more limited task, relying 
on the criteria associated with the paradigmatic art. For Dowling 
critical significance and discursiveness are a guaranty of high aesthetic 
value and cannot be replaced by elusive criteria and intuitive opinions. 
Cf. Christopher Dowling, “The Aesthetics of Daily Life,” British Journal 
of Aesthetics 50, no. 3 (2010): 225–242. 
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necessary in the practical applications of the theories based 
on the expressive functions constitute a sufficient plane of 
reference. Thus the perception of the aesthetic blooming 
around us, beyond the limits of art, forces us to start such 
an investigation from new locations: from the multiplicity 
of phenomena of the everyday, approached, as Yuriko Saito 
maintains, on their own terms. 
The everyday and aesthetic thought
The aesthetics of the everyday constitutes an influential 
field within the contemporary aesthetic theory with 
dozens of publications and growing impact on the altered 
perception of the nature of aesthetic experience.17 Its origins 
are usually found in the proposition of John Dewey, who, 
as early as in 1934, suggested redirecting attention from the 
17 The early studies pointing towards the everyday include: Joseph 
Kupfer, Experience as Art: Aesthetics in Everyday Life (Albany, NY: State 
University of New York Press, 1983); David Novitz, The Boundaries 
of Art: A Philosophical Inquiry into the Place of Art in Everyday Life 
(Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 1992); Crispin Sartwell, The 
Art of Living: Aesthetics of the Ordinary in World Spiritual Traditions 
(Albany, NY: State University of New York Press, 1995); Thomas Leddy, 
“Everyday Surface Aesthetic Qualities: ‘Neat’, ‘Messy’, ‘Clean’, ‘Dirty’,” 
Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism 53, no. 3 (summer, 1995): 
259–268; Kevin Melchionne, “Artistic Dropouts,” in Aesthetics: The 
Big Questions, ed. Carolyn Korsmeyer (New York: Blackwell, 1998); 
Yuriko Saito, “Everyday Aesthetics,” Philosophy and Literature 25, no. 
1 (2002): 87–95; Arnold Berleant, Art and Engagement (Philadelphia: 
Temple University Press, 1993); and Richard M. Shusterman, Pragmatist 
Aesthetics: Living Beauty, Rethinking Art (Oxford: Blackwell, 1992). 
(The above choice of literature is based on the list included in Kevin 
Melchionne’s publication “Aesthetic Experience in Everyday Life: 
A Reply to Dowling,” British Journal of Aesthetics 51, no. 4 (2011) 51: 
437–442. Within the last decade the major publication appears to be 
Everyday Aesthetics by Yuriko Saito, a Japanese philosopher currently 
living and lecturing in the United States. The study is the outcome of 
the author’s research conducted for more than twenty years. Cf. Yuriko 
Saito, Everyday Aesthetics (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007).
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world of so -called art to the practices of everyday existence, 
granting the still ennobling status of aesthetic experience 
to the sound -vision -and -smell of “the fire engine rushing 
by” or to “the delight of the housewife in tending her 
plants.”18 Although particular aspects of Dewey’s account 
are frequently criticized for clinging to the artistic object 
as a model of aesthetic appreciation (the idea of qualitative 
unity, closure or consummation) his general concept is still 
valid today. 
Contemporary approaches cover a large field of interests 
and issues, yet, despite the multiplicity of arguments and 
concepts, they seem to share some traits that most authors 
recognize and define.19
Firstly, the turn towards ordinary moments of our 
existence entails the re -evaluation of the full scope of 
human sensuality, including the neglected contact senses 
of smell, taste and touch.20 Thus the notion of aesthetic 
experience, contemplative and (frequently) disinterested in 
the case of art, should also embrace action -oriented, often 
unreflected, or intuitive judgments and the emotionally 
engaged appreciation of phenomena whose qualities 
have never been included within the traditional scope of 
aesthetics. The messy, the neat, the dirty and the clean, 
the new, the fresh or the prime and the old, the decayed 
or the decomposed, or even the blooming or the withered, 
the dried out or the muddy: these qualities marking the 
temporary stages of the ever -changing, transient world 
around us have been traditionally inscribed into the plane 
inferior to the paradigmatic art of the Western tradition. We 
should not forget that in our history the common factor for 
the denigration of the phenomenal reality, both in religious 
and philosophical terms, was its major inherent feature: 
18 Dewey, Art as Experience, p. 9.
19 Recognizing the significance of Yuriko Saito’s contribution I will 
frequently refer to her concepts as the most influential in the field.
20 Cf. Carolyn Korsmeyer, Making Sense of Taste; Food and 
Philosophy (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1999). The subject is also 
discussed by Arnold Berleant, Emily Brady, and Richard Shusterman. 
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its phenomenal, temporary nature, the impermanence 
of all things and, consequently, their imperfection. The 
inherent properties of bodily experiences, their natural 
relation to the basic instincts of sexuality and survival, 
were perceived as offensive both to the Western sense of 
morality and the idea of beauty, typically identified with the 
aesthetic. However, if we look underneath the surface of the 
philosophical tradition, it appears that the contemptuous 
approach to these experiences, which threaten us with the 
close contact with broadly understood contamination and 
dirt, derives from the depths of our biological and human 
history, as Mary Douglas proves in her famous study Purity 
and Danger.21 Therefore, the task of changing this position 
undertaken by everyday aesthetics seems to be a challenge, 
requiring educational projects and carefully prepared 
campaigns. 
The other issue, frequently brought up by the 
cognitivists, among others Allen Carlson, is the need 
for some structuring of “free” and direct experience of 
the everyday in order to find the space for the necessary 
minimum of a contemplative, intellectual element. This 
gesture towards the Kantian aesthetics is accompanied by 
acknowledging the relevance of knowledge, derived from 
both common sense and science, and some training in 
aesthetic perception of things. 
We cannot appreciate everything; there must be 
limits and emphases in our aesthetic appreciation 
of nature as they are in our appreciation of art. 
Without such limits and emphases our experience 
[…] would only be ‘a meld of physical sensations’ 
without any meaning or significance. It would be 
what William James calls a ‘blooming, buzzing 
confusion’.22
21 Cf. Mary Douglas, Purity and Danger (New York: Routledge, 
1996).
22 Allen Carlson, “Appreciation and the Natural Environment,” in 
The Aesthetic of Natural Environments, p. 71. 
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The validity of this viewpoint may be questioned 
within the scope of environmental aesthetics, especially 
the aesthetics of nature, weather, and the similar, where 
the metaphysical element is always powerful and allows for 
pure elation, it seems well justified in reference to the built 
environments and the artefacts of the everyday. 
Another crucial issue is the authorial identity and the 
originality of a work of art. These essential requirements of 
a modern artwork have no equivalent in the everyday where 
the individual “author” is usually nonexistent, and things 
happen, exist or function as a result of cumulative efforts, 
circumstances and, frequently, chance. Thus instead of 
discursive properties and the quest for the author’s message 
and intention, we talk about sensual experience, pragmatic 
sources of appreciation, practical values of a given object, 
and possibilities of further transformations due to human 
activity or natural causes. Here, things can be modified, 
repaired, re -painted, cleaned, put into parts, or organized 
into collections, they are subjected to environmental factors, 
biological or geological processes, climate changes and so 
on. On the other hand, natural objects or phenomena – 
a thunderstorm, a flock of birds in the sky, grey pebbles in 
the river – are frequently beyond our reach. Their aesthetic 
qualities also change, just as the ways of experiencing them 
aesthetically, since no stable identity is required within the 
realm of the everyday. The very nature of reality makes us 
experience things as forming the general pattern of life, 
since objects, moments, actions and phenomena never 
appear separately, like framed paintings in a museum or 
successive pieces performed by an orchestra. The ontology 
of the everyday is its interrelatedness.23 Let me quote Saito:
When we experience non -art objects, we do 
identify objects in many ways: the corner stone, 
the oak tree in my front yard, my black dress, Old 
Faithful, my office at school, and so on. However, 
23 Melchionne, Aesthetic Experience in Everyday Life, p. 6.
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they are subject to vicissitudes and are always 
experienced in certain temporal context which 
changes the nature of our experience.24
The third frequently observed trait is looking for 
inspiration in non -Western traditions, especially Japanese 
culture famous for its aesthetically -oriented design objects 
enhancing the quality of everyday life. The aesthetic 
sensibility and appreciation of the temporal, transient 
phenomenality is the core of the Japanese aesthetic tradition, 
where gestures and actions, objects and the environment 
constitute a dynamic, aesthetically vibrant reality, which, 
however, does not affect the importance of more Western 
kinds of artistic phenomena such as literature, theatre or 
fine arts. The paradox of simultaneous distinctiveness and 
unity of both types in terms of their aesthetic evaluation 
seems to be the most intriguing question for Western 
observers. 
The traditional Buddhist philosophy also offers some 
irreplaceable notions grasping the aesthetic values reflecting 
the impermanence of things and dynamic unity of all 
beings. The most basic one is the famous idea of emptiness. 
Originally understood as no -thing -ness, over the centuries 
has been transformed into a virtue of emptying one’s ego 
in order to “see” the world: to become one with the world 
while remaining oneself. 
Cultivation of artistic excellence requires 
‘emptying’ one’s ego, whether painting, poetry- 
making, garden design, arranging flowers, tea 
ceremony, or martial arts. The treatment of 
materials and subject matters in these art forms 
helps us cultivate an aesthetic sensibility by 
listening to the object’s voice, respecting its native 
disposition.25 
24 Saito, Everyday Aesthetics, p. 25.
25 Yuriko Saito, “Future Directions for Environmental Aesthetics,” 
a presentation prepared for the conference Old World and New World 
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When we replace the typical confrontational model of 
relationships of the Western world with the one derived 
from the ancient Buddhist idea of all -encompassing 
compassion26, we come close to understanding both the 
paradigm of the logic of paradox – is and yet is not – 
underlying the process of emptying the ego to raise it to 
its fullness, and the continuity of all forms, separate, yet 
forming a unity.27 
Zen Buddhism as a philosophy is extremely controversial. 
Its opponents claim that the essence of Zen is non -mental, 
and conditioned by “no method. Man only attains correct 
vision from the moment when no idea, no fabrication of 
the mind any longer comes between him and the fact.”28 
Others argue that behind the meditative practices of Zen 
hides a  deep and sublime philosophy, developed over 
the centuries.29 The logic of paradox as the core of Zen 
Buddhism also constitutes the underpinnings of aesthetic 
appreciation in Japanese culture; it is direct, yet mediated by 
tradition, just like famous traditional viewing of blooming 
cherry trees, watching the moon, or tea ceremony.30 
Perspectives on Environmental Philosophy 2011 in the International 
Society of Environmental Ethics, Nijmegen, 14–18. 06. 2011, p. 2. 
26 “Compassion always signifies that the opposites are one in the 
dynamic reciprocity of their own contradictory identity […]. If the 
concept of compassion has not been foundational for Western culture 
then I think there is a basic difference between Eastern and Western 
cultures in this regard.” Kitaro Nishida, Last Writings. Nothingness and 
the Religious Worldview trans. and ed. David A. Dilworth (Honolulu: 
University of Hawaii Press, 1987), p. 106.
27 The logic of paradox (Jap. hari no ri) based on the contradictory 
identity of the opposites, is claimed to be the dominant logical paradigm 
of the Japanese Zen Buddhism philosophy. Cf. Agnieszka Kozyra, 
Filozofia zen (Warszawa: PWN, 2004), p. 10.
28 Robert Linssen, Living Zen, trans. Diana Abrahams -Curiel (New 
York: Allen and Unwin, 1958), p. 46.
29 Masao Abe, Zen and Western Thought (Honolulu: University of 
Hawaii Press, 1985), p. IX.
30 Japanese aesthetics also recognizes the aesthetic distance and the 
contemplative type of experience, i.e. enjoying the view of a dry garden 
(karesansui), or viewing the moon.
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Much more “liberated” way of appreciating things 
aesthetically is suggested by the authors echoing Taoist 
tradition, the most frequently quoted among which seems 
to be a cultural geographer Yi -Fu Tuan. 
An adult must learn to be yielding and 
careless like a child if he were to enjoy nature 
polymorphously. He needs to slip into old clothes 
so that he could feel free to stretch out on the hay 
beside the brook and bathe in the meld of physical 
sensations; the smell of the hay and of horse 
dung; the warmth of the ground, its hard and 
soft contours; the warmth of the sun tempered 
by breeze; the tickling of an ant […] the sound of 
water over the pebbles […]. Such an environment 
might break all the formal rules of euphony and 
aesthetics, substituting confusion for order and 
yet be wholly satisfying.31
The Taoist concept of wu wei, letting things go, accepting 
them as they are and immersing oneself in the flow of 
existence, poses a challenge for Western thought scared 
of substituting confusion for order, or losing control over 
the polymorphous experience. However, Chinese insights 
seem to be more tempting for the aesthetics of the natural 
environment, as the numerous studies of Graham Parkes 
demonstrate.
Old cultures of the Far East are hardly the only traditions 
in which we seek models of the long forgotten communion 
of man and the world. Similar intuitions and the opulence 
of motifs is also found in these cultural traditions which 
pre -date art, or in contemporary tribal cultures, i.e. 
Australian Aborigines or Native Americans, which tend 
to see the world as the continuum of processes, with the 
aesthetic and the moral, the spiritual and the mundane, 
31 Yi -Fu Tuan, quoted by: Allen Carlson, “Appreciation and the 
Natural Environment,” p. 70. 
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the individual and the common rarely separated. So -called 
folk art, crafts, traditions, rituals and myths reveal the 
social functions of the aesthetic qualities of the everyday 
phenomena, creating what today we would like to call “the 
aesthetic welfare,”32 so desirable in our troubled times. On 
the other hand, while learning from the others, Western 
aesthetics of the everyday is deeply interested in its own 
“here and now”, and “does not need to be exoticized to 
justify its importance and claim its full impact.”33 What it 
aims at is the aesthetic awareness that opens our senses and 
our mind to the world we live in.
The forth, and the last issue is the blurred distinction 
between the ethical or moral and the aesthetic. The growing 
recognition of the ethical dimension of aesthetic choices, 
judgments and experiences has significantly changed both 
the theoretical and practical approaches to the functions 
of the aesthetic in private interpersonal space as well as 
in public spaces. The ramifications of this link are so far-
reaching that it deserves a closer examination. 
The aesthetic of the everyday and public spaces 
The aesthetics directed towards our environment and 
our everyday existence plays “a crucial role in our collective 
project of world -making.”34 The results of its application 
can range from the threatening, negative impact to the 
positive influence on people’s life. The twentieth -century 
experiences of ideological and political relevance of the 
aesthetic in public spaces revealed its violent manipulative 
power and its persuasive strength. It possesses all the 
properties of the perfect instrument to control people’s 
32 Yrjö Sepänmaa, “Aesthetics in Practice: Prolegomenon,” in 
Practical Aesthetics in Practice and in Theory, ed. Martti Honkanen 
(Helsinki: University of Helsinki Press, 1995), p. 15.
33 Saito, Everyday Aesthetics, p. 3.
34 Saito, “Future Directions for Environmental Aesthetics,” p. 2.
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emotions and sentiments, to shape group identities or instil 
nationalistic or ideological pride. The type of architecture, 
urban design, colours of the flag or stripes on a prisoner’s 
jacket convey messages whose influence is irresistible, yet 
the codes remain almost transparent. The invisible wars 
are being fought before our very eyes. The public space 
appears to be neither the space of a free person, as the 
Greeks claimed, nor of the consensus of the well -educated 
promoted by the Enlightenment idea described by Jürgen 
Habermas. 
The downfall of the public space is brought about by 
the impossibility of a rational debate, which is prevented 
by the fact that the discourses taking place within this 
space involve a  whole range of contradictory interests. 
In the fragmented reality it seems more effective to allow 
for a number of diverse discourses, which are transient 
but exist both in the institutional sphere and beyond it. 
Art is best positioned to fulfil this role when it annoys, 
provokes and criticizes, but at the same time comments 
on the events taking place in this reality. And whereas the 
place of art in the contemporary Western cultures appears 
well -established: art is critical, the status of traditional 
aesthetics is ambivalent. 
This ambivalence is diminished in the approach 
suggested by everyday aesthetics: the positive aesthetic 
qualities manifested in the everyday facilitate the conscious 
building of good relations with our environment and with 
people around us. The foundation of such good relations is 
knowledge, empathy and attention enabling us to approach 
otherness without violating its nature “on its own terms.” 
Saito, the author of this concept, derives it from the 
definition of a good person given by Yi -Fu Tuan.
One kind of definition of a good person, or 
a moral person, is that the person does not impose 
his or her fantasy on another. That is, he or she 
is willing to acknowledge the reality of other 
individuals, or even of the tree or the rock. So to 
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be able to stand and listen. That to me is a moral 
capacity, not just an intellectual one.35
The moral urge to “empty one’s ego” expressed by 
kindness and benevolence is a matter of pedagogy rooted in 
the traditions of a given society, community or family. This 
moderate cognitive approach is shared by James Howard 
Kunstler, the author of Geography of Nowhere (1993), 
who looks for remedies for our deteriorating landscapes, 
“housing tracts, mega -malls, junked cities and ravaged 
countryside that make up the everyday environment” we 
have to face. Kunstler argues that “the culture of good 
place -making like the culture of farming or agriculture is 
a body of knowledge and acquired skills.”36 Therefore, it 
requires educational efforts directed towards the cultural 
traditions and aiming at the future positive development. 
However, our contemporariness does not conduce easily to 
such projects of community making; we suffer a shortage of 
tools which would provide desirable solutions. Our cultural 
core is formed by autonomy, independence and weak social 
ties and networks, hence the necessity of supplementing 
them with additional layers of skills and emotions that 
would build tight social ties and promote our participation 
in social networks.
Among the possible options, everyday aesthetics has 
been gaining ground. Its major advantage is that it combines 
the aesthetic and the ethical as two essential components 
of culture generating values and shaping relations with 
the environment. Their association echoes the estimable 
35 Yi -Fu Tuan, after: Yuriko Saito, “Appreciating Nature on Its 
Own Terms,” in Nature, Aesthetics and Environmentalism, eds. Allen 
Carlson and Sheila Lintott (New York: Columbia University Press, 
2008), p. 151.
36 James Howard Kuntsler, after: Wendy Mcclure and Fred 
A. Hurand, “Re -engaging the Public in the Art of Community Place-
Making,” in: Downtowns: Revitalizing the Centers of Small Urban 
Communities, ed. Michael A. Burayidi (New York: Routledge, 2001), 
p. 107.
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ideas of the past where kalos was close to kagathos, and 
philosophical theory was meant to serve the praxis of life. 
Linking the two spheres has a profound impact on the 
evaluation of traditional instrumentation of art -centred 
aesthetics. 
Aesthetic value fit for disinterested contemplation of 
a work of art, alienated from the ethical sphere and from 
the natural world and, eventually, informing the view of 
the world becomes a false value,37 a sign of passivity and 
helplessness in the face of the cumulating dilemmas of 
contemporariness. Overcoming the comfortable habits of 
looking though the pane of glass and engaging aesthetics in 
the affairs of the daily life, as postulated by Berleant or Saito, 
is a reasonable proposition since our aesthetic response to 
them has a surprising degree of power in shaping the world 
and, subsequently, the quality of life.38 
Aesthetics directed towards the everyday, engaged and 
active, cannot avoid the ethical evaluation, taking into 
account the relationship between people’s aesthetic reaction 
to a given phenomenon and their decisions. The positive 
reaction encourages protective gestures, the negative one 
results in indifference, neglect or rejection. The impact 
of such evaluations on our environment hardly needs 
an explanation. What is more, the appropriation of this 
power of the aesthetic may serve specific social purposes, 
from environmental policy, through health services or 
educational projects, to so -called participative designs 
engaging the public in building the common space. This 
strategy, however, in light of historical facts, “needs to 
negotiate between two poles: aestheticizing certain objects 
and phenomena and at the same time being mindful of the 
agenda it is meant to serve.”39 
In this perspective aesthetic judgments should be both 
informed and in accord with ethics. Saito emphasizes the 
37 Berleant, Prze ‑myśleć estetykę, p. X.
38 Cf. Saito, “Future Directions for Environmental Aesthetics,” p. 1.
39 Cf. Saito, Everyday Aesthetics, p. 246.
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fact that the basis of everyday aesthetic is moral -aesthetic 
judgments of artefacts and actions relating to the vibrant 
fabric of everyday existence. There is enough room there 
for trivia – wrapping and unwrapping of gifts, setting the 
table for the family reunion and cooking for your loved 
ones, or using bleach to preserve the wonderful whiteness 
of your clothes and driving a huge SUV, the trendiest of 
status vehicles. However, more consequential things are 
also in focus – designing people -friendly public buildings, 
preserving endangered species even if they are not attractive 
to an average viewer, or putting hoardings in the middle 
of pristine landscapes and localizing garbage dumps in the 
vicinity of a public beach.
Let me call these judgments “moral -aesthetic” 
for want of a better term […] I hold that these 
judgments are aesthetic judgments insofar as 
they are derived from our sensuous (often bodily) 
experience of the objects, different from other 
moral judgments.40 
These judgments refer to the notions that are rarely 
brought up in the context of aesthetics, but in this case, 
do affect the aesthetic values: respect for the matter and/
or creative process, respect for the people participating in 
these processes and for intended users41; humility in the 
face of the task; responsibility for one’s actions, and, most 
importantly, care. Donald Norman, the author of The 
Design for Everyday Things, puts emphasis on the fact that 
what really matters is “care, planning, thought and concern 
for others.”42 All of these can be epitomized in the concept 
of thoughtfulness, “Thoughtfulness is beautiful.”43 
Transgressing the private space, thoughtfulness appears 
to be the essential prerequisite of two powerful ideas: the 
40 Ibidem, p. 208.
41 Ibidem, p. 207.
42 Ibidem.
43 Mariel Semal, quoted in: Saito, Everyday Aesthetics, p. 208.
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concept of the basic life good within the sphere of the 
commons, and the notion of aesthetic welfare achieved 
through the working of our emotional system engaged 
in the social patterns of positive communication. Helmut 
Hirsch, an American neurobiologist, points out: 
There is a saying, – It is our emotions that 
make us think. As I see it, an increase in goodness 
requires going beyond the intellectual approaches 
to the situations we face: we must reach into 
the deeper and hopefully broader emotional 
underpinning of all that we say and do. To 
increase goodness we must develop perspectives 
and approaches that include it all.44 
Nourished by our emotions, the aesthetic founded on 
thoughtfulness would also refer to the category of work as 
defined by John Locke, i.e. determining the intuitive sense 
of property and the natural need to direct our efforts to 
improve what is perceived as ours, yet shared with others. 
Using the title of Allen Carlson and Sheila Lintott’s book 
we may say that the path leads From Beauty to Duty.45
In this context Saito poses a controversial question opening 
the door to the normative aesthetics: “Can’t environmental 
aesthetics include not only an analysis of what ‘is’ our 
aesthetic response, but also an exploration of an ‘aesthetic 
ought’.”46 The issue, threatening the freedom of aesthetic 
judgments, remains unsolved but most aestheticians within 
the field of non -art aesthetics tend to agree.47 
44 Helmut Hirsch, “Confronting Our Emotional Brain. 
A Neuroscientist Views Humans at a Crossroads,” Old World and New 
World Perspectives on Environmental Philosophy 2011, p. 9.
45 Allen Carlson and Sheila Lintott, Nature, Aesthetics, and 
Environmentalism: From Beauty to Duty (New York: Columbia 
University Press), 2008.
46 Saito, “Future Directions for Environmental Aesthetics,” p. 6.
47 Those include Marcia Eaton, Emily Brady, and Ronald Hepburn, 
among others.
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Hence the link between the notion of thoughtfulness 
and the idea of the civil commons, with all its rights 
and duties, understood as a “human agency in personal, 
collective or institutional form which protects and enables 
the access of all members of a  community to basic life 
good.48” Basic life good will not grow without properly 
maintained channels of communication which can be 
supported by the aesthetic literacy directed towards the 
full scope of human environment, including art. To this 
end, everyday aesthetics functions as a form of positive 
social communication introducing the natural and built 
environment into the space of social relations. There 
emerges the notion of environmental justice in reference to 
the people, animals, plants, and places we live with. 
This short presentation of everyday aesthetics would 
be incomplete without at least signalling the issue of its 
general orientation towards the totality of existence, and 
the shift away from the purely anthropocentric point of 
view. Social communication embraces the non -human 
sphere as well, challenging the traditional western notions 
of nature and culture. Instead of placing them in opposition 
to each other, we should rather see them as the dynamic 
existential continuum of common existence. 
The most promising way to approach this continuum 
with respect, care and thoughtfulness and to retain the 
ability to wonder and enjoy its flow is the appreciation that 
would recognize the value of the category of gift with all 
its implications. According to Peter Barnes the social and 
natural environments we inhabit
have two common characteristics: they’re all gifts, 
and they’re all shared. A gift is something we 
receive, as opposed to something we earn. A shared 
48 John McMurtry (2001), quoted in: Daniel Mishori, “Concep-
tualizing the Commons: On the Rhetoric of Environmental Rights 
and Public Ownership,” Old World and New World Perspectives on 
Environmental Philosophy 2011, p. 12.
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gift is one we receive as members of a community, 
as opposed to individually. Examples of such gifts 
include air, water, ecosystems, languages, music, 
holidays, money, law, mathematics, parks, the 
Internet, and much more. These diverse gifts 
are like a river with three tributaries: ‘nature, 
community, and culture’. […] Indeed, we literally 
can’t live without it, and we certainly can’t live 
well.49
Final remarks
The development of the aesthetics of everyday, frequently 
used as an umbrella term for manifold aesthetic discourses 
focusing on the phenomena constituting our everyday 
environments, has brought about major changes in 
aesthetic theory. Everyday aesthetics is of limited autonomy, 
guided, at least partially, by knowledge provided by natural 
sciences and humanities. As the “engaged aesthetics” 
depending on emotions, sensuality and the directness of 
experience, it embraces the full range of forms of aesthetic 
appreciation, from contemplative through participative to 
active creation. It also has functional ramifications and the 
practical, teleological dimension. After all, “we are moved 
to act more often, more consistently, and more profoundly 
by the experience of beauty in all of its forms than by 
intellectual arguments, abstract appeals to duty, or even 
by fear.”50 
Its impact on everyday life signals the need of normative 
everyday aesthetics to be developed alongside the descriptive 
and meta -aesthetics (however, such decision would affect 
the subjectivity and freedom inherent in our aesthetic 
evaluations). Nevertheless, the return to moral -aesthetic 
49 Ibidem, p. 5. 
50 David Orr, quoted in: Saito, “Future Directions for Environmental 
Aesthetics,” p. 5.
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judgments forming the space of the ethical aesthetics opens 
the gates to new territories, rarely visited by philosophers, 
where cultural traditions of the moral and the ethical 
intertwined with the aesthetic may surprise us. 
Even if the future of everyday aesthetics is not obvious 
yet, it appears to be a positive turn in our philosophical 
tradition. The aesthetic discourse which has spread to the 
public or interpersonal spaces of our daily life returns to 
the dialogic situation, to the intimacy of an encounter. The 
functions of manipulation and control, so powerful in the 
institutionalized sphere of the commons, seem to have been 
weakened with the rise of aesthetic awareness of the value of 
the everyday, offering – together with cultivating aesthetic 
education – an alternative to the emphasis on mass culture 
or culture industry with its instruments of competitive 
pressure. We have an opportunity to re -discover the specific 
value of care, respect, and thoughtfulness in the realm 
of impermanence and imperfection, where the aesthetic 
engagement offers a possibility of designing our dwelling 
in the reality, a chance to find a place that suits our hand, 
a place of mutuality. In our daily life the implications of the 
aesthetic exceed the mere surplus of culture; it is a necessary 
condition of the “aesthetic welfare” of Yrjö Sepänmaa, “an 
ingredient necessary for a good society, along with justice, 
equality, freedom, and social welfare.”51 Aesthetic welfare as 
such should be included in the fourth generation of human 
rights, improving our common project of making a more 
friendly and more beautiful world.52 
51 Saito, “Future Directions for Environmental Aesthetics,” p. 3.
52 The classification of human rights is based on the idea of Karel 
Vasak, who in 1979 divided them into three generations, accordingly 
to the French Revolution’s motto of liberty, equality, fraternity. Thus 
the first -generation human rights deal essentially with the issue of 
freedoms. The second -generation human rights are related to equality, 
i.e. to institutions of social life. The third -generation human rights 
cover group and collective rights, such as community, the tribe and 
family, as well as healthy environment, intergenerational equity and 
sustainability. Today, most authors speak of the fourth generation of 
rights such as communication, privacy or copyrights. 
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Thus, sitting beside a river and reading a book, or resting 
under a tree and watching the ants, or eating home -made 
cookies and chatting with friends appears to be a serious 
matter. Especially, on a sunny day.
Part One
In Search of Description  
The Spatiality of Discourse  
and the Spatiality of Art

Aleksandra Kunce
Wonder and Anthropology*
1. Wonder and philosophy
What is wonder, astonishment – to qauma? It is 
a wonder, a thing of wonder, a wonderful picture, but also 
a  state of wondering, of being astonished and amazed. 
Astonishment provokes stupefaction and fear. Hence 
qaumazw (thaumadzo)/qaumazein (thaumadzein) means 
to wonder, to be astonished and amazed at something, 
to admire and applaud, to highly appreciate but also to 
venerate something.
In his work Theaetetus Plato writes that wonder is 
typical of philosophers, that there is no other way to start 
philosophizing but to be astonished and amazed.1 Aristotle 
repeats this conjunction of the origins of philosophical 
thinking and wonder.2 We learn that to love myth is to be 
in a way a philosopher, as myth is what satisfies wonder 
as a pure demand for knowledge, even though the orders 
of mythos and logos are diverse. Of the essence here is his 
* The chapter first published as “Wonder and Anthropology,” 
International Journal of the Humanities, vol. 9, issue 5 (2012): 123–136.
1 “I see, my dear Theaetetus, that Theodorus had a true insight into 
your nature when he said that you were a philosopher, for wonder is 
the feeling of a philosopher, and philosophy begins in wonder.” Plato, 
Theaetetus, trans. Benjamin Jowett, section 155D, accessed July 15, 2011, 
http://classics.mit.edu/Plato/theatu.html.
2 Aristotle, Metaphysics, trans. William David Ross, A2, 982b 18 ff, 
accessed July 16, 2011, http://classics.mit.edu/Aristotle/metaphysics.html. 
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pointing to the degrees of wonder and to the absence of 
practical interest, which sets wonder free and leads to 
rational investigation, or one that seeks reason -based 
foundations of things.
Astonishment is a stimulus which, in Jaspers’s words, is 
a constantly renewable source of philosophizing and not 
just a mere beginning in time that passes away. Therefore, 
wonder is a source of knowledge. What is thauma? It is 
a shock that goes with the recognition of things for the 
very first time. The old is recast as the new because it is first 
truly brought into focus. Astonishment upsets the usual 
order of things, especially in matters of everyday existence, 
it unsettles the routine of perception and questions the 
former experience and legitimization of things. Finally, 
it results in asking questions about the nature of the 
universe. It means recognizing something anew. But it is 
also a condition which, besides being open to the “new,” 
does not neglect of the “old.”3
Wonder stimulates us to pose a philosophical question 
– in disbelief, faced by the lack of clarity, out of concern. 
Wondering makes us discover our own ignorance. Hence 
the Socratic ignorance becomes the first step on the 
road to the real insight into things. Heidegger adds that 
astonishment is what constantly pervades philosophy and 
constitutes it anew each time.4 According to Krzysztof 
Pomian, philosophizing begins with the simultaneous 
experience of “recognizing the reality of what is seen and 
being struck and dumbfounded by the unreality of it.” 
Therefore, astonishment arises out of a sense of disparity 
between what is seen and what is expected.5
One should ponder the relationship between wonder 
and doubt. It begins with a common experience which 
gets transformed once the representation of reality ceases 
3 Dariusz Kulas, “O nomadycznej filozofii,” Anthropos? 6–7 (2006).
4 Martin Heidegger, What is Philosophy?, trans. William Kluback 
and Jean T. Wilde (London, 1968), p. 83.
5 Krzysztof Pomian, “Heidegger i wartości burżuazyjne. Rozmowa 
z Cezarym Wodzińskim,” Aletheia 4, no. 1 (1990).
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to be obvious. Is it, therefore, the case that wondering 
always means being in doubt? These are two great figures 
of thinking in philosophy, whose conjuncture is a driving 
force not just behind the growth of knowledge but also 
that of wisdom. Therefore, wonder and doubt are not only 
to help the philosopher gain a deeper insight but also to 
augment his or her wisdom. Hence the condition of being 
constantly astonished – which amounts to listening and 
observing in a different way, to being ready to renounce 
one’s former position, in a word, to being no longer rooted 
– is a self -effacing gesture of probing deep into reality, as 
well as an exercise in wisdom. 
2. Wonder and human condition
“Wonder is the basic characteristic of the human 
condition,” writes Jeanne Hersch.6 Very soon, however, 
doubts arise as to whether animals do not wonder too and 
whether the wondering of the homo sapiens sapiens species 
should indeed be so glorified. Yet what is most important 
is the very complexity of the typology of wonder. Hence 
I  wish to point to various kinds of wonder of different 
epistemic and existential significance.
One can wonder about something unusual also in 
a quick and superficial manner. This kind of astonishment 
is only a  brief contact with a  curiosity that soon fades 
away. It does not give rise to reflection, remaining just 
a condition of perpetual wondering that does not present 
an existential challenge. It is the sort of amazement felt 
by tourists in Capri,7 a commonplace of wonder, and, as 
Nietzsche sarcastically remarks, cows too “sometimes 
6 Jeanne Hersch, Wielcy myśliciele Zachodu. Dzieje filozoficznego 
zdziwienia, trans. Krzysztof Wakar (Warszawa: Prószyński i  S -ka, 
2001). 
7 Ryszard Kapuściński, Lapidarium III (Warszawa: Czytelnik, 
1997), p. 8.
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have a look of wondering which stops short on the path of 
questioning,” while the thinking of a sage is like a cloudless 
sky, the Horatian nil admirari.8 And, although Nietzsche 
does not deny the value of wonder as such, as I am going to 
argue in a little while, he does object to the folly of transient 
amazements and raptures. Such triviality and ordinariness 
of wonder does not translate into an activity that may be 
defined as “returning wonder to the world.” It refers to 
a situation when a sense of astonishment is fundamental 
and transformative enough to change the world. The 
interweaving of the philosophy of wonder with that of 
action is the noblest thing a human being can achieve. 
As discussed above, however, wonder, being ordinary and 
superficial, does not contribute anything to the world, and 
leaves a human intact. It is simply flat.
To do full justice to a  constellation of meanings the 
word spans, it is important to notice still another aspect. 
Natural as our capacity for wondering is, it is as common 
for us to turn our back on wonder in favour of a familiar 
image, a clearly defined order of things that is not subject 
to questioning. The fear of wonder entails a  flight into 
long -established systems of knowledge and affirmation of 
one’s social space as self -evident. We long to feel stable, 
trusting the immutable. But we also, at the same time, 
subject ourselves to the well -known regime of phrases like 
“normally,” “as ever” and “as it should be.” Is not wonder, 
therefore, traceable to the local? This is an idea I wish to 
discuss. I find it vital to point out that being amazed by 
place, one’s local environment, does not necessarily mean 
something negative. The anthropological rule of experience 
should make us conclude that amazement at the local is just 
a first step to examine one’s locality.
In the typology of wonder it is essential to emphasize 
the possibility of true wonder. One can be amazed and 
8 Friedrich Nietzsche, The Wanderer and His Shadow, section 313 
“The Monotone of the ‘Sage’,” accessed April 12, 2011, http://www.lexido.
com/EBOOK_TEXTS/THE_WANDERER_AND_HIS_SHADOW_.
aspx?S=313. 
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stupefied by nature, the experience of which is an encounter 
with the sublime, the ineffable and the infinite. It found 
its literal expression in the seventeenth -century work 
Telluris Teoria Sacra (Sacred Theory of the Earth) by 
Thomas Burnet, who wrote, recounting his experience of 
the mountains, that human thought naturally rises up to 
God and His magnitude, and anything that has the mere 
semblance of the infinite (which is whatever transcends 
our understanding) fills our mind with its immensity and 
excess, plunging us into a pleasant state of stupefaction and 
amazement.9 A sense of the sublimity of nature abounds 
with wonder.
Yet true astonishment is also one that affects human 
life and finds anxiety a source of transformative energy. 
It is the kind of astonishment that does not let certainty 
solidify. That is why Nietzsche called on his listeners to 
allow themselves to be surprised: he knew the pressure of 
an existential experience and moral image combined. In 
his words, whoever wants to see himself as he really is, has 
to allow himself to be surprised, with the torch in hand; as 
the spiritual is parallel to the corporeal, whoever has grown 
used to his looks in the mirror, forgets about his ugliness.10 
Hence astonishment is what lets one empty oneself of the 
knowledge possessed and makes one ready to question 
the former perception of things. Wonder then becomes 
tantamount to an existential metamorphosis. And this is 
a formula expressed most clearly but also most radically 
by Jean -Paul Sartre: is there anything more epistemically 
extreme than the experience of nausea stemming from the 
perception of the humdrum rhythms of street life?
This sort of creative wonder is important because 
without it there would be no receptivity to the new. 
Therefore, one should reconsider Nietzsche’s remarks on 
 9 Thomas Burnet, Telluris Teoria Sacra IX, in Historia piękna, ed. 
Umberto Eco, trans. Agnieszka Kuciak (Poznań: Rebis, 2005), p. 284. 
10 Friedrich Nietzsche, Human, All Too Human. A Book for Free 
Spirits, trans. Reginald John Hollingdale (Cambridge and New York: 
Cambridge University Press, 1996), vol. 2, part 2, section 316. 
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the thinker’s absent -mindedness, since all that interrupts 
our creative thinking and “disturbs” us in a  colloquial 
sense, should not only be received with calm,11 but also, 
to complete the philosopher’s statement, with receptivity 
to what is unheard -of and unpredictable. In the field of 
cultural praxis this notion of coming to terms with the 
unfamiliar was echoed by the formalists in their research 
on literature. In 1919 Viktor Shklovsky wrote his essay on 
art as a technique of defamiliarization which has to make 
its objects of description unusual and strange and is for 
that reason a form of perception marked with increased 
difficulty.12 Art being a result of discarding the routine of 
perception and hence an invitation to wonder was also 
an idea entertained by Bertold Brecht in his well -known 
formula of the “estrangement” effect (Verfremdungseffekt).13
The concern with wonder is frequently manifest in 
the figure of the child and childhood as a state of open-
mindedness and propensity for wondering. It does not 
stress infantile behaviour but an ever -expanding curiosity 
with the world and never-ending delight in knowledge. It 
is also a view quite easily found in Nietzsche’s writings. 
The philosopher is noted for having said that one needs 
to “know how to be little,” as this refers not only to the 
inclination for constant amazement but also to being as 
close to flowers, grass and butterflies as a  child who is 
hardly taller.14 Yet there is more to this remark than just 
an emphasis on the penchant for wonder: being “little” is 
to simultaneously affirm one’s position in the local, close 
to the earth, in natural experience. It refers to a sense of 
being rooted, without the usual alienation of a human from 
the environment. It also alludes to a dismissal of excessive 
11 Ibidem, section 342.
12 See Viktor Shklovsky, “Art as Technique,” in Literary Theory: 
An Anthology, eds. Julie Rivkin and Michael Ryan (Oxford: Blackwell 
Publishers, 1998), pp. 17–23.
13 See Anna Burzyńska and Michał Paweł Markowski, Teorie 
literatury XX wieku (Kraków: Znak, 2007), p. 119. 
14 Nietzsche, Human, All Too Human, section 51.3.
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humanism as, in Józef Maria Bocheński’s words, a form of 
“human idolatry.”15
This kind of wonder stems from a  personal attitude 
fuelled by curiosity. Curiosity in the face of an event gives 
rise to a sense of astonishment – which is easiest to arise 
while travelling, Ryszard Kapuściński points out, following 
as he does in Herodotus’s footsteps. To the question why 
indeed a person would make all the effort to go on a journey 
he would answer: out of curiosity, curiosity about the 
world.16 The main reason behind going abroad is a desire 
to understand oneself through the others. To be curious is 
to be ready to accept wonder as a shock.
Yet the kind of wonder stemming from curiosity does not 
necessarily lead to wisdom, as Leszek Kołakowski wrote in 
his lecture on travel, quoting the Latin proverb that those 
who run after wisdom overseas are more likely to affect 
the sky than their own minds – otherwise sailors would 
be wiser than theologians.17 One could argue, though, that 
to experience the world by contacting a concrete different 
culture, by enduring the hardships of a concrete journey, 
by wandering, is to empirically exercise oneself in wisdom 
better than through abstract reflection aimed at satisfying 
one’s curiosity. Is not a sailor wiser than a theologian? And 
what about a sailor theologian? Can a theologian exercising 
his mind and wisdom repudiate being a  sailor? Let us, 
however, leave the question now as it is going to surface 
again in the discussion of anthropology, as an important 
clue, an indication that wonder is not just a matter of abstract 
thinking but requires also some sort of empirical experience.
Another aspect of wonder is worth emphasizing here: 
one that concerns things within reach which are suddenly 
turned upside down, seen in different light, radically 
15 Józef Maria Bocheński, Sens życia i inne eseje (Kraków: Philed, 
1993), pp. 23–39.
16 See Ryszard Kapuściński, Travels with Herodotus, trans. Klara 
Glowczewska (New York: Random House Inc., 2008).
17 Leszek Kołakowski, “O podróżach,” in Mini ‑wykłady o maxi‑
sprawach (Kraków: Znak, 2003).
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transformed. The world of one’s own may also constitute 
an object of amazement, one that startles, puzzles, menaces 
and alienates. In his 1919 essay “Das Unheimliche” Freud 
describes it as a force capable of throwing our existence 
into complete disarray.18 Unheimlich, the uncanny, is the 
opposite of heimlich: that which is familiar, intimate, 
obvious, native, belonging to the home, cosy; the uncanny 
is threatening precisely because it makes strange what used 
to be one’s own. In this sense wonder, as an experience 
of the uncanny, is always uncomfortable: it is so because 
it lies beyond the comfort and self -evidence of familiar 
things. This seems also to bear on the theme of the local. 
The local has to be experienced as uncanny and menacing. 
It is necessary to leave one’s locality and then come back, 
a return that will never be a recurrence of the same. 
3. Wonder and textuality in field anthropology
Wonder is the basic figure of thinking we come across 
in field anthropologists. Lévi -Strauss wondered and 
recommended wondering to others, as a  force allowing 
one to sidestep the formerly established conventions of 
perception, in Ludwik Stomma’s anecdotal commentary.19 
Anthropology is an apotheosis of wonder and amazement 
at the diversity of the world’s cultures. It is where it posits 
its mythological starting point. Notes in diaries, memoirs, 
and monographs create a  textual realm that is hardly 
homogenous but has somehow been unified by wonder. The 
tension and divergence between, for example, a field diary 
and a monograph, today often viewed as a dissonance, is 
finally reinterpreted as a desperate attempt at fashioning 
18 Sigmund Freud, “The Uncanny,” in Literary Theory: An Anthology, 
eds. Julie Rivkin and Michael Ryan (Oxford: Blackwell Publishers, 
1998), pp. 154–167.
19 Ludwik Stomma, “Wstęp,” in Claude Lévi -Strauss, Smutek 
tropików, trans. Aniela Steinsberg (Łódź: Wydawnictwo “Opus”, 1992), 
p. VII. 
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one’s identity through narrative, to employ James Clifford’s 
reading.20 Yet is it not rather a “proof,” an indication of 
problems with astonishment? Furthermore, should these 
problems not provoke us to pose questions of methodology? 
For instance, how does anthropological wonder affect the 
lost localness, one that we take with us on a journey and then 
come back to, but also one that is imagined and imaginary? 
This is what I wish to consider. I am puzzled by the very 
dialectic of wonder. The anthropologist is a person who has 
to cherish wonder but at the same time cannot yield to it 
unconditionally, for that would mean surrendering to the 
exoticism of discourse. 
What does the dialectics of experiences look like then?
Textual testimonies show that the anthropologist has to be 
amazed by the familiar. It is an amazement stemming from 
a sense of estrangement: what used to be one’s own cannot 
be any longer taken for granted. Unsettling the self -evidence 
of one’s environment, rules of thinking, paradigms of 
behaviour, or systems of values means being alienated from 
the image of culture one previously appropriated and lived 
in. This image ceases to be the only possible and right one. 
It is a painful experience that Freud would probably have 
located in the already discussed idea of the unheimlich. The 
anthropologist has to be amazed by his or her own culture, 
in other words he or she has to find out that his or her matters 
and images of culture are no longer self -evident. It is a motif 
running through the work of all anthropologists. In terms 
of autobiographical narratives this kind of self -alienation 
and fashioning of identity is investigated by numerous 
theoreticians such as James Clifford, whose research revolves 
around the textual self -creation in Bronisław Malinowski’s 
work and the interpretation of functionalist discourse as 
a social and existential need.
20 James Clifford, The Predicament of Culture: Twentieth ‑Century 
Ethnography, Literature, and Art (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard 
University Press, 1988), pp. 21–54.
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Self -alienation portrayed as a shock is a notion present 
in Lévi -Strauss, for whom the researcher analysing culture 
is usually a subversive figure, a social misfit, one who has 
lost his or her roots.21 And when he or she has gone “there,” 
to the other side, they become highly conservative. But 
the estrangement from the familiar and absolute acts 
as a promise of the other, of that which expands mental 
horizons and reconnects with other people. It is quite 
another matter, however, that an anthropologist of the 
past would usually resort to the support of science; his 
escape was only seemingly neutral, a  confirmation of 
European relativism. This is what puzzles researchers 
nowadays providing descriptions of cultures on the meta- 
level. Meta -anthropology aims at a radical review of the 
rules of neutrality, scientific objectivity, the alleged view- 
from -nowhere of the discipline, its standards of certainty 
and detachment. It conducts a  close analysis of the 
ethnocentrism of thinkers whose habits of familiarization 
and cultural adjustment were based on European science. 
The meta -anthropological discourse cultivates the 
researchers’ wonder precisely on the meta -level, by trying 
to solve the problem why, indeed, one could have been 
so epistemically optimistic. Why did the amazement and 
doubt on the level of discourse never affect the discipline 
itself? It is, however, a  question that belongs more to 
the history of ideas and historical changing of scientific 
paradigms.
What is important here is a recognition of these two 
divergent aspects of wonder. One of them entails an 
affirmation of the home of one’s space as strange, no longer 
self -evident, one that has to be repudiated, together with its 
habits of absolutization. The other concerns a rejection of 
the self -evidence of the anthropological home conceived 
as the discourse of the discipline – whenever the 
anthropological writing turns out to be amazingly lacking 
in transparency.
21 Lévi -Strauss, Smutek tropików, p. 380.
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The next experience I  would like to mention here is 
a sense of amazement at the diversity of the world that one 
has to feel in order to be motivated to start one’s research. 
“The other as a source of wonder” has been a crucial motive 
for anthropology. However, in recent years when the object 
of anthropological research has itself been subject to much 
scrutiny, there has been a growing awareness of the way 
otherness was built on myth, and, what is more, on the 
key European myth created by the likes of Montaigne and 
Rousseau. On the one hand, it made for the higher status 
of the Other, no longer treated in the patronizing manner 
typical of conquerors and conquests, included instead 
(though somehow tentatively) in the human family; on the 
other hand, it was responsible for thinking about savages 
in terms of their supposed separateness and purity, which 
gave rise to the researcher’s desire to reach the primary 
uncontaminated culture awaiting to be discovered by the 
white.
The desire for what we dub here “white discovery” has 
been a great concern of European science, but also its great 
responsibility and, consequently, an important factor in 
its profit and loss account. “I wish I had lived at the time 
of real travelling,” confessed Lévi -Strauss, who wanted to 
touch uncontaminated worlds. This kind of wonder felt by 
the white who made themselves at home in an indigenous 
culture unknown to the Western world was rare even back 
in the 1930s, due to the rapid shrinking of areas that had not 
been explored yet by researchers. One is doomed to relive 
the predecessors’ experiences without much enthusiasm, but 
also without a shock, bemoan anthropologists.22 And even if 
one finds one’s “own savages,” as Lévi -Strauss did, one has 
the feeling that they are much too savage to be understood, 
that there is no key to them, because one does not know the 
language and there has not been any research done, and 
therefore one has to come back to already explored terrains, 
to “domesticated” savages, to continue one’s research.
22 Ibidem, p. 324.
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I find the fragment essential because it makes me aware 
of the fact that the desired otherness turns out to be its 
own punishment and that otherness as such is impossible 
to comprehend.23 At the same time, the promise of wonder 
will not materialize for most anthropologists who are 
conscious of the history of conquests and their encroaching 
upon territories marked by the previous contacts with the 
white – which leads to important dilemmas related to the 
absence of pure wonder. Not only Lévi -Strauss but also 
other anthropologists were aware that one always “loses” 
in confrontation with the field. An honest researcher 
concludes: no shock. If we are still amazed by anything, it 
is the strictly binary, either -or character of the situation. Yet 
on making the effort to go to the field, the anthropologist 
has to humbly accept this law of wonder which is a dialectic 
of longing for the promised amazement and the actual lack 
of amazement. Without the field experience and without 
knowing the dialectical way wonder works, one could not 
understand fieldwork at all. The tension is what allows for 
better insight into anthropological texts which are then 
read through the community of experience. This is what 
Nigel Barley touched upon, remarking that he was able to 
detect which fragments had been written in the manner 
that was deliberately vague, evasive, and artificial, or even 
which data were untrue and trivial, something he had not 
been capable of noticing before doing fieldwork.24 The 
tension and the final verdict “I have lost” is then no failure 
but an affirmed experience of the field worker, because it 
brings about social bonds and an awareness of the power 
of wonder. Is it possible to make sense of anthropology 
without taking into account this power of wonder to which 
one has to submit while in the field?
Afterwards, however, the anthropologist has to bring 
wonder under control. He or she becomes familiar with 
23 Ibidem, p. 331. 
24 Nigel Barley, Niewinny antropolog. Notatki z glinianej chatki, 
trans. Ewa T. Szyler (Warszawa: Prószyński i S -ka, 1997), p. 210. 
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the lack of self -evidence of his own culture. He or she 
is just curious about the difference and dissimilarity of 
distant worlds which are to be illuminated, ordered and 
explicated through systematic analysis and the whole 
scientific machinery. They are not supposed to be a source 
of wonder but to illustrate a  rational construction of 
different cultural patterns. So an anthropologist translates, 
interprets, provides descriptions and includes in the 
community of human culture, at the same time removing 
the stigma of otherness, exoticism and the uncanny from 
what is different. Knowledge restrains amazement. The 
anthropologist does not wonder or, we should rather 
say, does not wonder any more, because he or she has 
previously undermined what is their own and assimilated 
it to the other; he or she has also seen many things that have 
then been rendered epistemically familiar, as a result of 
scientific schematization. Their otherness is thus no longer 
strange. A text exemplifying best this absence of wonder 
and a resultant sense of dejection is Malinowski’s diary, 
where suspension, “blurring” of vision and fatigue drive 
wonder out. If the author is still amazed by anything, it 
is undoubtedly he himself. But the obsession to overcome 
fatigue and to eliminate all slackness makes him curb 
his wonder in favour of the monotony of research and 
the mundane rhythm of the diary.25 It is like a confession 
of an experienced person who is hardly ever astonished, 
nevertheless still hoping that suddenly something will 
upset his or her balance and self -evidence: the first wonder 
as an epistemic shock. It is like waiting for a  caesura, 
for the moment of epiphany in the life of the researcher 
bedeviled with constant disenchantment, a sense that there 
is no wonder and thus no source of power, as Lévi -Strauss 
noted.26 For he was less astonished than he had wanted.27 
25 Bronisław Malinowski, Dziennik w  ścisłym znaczeniu tego 
wyrazu, ed. Grażyna Kubica (Kraków: Wydawnictwo Literackie, 2002), 
pp. 470–472.
26 Lévi -Strauss, Smutek tropików, pp. 34–35.
27 Ibidem, p. 78.
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This absence of wonder makes the researcher of culture 
the opposite of a traveller. The latter’s sense of amazement, 
longing for adventure, freedom, individualism, struggle 
with oneself and insecurity provide a counterbalance to 
anthropological thinking. In anthropology the “I” has to be 
suppressed, what is behind is a scientific method, very often 
a whole school of research; this kind of formal thinking 
forces an individual to restrain his or her wonder and liking 
for adventure. In Geertz’s words, unlike the travel text, 
which by its very nature “describes one damn thing after 
another,” the ethnographic text has a thesis.28 That is why 
the first sentence of Tristes Tropiques (1955) is still one of 
the most significant sentences ever written in anthropology: 
“I  hate travelling and explorers.”29 The purpose of the 
anthropologist’s expedition is not to wonder, and the slides 
documenting it are not to torture friends or acquaintances 
from travelling societies. The anthropologist travels as if he 
or she did not travel at all. And, at the end of the day, which 
is actually a dramatic experience, he or she is very much 
surprised to find out that the hated travel is also there, that 
it has caught him or her off guard, something they wished to 
avoid at all costs. He or she is afflicted by identity problems 
and a sense of void. Yet it is only seemingly the researcher’s 
failure, since on second thoughts it remains a significant 
achievement, part of an exercise in humility during 
fieldwork. The weakening of methodicity of an expedition 
is interesting because it makes way for a human being. And 
this is not only a question of the anthropologist’s identity 
but also of the fact that in this seeming failure, in accepting 
inconsistency and contradiction in his or her research, the 
anthropologist proves that he or she has just touched upon 
the problem of recognizing what a human being is. The 
28 Clifford Geertz, Dzieło i życie. Antropolog jako autor, trans. Ewa 
Dżurak and Sławomir Sikora (Warszawa: Wydawnictwo KR, 2000), 
p. 57.
29 Claude Lévi -Strauss, Tristes Tropiques, trans. John Russel, 
accessed April 15, 2011, http://www.citeulike.org/user/chikuwabu/
article/272344. 
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failure to grasp something because it is difficult to classify 
unequivocally and not reducible to a system is clear proof 
of recognizing a problem.
This dialectic of wonder also leads to another revelation. 
The researcher is amazed by everything in the field. 
Conducting research means wondering at an every step. 
The very fieldwork is an object of wonder because it is not 
as transparent as one assumed, its order is not such as one 
expected, the work does not proceed linearly in stages, the 
natives do not play the role they are usually ascribed in 
books of methodology of field research, the anthropologist is 
not an objective and impartial researcher, notwithstanding 
the declarations, he or she fails to study what he or she 
wanted and comes across something else instead that is 
hardly unequivocal and definite enough to provide clear 
exemplification, etc. We are amazed by the fact that the 
future fieldwork experiences we project are so dramatically 
different and incompatible with what we encounter on the 
spot. The result is a clash. The relationships with the natives 
are at variance with the theory the researcher brings with 
him - or herself. Barley is constantly amazed by the field.30 
Lévi -Strauss bemoans trickery, deceit, theft, inequality 
of relations and the myth of equality one leaves Europe 
with and has to revise in order to be able to conduct any 
research whatsoever.31 Contemporary anthropology is 
capable of adapting this wonder for its purposes, as it 
well understands that cultures under examination do not 
constitute fully integrated beings which can be diagnosed 
and predicted while planning one’s research. But for 
classical anthropology wonder was no reason to boast 
about as the surprises and a sense of astonishment arising 
in the course of research led to a series of failures. Yet what 
interests me is still another consequence: the anthropologist 
is stunned by the local he or she encounters. This foreign 
localness is more than he or she can stand as it goes beyond 
30 Barley, Niewinny antropolog, p. 107.
31 Lévi -Strauss, Smutek tropików, pp. 126–135.
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the boundaries of familiar understanding and experience. 
On second thoughts, however, the work of the local, which 
is actually its major strength, resides in its capacity for 
stunning us with its otherness, for provoking simultaneous 
terror and delight. In epistemic terms, the contradiction is 
what wonder is all about.
It is also worthwhile to focus on another aspect of the 
experience. The researcher is a person of wonder to all – no 
one’s behaviour is more bizarre. He or she walks around, 
asks questions, exchanges gifts, makes sketches and notes, 
intrudes, is a busybody who never counts as one of “us,” and 
may not even be one of “them” (colonizers, missionaries, 
soldiers, administrators) because he acts in the name of 
scientific knowledge. Incidentally, bizarreness is also what 
protects him or her. This was witnessed by Barley, who 
wrote that he was about to join those “weird people.”32 
Doing research in the field means oscillating between 
the insider’s and the outsider’s view, without too much 
institutional involvement on the native ground.
The researcher is however primarily a person of wonder 
to him - or herself. He or she is alarmed by his or her 
narcissistic inclinations in the foreign land, familiar mental 
and moral habits, stable images of a human being and local 
time -space that have been brought to the new place. This is 
well documented by an anthropological diary: no other form 
of writing has been host to such an explosion of narcissism. 
It is a strange genre, fundamentally non -literary, rhetorically 
isolated from the world and not stylized as the display of 
intellectual acumen. The fieldwork diary is directed at an 
audience of one, since it is a message from the writing to 
the reading self, as Geertz wrote examining Malinowski’s 
Diary. And he asked if the inflation of the subject does not 
make the object shrink.33 It is not true that the tension has 
only recently been discovered by postcolonial discourse 
since the anthropologist was puzzled and alarmed by 
32 Barley, Niewinny antropolog, p. 24.
33 Geertz, Dzieło i życie, p. 111.
49Wonder and Anthropology
themself beforehand. This accounts for the mixed feelings 
Kenneth Read had on saying farewell to the Papuans in the 
1950s and visiting them again in 1981 and 1982, when he was 
so much amazed by the changes and uneasy about his sense 
of contentment once he left the place (as the anthropologist 
should not feel relieved to leave the field). The relief is not 
only psychological but also an epistemic one.34 It is due to 
wonder that anthropological thinking is able to appropriate 
this kind of epistemic anxiety. And thinking is only reliable 
when sustained by anxiety.
The researcher’s wonder may still lead to different 
results. Wonder itself is always a risk one takes both in 
scholarly and existential terms. It may be positively applied 
to the realm of research, yielding the readiness to receive 
each and every unique experience. This is the case even 
when the final image of culture obtained from the research 
bears less and less resemblance to the structure, system and 
hierarchy one projected initially. Wonder makes one amend 
one’s research, a fact readily acknowledged by Malinowski, 
who, in spite of his obsession with method and the idea 
of the whole, pointed out that one should accept all kinds 
of unique things, opinions, and voices, that one should be 
receptive even if the contents received goes beyond the 
embrace of methodology.35 Finally, wonder may lead to 
a radical call to abandon the former “habitus of fieldwork” 
in favour of experiments conceived as various ways of doing 
fieldwork where the places researched provide the resource 
of fragmentary knowledge, and are engaged in critical 
dialogue and respectful polemic, as Clifford wanted in his 
wanderings, visits to museums, tourist trails, and heritage 
parks.36 Yet the planning of research on the move, marked 
by instability and hybridity, is made possible by wonder, 
34 Kenneth E. Read, Return to the High Valley: Coming Full Circle 
(Berkeley: University of California Press, 1986), p. 246.
35 Malinowski, Dziennik, p. 650.
36 James Clifford, Routes: Travel and Translation in the Late 
Twentieth Century (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1997), 
p. 91. 
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which plays the role of a  subversive force facilitating 
displacement, renegotiation, or reconstitution. It cannot 
be repudiated once we enter the realm of the postcolonial 
and postexoticist reading.
I  think it was precisely anthropological wonder that 
eluded the grasp of exoticism. And it is wonder, with its 
inner tensions and epistemic contradictions, that makes 
it impossible to confine anthropological writing to the 
fashionable perspective of contemporary postcolonial 
studies. 
Yet the rhythm of fieldwork experience makes us 
ponder still another consequence. Wonder may be applied 
differently – when it lets us reject what is astonishing in 
epistemic terms, what does not suit the formula or explodes 
the method. It translates into the commitment to the 
invariable instead of variants, to the trust in the centre 
instead of the marginal, to the recognition of the repeatable 
and general instead of the unique and individual. It may 
contribute to the reduction that introduces order into 
the world examined. Actually counteracting wonder, the 
activity involves the movement of totalization but also 
that of ordering. The dislike of adventure, accident, and 
danger, as well as the wish to see everything developing 
according to a plan, with no surprises on the way, with the 
projected aim of research being gradually achieved almost 
in the manner of the Cartesian linear method, is what 
Lévi -Strauss dreamt about. He wrote that we are bothered 
by thousands of unnecessary events in the course of the 
expedition, that our existential experiences are trivial and 
mere obstacles, that “the nonsense of diaries,” even though 
their writing is obligatory for the researcher, is a waste of 
time.37 And all of it in the service of “drastic clarity,” as 
Geertz wrote about Edward Evans -Pritchard’s ethnography 
which sought to make everything clear.38 And, one should 
add, to dispose of wonder. 
37 Lévi -Strauss, Smutek tropików, p. 380.
38 Geertz, Dzieło i życie, p. 97.
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Wonder, if conceived of correctly in all of its contra- 
dictory contexts, is desirable and commendable. It allows 
us to provide the dynamic description of cultural practices, 
sustaining their otherness, but, at the same time, not 
reducing them to the inventory of wonders and curiosities. 
This first wonder, adapted, restrained, and properly applied 
to preserve its tension, is what leads to the descriptions we 
know from anthropological discourse. Can Malinowski’s 
painstaking concentration on the details of the Trobriand 
canoe, a  description which spans over 600 pages, be 
understood without reference to the power of wonder? 
Due to wonder, headhunting is not conceived as something 
exotic but constitutes an ordinary cultural practice that calls 
for interpretation and detailed examination illuminating its 
diversity.
Therefore, wonder, starting from a sense of amazement at 
the other, including the other in oneself, to the astonishment 
one feels in the relations with the subjects of research, to 
the contradictory methodological attempts at handling 
it, is indeed a driving force behind the research. It  lets 
one oscillate between epistemic arrogance (everything is 
transparent and can be explicated) and humility (many 
a  times have we been caught by surprise) towards that 
which cannot be easily captured and grasped, determined 
and situated within familiar and well -known typologies. 
Sustaining one’s propensity for wonder is a necessity for 
the researcher, as the one who is used to discarding roots. 
On the other hand, trusting wonder without reservations 
would make one follow mere curiosities and seek the ill-
conceived unusual quality in things, while anthropology 
is to teach and evoke understanding for the ordinariness 
of human experiences, no matter what they are and how 
much they conflict with our views of the world.
Can wonder help save anthropology today?
Does wonder interfere with the experience of culture if 
it is burdened with the myth of amazement at the other? Or 
is it, contrary to postcolonial insights, capable of redeeming 
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anthropology? As Geertz once wrote, having read Ludwig 
Wittgenstein’s Philosophical Investigations, anthropology 
has finally arrived at the end of the smooth icy surface 
it used to slide upon and entered the rough ground, 
which meant that it has given up its habit of making 
sweeping generalizations and referring to universality and 
impartiality of the researcher, in favour of local knowledge 
and the fragment. “Anthropology is exploring the rough 
ground,”39 a statement that researchers of culture find highly 
instructive, points out that the fixed and cumulative view 
of culture has been abandoned, and what we get instead is 
no more than a blurred image.
I have to ask, though, whether that roughness was only 
discovered once the discipline moved from the paradigm 
of scientific knowledge to a new formula dismantling the 
image of the world of separate cultures. Is it a clear caesura? 
Or has the roughness been constantly eroding the field for 
a long time?
Perhaps we should search for the tendency to reinforce 
the roughness within anthropology itself, not just as 
a  figure of thinking whose sudden emergence affects 
the description and style of research, but on the level of 
fieldwork experience. Was it not wonder that sustained 
that roughness, since it was wonder that showed the 
discrepancy between what was expected and what actually 
happened in the realm of culture, that taught uncertainty 
and questioned established orders, that was directed at the 
radically other and subsequently helped undermine that 
otherness? Wonder has been present in many spheres. Its 
presence points to the confusion in the heart of research – 
nothing is as holistic and certain as we would like it to be 
to make matters simple. Cultural paths of communication 
and its points of intersection are confused and so is the 
researcher’s identity. But this is what the work of wonder 
39 Clifford Geertz, Available Light: Anthropological Reflections on 
Philosophical Topics (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2000), 
p. XII.
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on the level of methodology and fieldwork experience has 
always demonstrated. There is no other way to account 
for the tension between diaries and monographs from 
fieldwork, no other way to understand the strenuous effort 
to construct elaborate conceptions of culture and to erect 
edifices of knowledge capable of placing single phenomena. 
It cannot be reduced to identity tensions Clifford wrote 
about. A lesson that comes with wonder has always led to the 
rough ground in the descriptions of culture. It has always 
led outside, beyond the known. Desperate attempts to 
counteract its influence have been aimed at familiarization, 
yet it is the subversive work of wonder that has prepared the 
anthropologist to be open -minded and receptive to the new.
The potential of anthropological wonder consists in 
the way the abstract philosophical formula was translated 
into empirical experience. It was the desired conjunction 
of theory and practice, of the theologian and the sailor 
that Kołakowski talked separately about. I think wonder 
in experience is what makes for knowledge that is truly on 
the move, one that does not stem from armchair reflection, 
which, according to Nietzsche and his philosophy, is 
a curse. It is a walked knowledge, knowledge originating 
in interaction and benefiting from the tension between 
theory and the empirical in the field. Anthropological 
writings, which always embraced the tension, have 
recently become, more or less successfully, the object of 
research in postcolonial studies and, especially, meta-
anthropology, yielding the image of the anthropologist as 
a person implicated in ideology and colonial vision, as well 
as the exoticist perception of the other. Yet it seems that 
the critical discussions have not been able to capture the 
essence of the dynamic of wonder which is still present in 
anthropological texts.
Wonder provided the knowledge, one that the theory 
of the time ran away from, but it also made way for the 
new discovery that had long been seeping through – the 
discovery of culture as confusion. Hence anthropological 
amazement at the confusing and intricate relationships 
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between the individual and the collective, the original 
and the common, the certain and the uncertain clearly 
paved the way for what was then named the entrance 
of the discipline onto the rough ground. But the very 
commitment to wonder and the call “towards the Other!” – 
very often contrary to the researcher’s intentions – already 
meant inviting elements of confusion which anthropology 
constantly multiplied even though it claimed to order them 
by constructing systems. For the more we attempt to order 
things, the more doubts we raise.
Therefore, I think, that the roughness of anthropology 
should not be solely located in the change of the scientific 
paradigm which has led to embracing the other and 
transformation of research. This roughness should instead 
be sought on the level of fieldwork experience which has 
been there “from the time immemorial,” subject to the 
power of wonder. It is wonder that brings roughness of both 
the epistemic and existential kind. 
Maria Popczyk
Aesthetics in View of the Art on Display*
The culture of modernity is burdened with a formidable 
task of reconciling contradictions originating inside 
it. It struggles with the rupture which has developed as 
a result of producing the new in the fields of both technical 
and artistic endeavours, and with the constant need to 
distance itself from the past through determining and 
extracting what is dated and no longer valid. And it is in the 
museum that the effects of these contradictions are being 
mitigated and various attempts at a resolution are being 
made. The museum practice is focused on the culturally 
significant content, and within the space of a museum the 
dilemmas concerning what is art, how history should be 
studied and presented, what is the cornerstone of cultural 
identity and how multiculturalism should be approached 
are being resolved. Therefore, the museum from its very 
beginnings has given rise to many a heated debate engaging 
academics, politicians, artists, critics and the general 
public. We see among them the enthusiasts who view the 
museum as an antidote to the ills of modern times, the 
proponents of the notion that art needs a special place, in 
which its educational, artistic and aesthetic qualities can 
be best brought out. On the other side there are ferocious 
opponents of the museum who construe collecting, storing 
and displaying artworks as a political act. They take up 
* The chapter first published in Polish as: “Ekspozycja muzealna 
a problem zadomowienia,” Anthropos? 16/17 (2011): pp. 81–94.
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arms against the museum in defence of the genuine origins 
of art on behalf of artists, of the contexts which have been 
left out, of the absent. The ongoing debates and disputes 
revolve around the fundamental issues concerning the 
overlapping domains of art, theory and the institution 
in charge of organizing social practices: the issues 
determining the character of the museum. And the shape 
of museums themselves are also subject to change brought 
about by the adoption of particular theoretical principles 
and influenced by directors,1 which ultimately results in an 
emergence of a multitude of various museums in the era 
when museums are becoming increasingly more specialized 
and individualized rather than generalized.
From the perspective of art itself, both its material and 
axiological dimensions are in the hands of artists. They 
are the ones who amaze us with their artistry, their skill 
in subjecting the matter to the discipline and the rules. 
They move us deeply and inspire our reflection. Although 
their works are created with the particular audience in 
mind, years later they are capable of unifying a different 
community: the community of museum -goers as well 
as the one, not tied with any specific place or time, the 
community of commentators. Art does not exist in the 
intellectual vacuum. On the contrary, from the beginning 
of philosophical thought it has constituted an important 
element of philosophical systems concerned with artist’s 
works and the nature of a creative process, which were 
analysed from various perspectives, like idealism or 
contextualism. At the time of Vitruvius artists already 
wrote their treatises, whereas modern art is accompanied 
by artists’ manifestos containing what Władysław 
Tatarkiewicz called the implicit aesthetics. In the mid-
eighteenth century Alexander G. Baumgarten introduced 
the academic aesthetics and finally unified those theoretical 
1 Directors as a significant aspect of an exhibition are mentioned 
by Lyotard. Jean -François Lyotard, Über Daniel Buren, ed. Patricia 
Schwarz, trans. Alexandre d’Alleux and Patricia Schwarz (Stuttgart: 
Ed. Schwarz, Galerie Kubiński, 1987), p. 41. 
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endeavours. At the same time the relationship between 
theory and artistic practice was established: aesthetics 
became the philosophy of fine arts, the science of sensory 
perception, which was to be superordinate and normative 
with respect to every existing and future work of art. It is 
significant that at the same time we see the development 
of the public sphere, which, however, was not a  simple 
extension of informal personal relationships bringing 
art lovers together in private collections, but created 
a completely new lifestyle: “a life led among strangers.2” 
Artworks underwent the change in status and became 
institutionalized, historized and aestheticized – now they 
were works on public display.
A  number of theoreticians point out the fact that 
the establishment of aesthetics and the founding of 
first museums coincided. However, they offer different 
interpretations of this fact. Wolfgang Welsch emphasizes 
the educational function. In his view, aesthetics provides 
the general public with the instruction how to view works 
of art, how to react to them, what to look at and what to 
ignore. Odo Marquard stresses the compensatory role of 
the museum and the aesthetic experience, which proves to 
be crucial for the mental well -being of a modern person 
for whom the museum offers the deliverance from the 
pressure and strain brought on by the pace of the modern 
technologized life.3 Carol Duncan associates the rise of 
the theory of taste with the formation of the secular ritual 
legitimizing the scientific truths in the aesthetic medium, 
the ritual giving the authorities the means to control the 
society.4 She argues that a major role in imposing discipline 
on society is played by the aesthetics of taste and an aesthetic 
2 Richard Sennett, Upadek człowieka publicznego, trans. Hanna 
Jankowska (Warszawa: Muza, 2009), p. 36.
3 Odo Marquard, “Wegwerfgesellshaft und Bewahrungskultur,” in 
Macrocosms in Microcosmo. Die Welt in der Stube. Zur Geschichte des 
Sammelns 1450 ‑1800, ed. Andreas Grote (Opladen, 1994), p. 916. 
4 Carol Duncan, Civilizing Rituals: Inside Public Art Museums 
(London and New York: Routledge, 1995), pp. 8–9.
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experience, which in the museum acquires a quasi -religious 
quality and serves as a kind of enlightenment elevating the 
viewer above and beyond the realm of everyday activities. 
Thus the status of aesthetics proves to be not only highly 
ambivalent but also rather unclear. On the one hand, the 
philosophers highlight the aesthetic and artistic values 
made accessible in an artwork regardless of social practices 
or political ideologies. This is the conception of art behind 
Kant’s, Hegel’s and Schopenhauer’s works on aesthetics, 
or Ingarden’s phenomenology. Its underlying principle, 
although not in the systemic form, has survived into the 
modern times, as theoretician are still keen to speak about 
the axiological character of art.5 On the other hand, when 
the selected aspects of the philosophy of art are translated 
into the space of an exhibition (for instance, when neutral 
conditions required to contemplate a work of art are created), 
it is turned into a tool of symbolic violence, as pointed out 
by Pierre Bourdieu in his social critique of the judgement of 
taste. However, it has to be underlined that the process of the 
aesthetization of art is taking place in two distinct domains: 
in aesthetics as a branch of philosophy, the philosophical 
conception of art constitutes a measure according to which 
a  work of art is judged, while the museum exhibition 
practices are concerned with the arrangement of physical 
space to prepare the viewing public for the specific sensations 
and experiences. Thus the philosophical aesthetics of an 
artwork and the aesthetics of an exhibition, of which a work 
is an component, have to be studied separately, since they 
constitute two distinct orders which cannot be reconciled, 
two different ways of speaking about art,6 which, however, 
can and do interact with each other. Yet it is impossible 
5 Andrzej Basista, Architektura i wartość. Architecture and Values 
(Kraków: Universitas, 2009). 
6 Which can be demonstrated by comparing Roman Ingarden’s 
phenomenological conception of a work of art with Jerzy Świecimski’s 
phenomenologically -oriented conception of an exhibition. Cf. Maria 
Popczyk, Estetyczne przestrzenie ekspozycji muzealnych. Artefakty 
przyrody i dzieła sztuki, Kraków: Universitas, 2008), pp. 149–160.
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to translate a philosophical system into the space of an 
exhibition, even though the reverse phenomenon is fairly 
common: art lovers seek the confirmation of an aesthetic 
theory in the museum and the architectural design of 
a museum or the layout of an exhibition are frequently 
confronted with a philosophical concept.7 What is more, 
the same historical display of artworks can be supported 
by contradictory theories. Some scholars claim that the 
space of exhibition corresponds to Kant’s aesthetics of 
a disinterested pleasure, according to which a viewer learns 
nothing but merely enjoys the “free play” of the imagination 
and delights in the beauty of lines and shapes. Others, by 
contrast, maintain that it is most appositely expounded by 
Hegel’s aesthetics: viewers discover different kinds of beauty 
manifesting itself in the histories of particular nations and 
then by reflecting upon them they can break away from 
the specific examples and capture the timeless beauty. 
It becomes even more complicated when museologists’ 
views are taken into consideration, since they have their 
own notion of how exhibits ought to be perceived. Jerzy 
Świecimski distinguishes a “non -professional” (“tourist”) 
approach and an aesthetical -experiential approach with its 
variants: a cognitive approach and a academic -analytical 
approach.8 Thus the philosophical theory of an artwork 
and exhibition practices constitute separate domains with 
disparate objectives.
The charges levelled against the philosophy of art tend 
to be aimed at the theory of an autonomous artwork. 
Philosophers search for the essence of art and they analyse 
artworks as discrete forms which require a special kind 
of approach, the aesthetic approach, which disregards 
everything that is taking place around the work: they 
are unconcerned with the architectural setting, the idea 
behind an exhibition or the layout of exhibition rooms. In 
7 Douglas Crimp, On the Museum’s Ruins (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT 
Press, 1993), pp. 290–302.
8 Jerzy Świecimski, Wystawy muzealne. Studium z estetyki wystaw, 
vol. I (Kraków: Jan -Kajetan Młynarski, 1992), p. 23.
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terms of exhibition practices it means that the theories of 
contemplation sanction the displacement of works from 
their original context (the artist’s workshop, the temple, 
the private space) and at the same time they strengthen 
the context imposed on artworks by the institution and 
the mechanisms which use knowledge to legitimize the 
authority. The fact that they isolate an artwork from 
exhibition practices is the major reason why they come in 
for so much criticism. Philosophers may go to the museum 
to see paintings and sculptures, but in their subsequent 
writings on the value of the works and their experiences 
they neutralize the original context of the works as well 
as the context of the exhibition, which they do in order to 
highlight the value of an artwork itself. Few of them approve 
of the way museums display works of art, they are more 
inclined to demonstrate how unsuitable they are for this 
task. Hans Sedlmayr is indignant at the fact that artworks 
are subjected to the classification requirements of positivist 
science. John Dewey believes that the museum is founded 
on political doctrines instead of growing out of the nature 
of art. Theodor W. Adorno sees the museum permeated 
by the economic element which stifles the pleasure which 
should arise from admiring works of art. In other words, 
the public space suppresses the true aesthetics, and the 
aesthetics which reigns there belongs to the culture of 
mass production. This is why Martin Heidegger discredits 
both museum exhibition and the corresponding aesthetics, 
namely the aesthetics of an artwork on display. He uses 
the example of Raphael’s Sistine Madonna to lament the 
loss of the world in which people gathered around it in the 
provincial church in Piacenza. He rejects the mobility of 
museum pieces travelling from one exhibition to another.9 
9 Martin Heidegger, Über die Sixtina, in Aus der Erfahrung des 
Denkens 1910–1976 (Frankfurt am Main: Klostermann, 1983), p. 120. 
For an interesting commenraty regarding the origin of an artwork, see 
Werner Hamacher, “Expositions of the Mother. A Quick Stroll through 
Various Museum,” in The End(s) of the Museum (Barcelona: Fundaciό 
Antoni Tǎpies, 1995), pp. 91–95.
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Marice Merleau -Ponty regards the museum as a threat to 
painting, whose uniqueness is extinguished by the space 
of exhibition: “The museum kills the violence of painting.” 
Therefore, he places the museum in the realm of history 
rather than aesthetics.10 In other words, the philosophers 
criticize museum exhibition in defence of the unique 
qualities of artworks and their social role outside the 
museum. In their view, it is the philosophical reflection that 
protects artworks from political, academic and economical 
meddling.
It seems, however, that all that criticism notwithstanding, 
it may be worthwhile to demonstrate the usefulness of the 
aesthetics whose aim is to analyse and expound what an 
artwork on display in a museum is. Yet it cannot be done 
from the viewpoint of the philosophy of art, which has 
never developed appropriate terminology. Jacques Derrida’s 
deconstruction of the relationship between ergon and 
parergon established by Kant and the following conclusion 
that no framework, whether theoretical or physical, is 
natural but is always a construct,11 allows us to undertake 
this task from the standpoint of the new trends in aesthetics, 
which take into consideration the most contemporary art 
as well as contextual conceptions of an artwork. What 
deserves a  closer look is the nature of an artwork on 
display, which in the museum becomes aporetic: created 
by artists and exhibition organizers it points to the unique 
creativity of an artist but also to the museum surroundings. 
This task becomes even more urgent since aesthetics 
has been abolished from the study of art, or at least its 
explanatory power has been depreciated on the grounds 
that philosophers are believed to suffer from the incurable 
affliction which manifests itself as visual essentialism, 
diagnosed by Micke Bal as an inclination towards seeing 
10 Maurice Merleau -Ponty, “Mowa pośrednia i głosy milczenia,” 
trans. Ewa Bieńkowska, in Oko i umysł: szkice o malarstwie, ed. Stanisław 
Cichowicz (Gdańsk: Słowo/Obraz Terytoria, 1996), pp. 147–149.
11 Jacques Derrida, Prawda w  malarstwie, trans. Małgorzata 
Kwietniewska (Gdańsk: Słowo/Obraz Terytoria, 2003), pp. 68–71.
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a work of art as autonomous and neutralizing its social 
relations.12
The theoretical discomfort associated with the assessment 
of an artwork status in the museum is caused by its 
entanglement in a myriad of contexts, including academic, 
educational, economic, and political. Therefore, scholars 
tend to select one of those contexts as dominant and use it 
as a foundation for their subsequent observations. However, 
if the space of exhibition is regarded as an environment,13 
the complex status of an artwork, oscillating between 
autonomy and the lack thereof, can be preserved. The 
environment of an exhibition constitutes a cultural artefact 
and it creates a dynamic situation in which an audience 
can participate. It is a product of the compromise between 
a number of diverse practices, such as museology, aesthetics, 
the history of art, the art market and education combined 
with whatever is brought into the museum by viewers, 
their predispositions and the depth of their involvement. 
It constitutes an organized selection of sensual parameters 
which coordinate an architectural design, an exhibition and 
exhibits, thereby constructing the physical, psychological 
and social space. In relation to the selection of the senses 
which are allowed to participate, it might force viewers to 
remain passive or, on the contrary, it might stimulate their 
corporeality. This is how particular cognitive processes are 
stimulated and the particular (individual, cultural, social) 
identification is bolstered. In this sense each museum 
12 Micke Bal, Double Exposures. The Subject of Cultural Analysis 
(London and New York: Routledge, 1996).
13 Arnold Berleant uses the notion of environment with regard 
to the art museum, but he does that in the normative sense: in his 
opinion museum space is not an environment in itself, it can only be 
transformed into one with the crowds removed, silence and viewers 
adjusting their perception to the nature of an artwork. He opposes the 
objective and qualitative treatment of artworks (he rejects the Cartesian 
kind of museum space) and he opts for organizing the conditions of 
an experience in the sense established by Dewey. Arnold Berleant, The 
Aesthetics of Environment (Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 1992), 
p. 114. 
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can be regarded as an environment, irrespective of the 
fact whether we deal with the modernist museum, which 
separates exhibits and subordinates the entire experience 
to the visual perception in order to fulfil its educational 
objectives through the linear narrative, or the museum in 
question is open, pluralistic, focused on demonstrating 
the hybridization of cultural phenomena and creating the 
multisensory surroundings for the viewers’ participation, 
which is the case of the museums of modern art founded at 
the end of the twentieth century, which provide the space 
for artists’ active involvement. The tendencies to shift 
museum practices towards people’s surroundings, such as 
musealization and the rise of ecomuseums, confirm that the 
museum is environmental in its nature and constitutes the 
place where various relationships converge and can extend 
beyond the museum walls. The museum of the modernist 
kind and the environment of the open museum represent 
the extreme manifestations of museum environments, with 
a full spectrum of intermediary forms between them, as 
each museum constitutes its own unique environment. The 
emergence of such a multitude of diverse environments 
within the museum, the pluralization of museums, must 
be attributed the paradigm shift in European culture which 
affects all its aspects. However, works of art have been 
collected and displayed in various ways since the times of 
private collections. 
A  work of art displayed in a  museum affects the 
environment of a museum and is, in turn, affected by it. 
An artist’s intention might be distorted by the environment 
of a museum but it is just as likely that artwork parameters 
will dominate the character of such environment. In order 
to adequately characterize and assess the status of a work 
on display, the environment of an exhibition has to be 
described taking into consideration sensory perception 
and anaesthetic, so that its exact nature can be defined. 
Subsequently, a work on display should be examined in 
the context of the community which formed its original 
target audience.
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Wolfgang Welsch suggested that the scope of aesthetic 
research should be extended so that, apart from the 
sensations arising from the experience of art itself, it would 
encompass the realms of everyday life, including both 
sensual sensations and spiritual ones.14 He shifted the focus 
of aestheticians’ concerns with an aesthetic experience 
towards the wide spectrum of sensations, which he 
supplemented with the anaesthetic: the absence of sensory 
perception, insensitivity, indifference. Aesthetics and the 
anaesthetic complement each other, they are like two sides 
of the coin which cannot exist separately. Each sphere of 
stimulation contains in itself the sphere of anaesthetization 
and the relationships between the two should be studied by 
aisthesis in place of aesthetics understood as the philosophy 
of art. The philosopher based his observations on the 
research carried out by the psychology of perception and 
the phenomenology of perception, namely the theory that 
seeing one thing we become blind to another in the same 
field of vision. He believes that the culture of aesthetization 
makes it imperative to study the anaesthetic, all the more 
so because contemporary artists tend to incline towards 
it. It is worth mentioning that the project of aesthetics 
as aisthesis corresponds with the suggestions made by 
the scholars in the field of visual culture. According to 
William J. Th. Mitchell visual studies should include the 
investigation into what is invisible, impossible to see and 
what is perceived. They should go beyond the analysis of 
the image and embrace everyday events as well, taking 
notice of their multisensory qualifications.15 Likewise, 
aesthetics in the form of aisthesis offers the rehabilitation 
of multisensory nature of sensory perception. Welsch 
maintains that the aesthetization of all aspects of life 
ought to draw philosophers’ attention to its companion, 
14 Wolfgang Welsch, “Estetyka i anestetyka,” in Postmodernizm. 
Antologia przekładów, ed. Ryszard Nycz (Kraków: Wydawnictwo Baran 
i Suszyński, 1997), p. 521.
15 W.J.T. Mitschel, “Showing Seeing: A Critique of Visual Culture,” 
Journal of visual culture 2, no. 1 (2002), pp. 165–181. 
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the anaesthetic, and thereby expose the latent and ignored 
contents, called in other dictionaries “scopic regimes”, 
absence or discourses pushed to the margins of social 
consciousness. When applied to the space of a museum, 
Welsch’s conception enables us to see the environment of 
an exhibition as a well -planned and well -structured field of 
stimulation and anaesthetization. The museum rather than 
constituting homogeneous or unequivocal space represents 
an area where contradictory tendencies and purposes 
coexist, which by no means prevents exhibition practises 
from merging exhibits so as to create a coherent narrative 
and provide an audience with the sense of unity. Such 
practices, however, need to be demystified, the relationship 
between sensory perception and anaesthetization specific 
to every museum environment needs to be brought to light 
and given a name so that the public is aware of the cost at 
which the coherence is achieved.
The issue concerning the complex nature of an artwork 
on display is brought up by Didier Maleuvre, who claims 
that it is its character itself that calls for the museum to 
be set up, as the museum and artworks contribute to 
the processes dynamizing the modernity. He chooses to 
disregard the relationship between knowledge and power 
within the museum and instead concentrates on the internal 
contradiction in a work of art itself, characterized, in his 
opinion, by non -identity.16 A work of art cannot be identified 
with an empirical object, since it oscillates between sensual 
and conceptual spheres; it creates a  distance from the 
directness of life as well as from the directness of cultural 
representation itself, thus it cannot be wholly identified 
with culture. According to Maleuvre, it is artworks that 
are responsible for the paradoxical nature of museums, 
which displace them and at the same time assimilate 
them: “[…] the museum embodies the antagonistic drive 
of culture, at once striving for self -invention and pulling 
16 Didier Maleuvre, Museum Memories. History, Technology, Art 
(Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1996), p. 38. 
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backward to self-preservation and the status quo. The 
great paradox of museums is that they implement culture’s 
program of self -preservation by preserving the thing by 
which culture ungrounds itself, the artistic gesture.”17 
The process of displacing and re -settling of an artwork 
in a museum, assisted by positivist theories, ideologies or, 
as it is the case nowadays, curatorial decisions, is by no 
means limited to the modernist environment, such as the 
temple of art style museums or “white cube” museums of 
modern art, but is still in operation and still being used as 
a means to reinforce stereotypes. Therefore, the question 
arises whether the original context and the artist’s intention 
are preserved in an artwork or the environment of an 
exhibition creates an entirely new context which replaces 
the original one.18 Maleuvre suggests that the solution 
lies in the unique character of a work of art rather than 
in the exhibition organizers’ intentions. An artwork is 
created in a specific period of history, but it is ahistorical 
in itself. It oscillates between an object and a notion, and 
its fundamental feature is that it is ahead of its times. Its 
originality and uniqueness cannot be directly inferred 
from – nor are reducible to – its historical circumstances, 
which distinguishes it from technological inventions 
whose innovative character stems from improvement on 
the existing devices. Maleuvre recognizing that the world 
of an artwork is separate from the real world points out 
that it contains a historical attribute in that it makes the 
past manifest in the present. This historical attribute is 
inherent in the work itself but it also contains the original 
intention. The historical exhibition not only demonstrates 
the chronological sequence of historical events but also 
exposes “a creative act” contained in an artwork, in other 
words, the instants when it is torn out of its historical 
17 Ibidem. 
18 M. Quatremère de Quincy, Martin Heidegger and Donald 
Preziosi, among others, argue for the complete annihilation of the 
context, whereas W. Benjamin underlines the oscillation between the 
aura and the exposition. 
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circumstances, although the context of their construction 
is retained. Therefore an artwork is a Différance in the 
historical sense, while an exhibition communicates an 
experience of dialectical history apparent in artworks.19 
Thus the aporetic character of a museum piece entails the 
dual reference to time (the past and the present) while at the 
same time it embodies timeless values. All these instants 
are incorporated in a  work of art. Maleuvre advocates 
a novel way to see a museum exhibition, which merges 
a work and the idea of the museum, and argues that there 
is no contradiction between them, contrary to what the 
opponents of the museum like to point out.
Undoubtedly, a work of art acquires a double status in 
the era of museums. As it becomes a work on display, it 
is subject to a kind of uncertainty principle: it oscillates 
between the past and the present, between the creator’s 
intention and the requirements of style, between the 
life which brought it into existence and the theoretical 
framework in which it is installed. In the terms of aes- 
thetics, it can be described as autonomous, pointing to 
itself, but at the same time it is inextricably interwoven 
with the exhibition and as such it is not autonomous. In 
a sense it is that ambiguous nature of a modern artwork 
that Friedrich Schiller refers to when he emphasizes the 
significance of an individual experience of beauty, taking 
place beyond the realm of everyday affairs. And for him 
only such an autonomous experience is capable of setting 
in motion an aesthetic revolution or bringing about a moral 
transformation in society. Thus in the environment of an 
exhibition the viewer is anaesthetized against the original 
context. This anaesthetic of displacement prevents viewers 
from experiencing any sensual attributes relating to the 
original site or social rituals, to the home or the artist’s 
workshop. In the space of exhibition, however, an artwork 
attains new qualities and meanings, arising from the idea 
behind the exhibition, for instance, a work might become 
19 Maleuvre, Museum Memories, p. 71. 
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a historical construct, it might represent a particular trend 
in art or a recognized variety of aesthetical qualities. Paweł 
Florencki explains how the environment of exhibition is 
destructive in the case of an icon. For him “only in the 
temple, in the surrounding corresponding to its essence, 
will an icon acquire its artistic meaning and reveal its full 
magnificence as an artwork before the viewer’s eyes.”20 
The neutralization of the context, however, is gradable, so 
despite the explicit intention behind certain exhibitions, 
it is still possible to access and appreciate the value of 
artworks on display. Thus the Degenerate Art exhibition, 
mounted by the Nazis in 1937, is also remembered as the 
first exhibition of Expressionism and its ideological context 
was unable to obliterate the works’ artistic value. Although 
a work on display certainly contributes to the environment 
of an exhibition, it never ceases to be an autonomous entity 
and it never discards completely the elements of its past, 
its original context, a life and a creative act incorporated 
in it – it preserves them somehow so that they still can be 
accessed. 
It is true that, as scholars maintain, modernistic 
exhibition environment suppresses the abovementioned 
duality contained in an artwork on display, as a consequence 
of the epistemological foundations of the museum practices 
and its insistence on the autonomous character of works 
of art. An exhibition is construed as an academic message 
conveyed by means of a sensual spectacle; its purpose is 
to tell the story of how trends develop but also the story 
of emancipation. Moreover, it constructs metanarratives 
in the sense defined by Lyotard. The parameters of the 
environment are subordinated to theoretical views while the 
eye -centred organization21 is reinforced by the anaesthetic 
20 Paweł Florencki, Ikonostas i  inne szkice, trans. Zbigniew 
Podgórzec (Białystok: Bractwo Młodzieży Prawosławnej w  Polsce, 
1997), p. 41. 
21 Bennett Tony, “Civic Seeing: Museums and the Organization of 
Vision,” in A Companion to Museum Studies, ed. Sharon Macdonald 
(Oxford: Wiley -Blackwell, Malden, 2011), pp. 267–275. 
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of the visitors’ other senses (smell, touch, corporeality), as 
a result of which they have no choice but to focus their 
eyes on exhibits. The proscenium -like arrangement of 
space allows viewers to assume but one posture: they are 
forced to stand passively in front of a work. The exhibition 
based on the dominance of optical perception directs 
the attention to central and peripheral phenomena, so 
that viewers will have the impression of the transparency 
and continuity of historical processes taking place in the 
world of art, while the whole range of objects left out from 
the selection becomes concealed from sight. The general 
public has only limited access to works and therefore has 
to rely on the choices made by art historians, who build the 
authority of the museum, thereby becoming anaesthetized 
to the unselected works and subjected to the anaesthetic 
of exclusion. Even though there are several types of the 
modernist exhibition,22 the one that comes in for most 
criticism is the academic exhibition, since it tends to be 
regarded as the only proper – the only objective – form of 
displaying artworks. Through an exhibition, the academia 
legitimises political education. The example of this is 
the communist regime appropriating Princess Izabela 
Czartoryska’s (née Countess Fleming) private collection 
and handing it over to the academia in 1950. The exhibits 
placed in the glass display cases were intended to impose 
the discipline, to unify the private mementoes, the relics 
testifying to the historical achievements of Poland in 
order to subordinate them to the new political order. Thus 
the notion of the national mausoleum evoking patriotic 
sentiments had been excluded from the public space.
Independently from the activities within the framework 
of the modernist exhibition environment, avant -garde 
art, the major opposition against the institution of the 
academia and the museum, also gains a strong position. 
22 Hall Margaret, On Display. A  Design Grammar for Museum 
Exhibitions (London: Lund Humphries, 1987), pp. 14–15; Świecimski, 
Wystawy muzealne, p. 149. 
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The experiments with the space of an exhibition, such as 
El Lissitzky’s or Mondrian’s works and Marcel Duchamp’s 
Mile of String (1942) contributed to the expansion of the 
scope of art itself. The abovementioned works inspired 
a host of activities undertaken by the artists belonging to 
the 1960s avant -garde movements, notably those whose 
objective was to expose the mechanisms of museum 
practices normally hidden from the viewer’s sight. Artists 
were particularly fond of museum spaces where, next to 
traditional artworks, they placed natural objects or biological 
specimens in order to initiate a debate with the arrangement 
of the space in a museum, with the anthropocentrism and 
the consequences of scientific developments. Socially-
conscious art has taken over the territories belonging to the 
museum, and it by no means limits its actions to modern 
art museums, and as a result a new, so far unknown, type 
of museum appears: the environment where the primary 
objective of artistic activities is to expose the contradictions 
intrinsic to the nature of an exhibition understood as an 
act of conferring meanings and establishing values. The 
activities of this type, including the most extreme such as 
Marcel Broodthaers’s artistic deconstruction of museum 
practices,23 are inextricably linked to the museum, both 
on theoretical and spatial levels, they need a  museum 
to come into existence, and this fact has made it finally 
possible to recognize and appreciate the links between an 
artwork and its spatial and theoretical surroundings. The 
artists’ activities have led to the total transformation of the 
conception of the museum itself, as they have altered all 
the sensual parameters of the space of a museum, which 
has led to the institution of open museums. Although it is 
used by Jean Clair to criticize tourism and the economy of 
globalization permeating modern museums,24 the notion of 
23 Broodthaers: Writings, Interviews, Photographs, ed. Benjamin 
H.D. Buchloh. Essays by Rainer Borgemeister (Cambridge: MIT Press, 
1988). 
24 Jean Clair, Kryzys muzeów. Globalizacja kultury, trans. Jan Maria 
Kłoczowski (Gdańsk: Słowo/Obraz Terytoria, 2009).
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openness can also be associated with what Maleuvre calls 
“the laboratory where art overcomes its aesthetic isolation”, 
and as a result of the artists’ theoretical activities in its 
realm, it is works that determine “the way in which we 
reach art and how we communicate with it.”25 Both an artist 
and an audience participate in the events produced by the 
neo -avant -garde works within the framework of the space 
of an exhibition.
The open character of the environment of an exhibition 
is characterized by the individualized harmony of sensory 
stimuli and space: artworks, exhibits and artefacts are 
frequently linked and they point to the experience of 
everyday life, the ambient sounds evoke emotions and the 
narratives follows from oral traditions. The homologous 
and timeless space of modernist museums is supplanted 
by a host of various spaces and temporality exposed in 
the process. The environment of an exhibition becomes 
a dynamic mediated field characterized by fluidity and 
the interplay of many various themes. Theatricalization 
acquires a new dimension when the staging of a secular 
ritual is replaced by the performative pedagogy.26 Such 
an environment gives rise to a number of exhibitions of 
varying level of openness, geared up to present problems 
from a range of disciplines, whereas local issues are typically 
shown against the backdrop of global transformations, and 
artists and their works participate in the construction of 
natural, historical or ethnographic exhibitions. Museum 
exhibitions reflect the plurality of rationality which 
comprises cognition, morality and aesthetics, whereas 
different branches of culture are presented as interconnected 
with no attempt to establish a  hierarchy among them. 
A new exhibition form emerges: an interactive exhibition. 
The example of such an exhibition is the Fryderyk Chopin 
25 Maleuvre, Museum Memories, p. 56. 
26 Jem Fraser, “Museums -drama, ritual and power,” in Museum 
Revolutions. How Museums Change and Are Changed, eds. Simon 
J. Knell, Suzanne MacLeod and Sheila Watson (London and New York: 
Routledge, 2007), pp. 299–301. 
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Museum in Warsaw where the modules arranged into 
a  clear narrative present the successive stages of the 
composer’s life and at the same time serve as interfaces 
of virtual reality. Without an active user they do not say 
much. Only when touched with an individual chip will the 
particular module run its track of images, sounds and texts. 
Although they take up physical space and make it more 
or less rhythmical, the classical division of space between 
an exhibit, an exhibition and an audience does not apply. 
What distinguished an open museum is the space of an 
exhibition which cannot be taken in at a glance: despite the 
signs and labels, instead of providing visitors with the clear 
view of the whole, the spatial arrangement confuses them, 
generating as a result what can be called diffused seeing. 
Visitors are equipped with the map, which they can use to 
pick their own routes and make up their own narratives of 
the exhibition. Exhibitions of this kind, typically displaying 
modern art, give emphasis to the distinctive character of 
works and installations, their unique visual -audio -tactile 
sensorium. In extreme cases, like the Biennale Beyond 
Mediations (Centrum Sztuki Zamek Ujazdowski, Poznań 
2010), it can result in a sense of chaos, which, however, is 
absolutely intended and whose purpose is to demonstrate 
that there are a number of phenomena in art which cannot 
be subordinated to one general idea. Additionally, it points 
to the hybridization of culture: “The world is chaos, once 
liberated from the corset of ideologies imposing order.”27
If we presume the open character of the exhibition 
environment, open to the critical activity and the audience’s 
participation, we may wonder whether its modernist 
attribute is still preserved, whether the museum still 
keeps order in a community, passes judgements, imposes 
discipline. The character of aesthetics in open museums is 
also problematic, since artworks displayed there are not 
included in the canon of autonomous art.
27 Ryszard Kluszczyński, Pochwała różnorodności, in Beyond 
Mediations (Poznań: Centrum Sztuki Zamek, 2010), p. 21. 
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Pierre Bourdieu sees no fundamental changes in the 
modern museum. Two mechanisms of consecrating 
a work, by introducing it into the public circulation and 
by arranging the conditions for disinterested experience, 
are still in operation.28 Which means that Manet’s 
paintings, Pollock’s abstract expressionism, Kosuth’s texts 
or Nisch’s quasi -ritual actions fit well into the aesthetics 
of taste. Little variety is offered as far as spending time 
with art is concerned and art itself provides few new ways 
in which works can be appreciated. The museum space 
allows for no dialogue, no dispute, no criticism. Even 
the introduction of popular art into the museum has by 
no means changed those invariable objectives pursued 
by artists, the institution and art lovers alike. It seems, 
however, that despite the mechanisms of sacralization, 
eagerly exploited by artists themselves, for instance 
Daniel Hirst, well-developed critical awareness prevents 
the museum from being reduced to one -dimensional 
space. Thanks to critics and theoreticians who have been 
exposing exhibition practices for a long time, exhibitions 
presenting classical art or art of other cultures give rise 
to the reflection regarding their cultural contexts and 
the structures which they have entered. Their work is 
far from completed, since every exhibition poses new 
challenges in this respect. Global and national museums 
are more interested in reinforcing stereotypes, which 
are convenient for the authorities, than the smaller ones 
situated in the same metropolis. More importantly, 
however, a number of different discourses on the same 
subject are now possible.29 
28 Pierre Bourdieou, Reguły sztuki. Geneza i  struktura pola 
literackiego, trans. Andrzej Zawadzki (Kraków: Universitas, 2001). 
29 This point can be exemplified by the exhibitions organized to 
mark the anniversary of the battle of Grunwald. Syrewicz’s multimedia 
installations in the National Museum in Warsaw reinforced the 
nineteenth -century myth of Poland defeating Germany, whereas 
Anda Rottenberg’s exhibition in Berlin (2011) exposed this myth and 
attempted to remedy it.
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On the other hand, Jean Baudrillard conjures up 
a pessimistic apocalyptic vision where no aesthetics exists 
and the formal value of an artwork is no longer accessible, 
the example of which are Andy Warhol’s paintings: empty, 
deprived of any meaning and as such capable of initiating 
a  permanent spectacle. This is the museum proposed, 
according to the philosopher, by postmodernism.30 Both 
Bourdieu’s and Baudrillard’s positions reduce the museum 
to a few fixed functions: it serves the educational purpose 
or provides entertainment; it is one -dimensional, because 
its contradictory, aporetic character is not taken into 
consideration. In this context, museum exhibitions also 
serve the purposes subordinated to one principle. Scholars 
see artworks on display as the realizations of superficial 
aesthetization, which, according to Bourdieu, leads to 
continual attempts at creating the illusion of autonomous 
aesthetic art within the framework of an exhibition, whereas 
according to Baudrillard, all this results in is aesthetization 
produced by blurring the distinction between a work and 
its context.
The way out, beyond those two different stances, 
is provided by Jean -François Lyotard’s exhibition Les 
Immatériaux organized in the very centre of the modernist 
type museum, in the skeleton -like structure of the Pompidou 
Centre, with its fluid exhibition space shaped on an ad hoc 
basis by movable panels. Lyotard defines the philosophical 
principles of a modernist exhibition and points out that 
within its framework the Cartesian character of space 
defines both artworks and the way they are perceived. And, 
in such a space, with the extensive use of modern media, he 
arranges the situations in which the audience is given an 
opportunity to experience the inability to present objects as 
clearly categorized static images. The geometric character 
of this space in the order of sensory perception literally 
30 Jean Baudrillard, Spisek sztuki. Iluzje i  deziluzje estetyczne 
z  dodatkiem wywiadów o  „Spisku sztuki”, trans. Sławomir Królak 
(Warszawa: Sic!, 2006), pp. 63–68, 85–101. 
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ceases to exist and its mathematical divisions vanish in the 
relationships and mediations. Lyotard blurs the boundaries 
between the order of exhibition and the diverse fields of 
art, science and everyday life. In the process he invites 
a  visitor into the space of the mediated nebula, where 
the itinerary can hardly be signposted, and instead of an 
exhibition (“exposition”) he proposes an overexposition.31 
Lyotard’s Paris exhibition did not abolish the Cartesian 
character of space in existing museums. There is no doubt 
that the museum’s raison d’être will gravitate towards 
the unification of contradictions. Modernity continues 
to prevail in the museum, which still constitutes the 
aesthetic space of exhibition, in the sense of anaesthetic of 
displacement and exclusion as well as the aesthetic of an 
artwork and exhibition. The plurality of artistic activities, 
however, introduces alternative solutions into its domain 
or just next to it, the solutions which obscure the clear-
cut divisions not just in the space of a museum but in all 
spheres of culture, including knowledge, education and art: 
space as well as society.32 This way the insolubility enters 
the space of exhibition.
Since the environment of exhibition is so diverse, 
it is hardly possible to speak about one universal type 
of aesthetics originating in the philosophical principle. 
It seems more practical to recognize several alternative 
forms it can assume in relation to a particular exhibition. 
Each of these types of aesthetic contain three spheres: the 
biological, the constructive -contextual and the universal, 
which are inextricably linked to one another. The first one 
31 Jean -François Lyotard, “Les immateriaux,” Art & Text 17 (1985): 
47–54. For Baudrillard, the nebula generated by media images leads to 
the communication breakdown, lack of communication.
32 Huyssen argues that in the postmodern museum global 
exhibitions grant the opportunity to build a  cultural identity in 
a  multicultural “melting pot.” Cf. Andreas Huyssen, Escape from 
Amnesis: The Museum as Mass Meidium, in Twilight Memories: Marking 
Time in a Culture of Amnesia (London and New York: Routledge, 1995), 
pp. 16, 32–34. 
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refers to the aesthetics of sensuality where the essential 
role is played by the biological determinants of perception. 
Zbigniew Żygulski (junior) discussing the psycho -physio- 
logical aspects of an exhibition lists the following proper- 
ties of museum space: “grandiosity -intimacy, spaciousness-
incommodiousness, brightness -darkness, warmth -cold, 
dryness -dampness, airiness -stuffiness, flatness -multi- 
levelness or inclination, curviness -cubicity (angularity), 
colourlessness -colourfulness, non -decorativess -decora- 
tivess, odourlessness -smell (the particular kind of smell is 
also significant).”33 The convergence of these parameters of 
the space of exhibition generates other types of aesthetics 
expressed explicitly, which relate to the particular type 
of art requiring the audience’s interpretation, activity 
and response. It applies to the formal interpretations of 
exhibition space as well as to critical art. For example, 
Lyotard recognizes Buren’s and Kosuth’s works as the types 
of activities which produce a particular interpretation of an 
exhibition in opposition to the ways of seeing established 
by this exhibition. In his view, “the essence of an exhibition 
is not evident,” what unfolds before the viewer’s eyes 
conceals in the process what is hidden, another side, the 
back, the sides, and whatever evades presentation but is also 
visual.34 Lyotard examines Buren’s work and sees it in the 
perspective of the game of language, one of those played by 
painting.35 The game takes advantage of the interpretation 
of a work and the associated narrative apparatus as well 
as the theories on which the interpretation is founded: 
an artist’s work is a reaction to the interpretations of an 
exhibition, artworks constitute polemics with the existing 
interpretations. Among various types of aesthetics relating 
33 Zdzisław Żygulski Jr., Muzea na świecie. Wstęp do muzealnictwa 
(Warszawa: PWN, 1982), p. 147. 
34 Lyotard, Über Daniel Buren, p. 34.
35 Ibidem, p. 14. See Jean -François Lyotard, Vorbemerkung Über die 
Pragmatik der Werke (Insbesondere zu den Werken von Daniel Buren), 
in Philosophie und Malerei im Zeitalter ihres Experimentierens (Berlin: 
Merve Verlag, 1986), pp. 79–95. 
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to the context we can find performative aesthetics, whether 
in the sense of a social gathering ascribed to it by Pierre 
Bourdieu, or in the form of artistic actions, to which Arthur 
Danto gives a  term participatory aesthetics. The third 
sphere includes the types of aesthetics which are related 
to what is universal, shared by a given community. Here 
we can find the sphere of consensus, valued so highly by 
Habermas, as well as the timeless subjects, such as death 
and love, exploited by artists. Finally, there is a place for the 
aesthetics of beauty and Lyotard’s post -utopian aesthetics 
of the sublime.
These three spheres never occur separately but coexist 
and together establish the fields of mutual influences and 
interrelationships. In the space of an exhibition visitors 
move through these fields being sensorily stimulated 
or anaestheticized, encouraged to remain passive and 
undertake an intellectual effort or invited to corporeal 
participation.
Aleksandra Kunce
Anthropology of Points: Towards the Pedagogy  
of Human Space*
Anthropology of points outlines a research perspective 
which makes it possible to interpret culture, but it also leads 
to the foundation of the pedagogy of human space. To read 
culture through points is in fact to learn to comprehend the 
environing and alien space, but also to learn to understand 
oneself. Anthropology of points as a mental and pedagogical 
project is today a challenge. The strategy here is to follow 
the notion of a point. It is a key term which both establishes 
and concludes this humanistic undertaking. It is vital to 
point out that it serves not only as a tool for ordering the 
world, aimed at classifying and enclosing the living tissue 
of culture within a scheme. Its purpose is rather to uncover 
a way of experiencing what is specific to a human being.
One should start from the question “What is a point?” 
A point is an abstract entity, but also something tangible 
in human life. It is therefore essential to determine the 
circumstances under which the question can be asked, 
as it requires the presence of a  landscape, people, texts 
and things. What is a point? What is an anthropology of 
points? How is such a point ‑like reflection possible? Gilles 
Deleuze and Félix Guattari state that there is no heaven 
* The chapter first published as: “Anthropology of Points: Towards 
the Pedagogy of Human Space,” The International Journal of Learning, 
vol. 16, issue 6 (2009) 475–486.
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for concepts,1 since concepts simply do not await us ready-
made, shaped once and for all. Following in Friedrich 
Nietzsche’s footsteps,2 one has to acknowledge that they 
need to be refined, processed and created anew. Even 
primary concepts have many components, as Deleuze and 
Guattari stress,3 whereby they are defined; hence they are 
not self -evident.
A point is a concept which has its restricted domains 
within science. It is highlighted in geometrical discourse, 
which is a theory of space and objects included therein, as 
one of its rudimentary concepts. A point is the smallest non-
 -dimensional geometrical object which is indispensable to 
describe complex mathematical relations and constructions. 
A  point is a  site without dimensions.4 Sciences discuss 
a point as an object, attempting to define, enumerate, prove, 
segregate, or explicate on the basis of definite points, but they 
do not focus on their own point-like mode of thinking. They 
do not inquire about the presence, frequency and perhaps 
even the necessity of point -like thinking, since this is the 
field of the humanities. It is their task to pose the question 
of what point -like thinking is from the philosophical or 
anthropological perspective; furthermore, it is their job 
to ask why it is important for human experience to stop 
the thinking process at a point, to observe the objects at 
a point, to guide thinking from point to point. Theory of 
a point, constructed not for the purpose of sciences, but 
for the humanities, is a considerable challenge today. Not 
because it could aspire to become a  new methodology, 
intended as a tool for ordering the world of texts, objects, 
ways of behaviour and mental conventions. That would 
just prove its broad utility. Something else seems of greater 
significance, namely showing that a “point -like” quality 
1 Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari, What is Philosophy?, trans. 
Hugh Tomlinson and Graham Burchill (Verso, 1994), p. 5.
2 Cf. Friedrich Nietzsche, Tako rzecze Zaratustra. Książka dla 
wszystkich i dla nikogo, trans. Wacław Berent (Warszawa, 1990), p. 270.
3 Deleuze and Guattari, What is Philosophy?…, p. 15.
4 Jan Zydler, Geometria (Warszawa: Prószyński i S -ka, 1997). 
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describes a human mode of experiencing oneself, the others 
and the world. Why then is it worthwhile to explore the 
concept of a point in the humanities?
The Latin punctum introduces us into the world of that 
which pricks. Punctum (pungere) means in classical Latin to 
pierce, to prick, as well as the mark left after piercing.5 It also 
signifies a full stop as a diacritical mark and a punctuation 
mark. Besides, it denotes a spot (of a leopard), a spot on 
a die and a number on the scales which equals the mark 
of division. But it is also a ballot in elections. Construed 
differently, it is a mathematical point, a tiny element which 
has its position in space, but also in time since punctum 
means also a while, a moment. In medieval Latin it stands 
additionally for a middle, a praise, a fragment, and one 
of the squares on the chessboard.6 The Latin  pungō 
(– pungere, pupugĩ, punctum)7 explicitly reveals the world 
of action because it means: to pierce, to sting, to harass, 
to move, to penetrate, to have a bitter taste, to cause pain. 
Etymologically close words such as punctim (to prick), 
punctiō (a  prick), punctulum (tiny prick), punctiuncula 
(delicate prick, gentle touch)8 multiply the references to the 
space of experience and thinking of that which pricks and 
touches, at the same time subtly differentiating its intensity.
The Latin punctum opens up an interesting space of 
thinking since it is not only a point in space and time, 
a point of record, a point of specification, but also a point 
which pierces, which is a trace in itself. And since it is the 
space of that which hurts and cuts to the quick, it steers us 
towards point -like thinking. We create points of description 
5 Cassell’s Latin Dictionary (New York: Macmillan Publishing 
Company, 1968), vol. 4, pp. 389–390; Słownik łacińsko ‑polski, 
ed. Marian Plezia (Warszawa: PWN, 1974), vol. 4, p. 389.
6 Mittellateinisches Glossar, eds. Erwin Habel and Friedrich 
Gröbel. Mit einer Einführung von Heinz -Dieter Heimann (Paderborn-
München -Wien -Zürich, 1989), kol. 322.
7 Cassell’s Latin Dictionary; Słownik łacińsko ‑polski, vol. 4, pp. 389–
390. 
8 Ibidem, p. 389. 
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but at the same time we realize that we are created by the 
points of experience. In this way we indicate the genuine 
nature of human experience which is close to what is tiny 
but also to what harasses and deeply moves.
Although we are anchored in this Latin heritage of 
punctum, we also need to refer to the primary linguistic 
perspective for us, that is to say to the Greek language. As it 
has already been mentioned, Euclid in Στοιχεία (Stoicheia), 
Elements, uses the term σημείο (semeío)9 to denote a point, 
a term which in Greek is connected with a symbol. Such 
a  point, in geometry, has for Euclid its tangible shape, 
as we have stated before. Nouns τo σημα (séma) and τo 
σημείoν (semeion) refer however to a recognizable mark, 
a  miraculous sign, but also to a  grave, a  proof – these 
are the meanings we find in the Scriptures.10 In the 
New Testament τo σημείoν denotes a sign which augurs 
something, warns against something and at the same time 
is a miracle performed by Jesus. We will come back to that 
point when the relationship between a sign, brand and axis 
mundi is discussed. In Pythagoras, a point is understood as 
“a monad which has a place”11 — μονάδα (monáda). A point 
is also connected with στίγμα (stígma)12, from stizo (stick, 
stab) which refers to the mark left after cutting or hitting. 
It is a scar, a puncture, as well as a brand on the slave’s 
 9 Euclid, Elements, in The Thirteen Books of Euclid’s Elements, 
edited and translated by Thomas Little Heath (New York: Dover 
Publication, 1956), book I, definition 1.
10 Some examples of such understanding of the term in the New 
Testament are the following fragments: Mt 26,48; Lk 2,12; C12,12; 2Thess 
3,17; Mt 12,39; Jn 3,2; Jn 20,24–29; 2Cor 1,22; Acts 13,14. Cf. The Bible. 
Revised Standard Version (Westlea and Swindon: The British and 
Foreign Bible Society, 1981).
11 Magdalena Prokopovà, “Public and Personal Interpetation of the 
Point, a Straight Line and their Relation: A Comparison of Phylogenesis 
ans Ontogenesis,” in Researching the Teaching and Learning of 
Mathematics: Proceedings of MATHED Intensive Programme 2003, 
eds. Brian Hudson and Klaus Esner (Linz, 2005), p. 165.
12 The Perseus Digital Library. Tufts University, http://www.perseus.
tufts.edu.
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body, signifying the mark of possession. The feminine 
form στιγμή (stigmé) steers us towards a moment, a while, 
but also towards a very small point, a punctuation mark. 
Thus a  point related to στίγμα and στιγμή has a  broad 
spectrum of meanings, recalling a sign, a prick, a full stop 
and a point in time. Aristotle uses the term στιγμή (stigmé) 
in Physics, Mechanics, On Indivisible Lines13 to designate 
a mathematical point. In Greek there is a fusion of different 
meanings of a point as a stain, a spot (on an animal’s body), 
a brand, a mathematical point, a full stop, an iota, a moment 
in time, and a wink of an eye. It opens up the broad space 
of a point as a space created by human experience. 
The concept of a point is further reinforced in a different 
linguistic context, for instance that of the English language, 
where a point denotes a concrete place, a moment in time, 
a full stop (American English period), an argument and an 
outlook (point of view); but (in the plural) it may also refer 
to a junction of railway tracks in which a pair of rails can be 
moved so that a train can be directed onto either of two lines 
(American English switch). It could also express somebody’s 
right reasoning (That’s a point!), a fundamental reason (to 
get to the point), as well as sense (there’s no point, what’s the 
point of doing something).14 Besides, it refers to grasping an 
idea and appreciating what somebody is proposing (take 
somebody’s point), to what is relevant, essential (to the point) 
or partly true and acceptable (up to a point). The verb to 
point means to direct attention to, to show the position 
or direction of. The adjective pointed describes objects 
which are sharp; figuratively, it refers to sarcastic or cutting 
remarks or a type of incisive wit; a pointer is a stick used 
to point to things on a map, etc., an indicator on a dial or 
balance. These are not all of the meanings but they reveal 
in the English context the semantic field of that which is 
13 Aristotle, Fizyka, Mechanika, O odcinkach niepodzielnych, in 
Dzieła wszystkie, trans. Leopold Regner (Warszawa: PWN, 1993), vol. 
4.971a 23–28, pp. 746–747.
14 Oxford Advanced Learners Dictionary of Current English (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 1980), vol. II, p. 643. 
83Anthropology of Points…
fundamental, essential; what is more, they underline the 
fact that all that is pointed is, at the same time, directed 
towards something, and shows something to somebody; as 
well as the fact that a point refers to something that is the 
heart of the matter.
If a point encompasses whatever is tiny, sudden, what is 
a short interval and a full stop, something piercing, moving, 
causing pain or annoyance, then it opens up the space of 
human experience. It is significant that in a point (even 
etymologically) the spatial and the temporal, the beginning 
and the end are all conjoined. In a point we recognize the 
primal (which eludes defining), that which is a distance, 
a focal point, a prick and a cut, and the opening of a space of 
different configurations. This combination of multifarious 
meanings is conducive to humanistic thinking since it 
indicates a  field of research that needs to be explored, 
but it also makes it clear that each experience contains 
that richness punctum implies. The temporal point is in 
the everlasting “now”. It brings up the epistemology of 
a moment, of that which is sudden and quick, of “a wink 
of an eye”. Furthermore, a  point is inscribed in the 
perpetual rhythm of return, of the Nietzschean Eternal 
Return,15 which transforms the recurrent “now” into the 
perennially actual. Yet, points can form lines, temporal 
cause -and-effect chains, linking past and future. Hence, 
they can become less distinct in the total organization of 
the figures of thought; still, each time we endeavour to 
specify time, it turns out that we have to focus on points 
once again, points which reveal interrelations, proportions, 
distances, but also the temporal “now”. A point of view 
is situated “here and now”. The post -Kantian view of the 
way the object is perceived and created by the subject16 was 
ennobled by Nietzsche as the knowledge of the fact that 
a point of view circumscribes the object, that it is created 
15 Nietzsche, Tako rzecze Zaratustra, p. 271.
16 Immanuel Kant, Krytyka czystego rozumu, trans. Roman 
Ingarden (Warszawa: PWN, 1957), vol. I, p. 436 (A 250).
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anew upon each estimation; but also as the knowledge that 
there is no fixed and stable point of view and point of the 
object, that the human world is entangled in the dynamics 
of observation -knowledge -living -responsibility.17 
If we consider a  point in relation to the function 
it performs, we realize that it could be a  detail which 
we single out as part of a greater whole. Hence, we can 
regard it as a  minute item, as something which is very 
tiny, almost microscopic. It is something irrelevant to the 
entire structure, it may even be an unnecessary immaterial 
gesture. A point as an ornament is always “next to” that 
which is significant, entire or primary. But this being “next 
to”, “close to” is at the same time being “between” what is 
crucial. It is much more than just an appealing intermezzo. 
Strangely enough, a detail can be regarded as a turning 
point in an interpretation of events. Such a point turns out 
to be a clue, a noticeable trace, a key to the description and 
interpretation of data. 
There is, however, still another way to think of a point as 
a centre, a focus, that which combines meanings, mingles 
types of conduct, merges thoughts. Such a point lies at 
the heart of the matter – it relates to the system of signs, 
to mechanisms of communication, to existent culture 
codes, to the hierarchy of information or to the principles 
of discourse. This is a  point that binds, establishes the 
relations of dominance and subordination, of the formal 
and the marginal. A point is what organizes and focuses 
thoughts but also what standardizes all variation and 
difference by placing it exactly in a point. It is a stigma. 
It is a wound, a brand, an eye -catching colourful stain; 
it is a disgraceful experience, a distinctive characteristic, 
a point of convergence, a power point. It builds up its own 
context. It refers everything that surrounds it to itself. It 
makes localization distinctive. Like the Renaissance eye of 
17 Vincent Descombes, To samo i  Inne. Czterdzieści pięć lat 
filozofii francuskiej (1933–1978), trans. Bogdan Banasiak and Krzysztof 
Matuszewski (Warszawa: Spacja, 1996), p. 226. 
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the perspective, it reigns over the structure of the whole, 
dictating the ontology of a work of art and its reception. 
As punctum, a brand burnt on the slave’s body, it labels 
and separates. But, at the same time, it has explicit social 
connotations – establishing symmetries and asymmetries 
of the communal order. These hierarchies of existence, of 
actions, of thoughts, of the world make us appreciate that 
which is focal, that which a point leads us to. Yet, a point is 
not only a focus, a place of convergence, but also a place of 
divergence and splitting. It maintains its separateness only 
to decentralize the structure, rewrite it into the marginal. 
A point of divergence tears apart interpretative continua, as 
in Barthes, when it interrupts and distracts the continuity 
of stadium, a conventional reading.18 Punctum changes the 
interpretation, it injures and pricks. It is a turning point of 
perception which sharpens the vision of an image. Such 
location of a point clearly leads to dislocation.
That is why humanistic reading needs to decipher 
points which bind and blow up at the same time, which 
lead to what is irrelevant and at the heart of the matter. 
This is the foundation of thought which controls the 
incoherence of thought. Finding and distributing points, 
repeating, combining together, liberating them from 
the abundance of comprehensive meanings and from 
the presence in the structure – these are the tropes of 
thinking. On the one hand, the whole, the structure to 
which points are subordinate, is appreciated, but on the 
other, a comprehensive and all too synthetic reading raises 
doubts. The hermeneutic perspective19 puts emphasis on the 
openness of a text and instability of interpretation. Still, the 
wish to restore order seems to be the nostalgia for the lost 
whole. A more radical formula is the postmodern tendency 
to do away with the unity of things altogether, without 
cherishing the hope to restore order, as in Baudrillard’s 
18 Roland Barthes, Światło obrazu. Uwagi o fotografii, trans. Jacek 
Trznadel (Warszawa: KR, 1996), § 10.
19 Katarzyna Rosner, Hermeneutyka jako krytyka kultury: Heidegger, 
Gadamer, Ricoeur (Warszawa: Biblioteka Myśli Współczesnej, 1991).
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vertiginous exhaustion and superfluity of meanings.20 It is 
a distrust of the totalizing thought and action in culture, 
realized in different forms. Trust in the text’s ability to form 
a whole – in the classical semiological understanding of 
the text as a discrete and cohesive construction – seems 
to be almost lost. Yet one cannot get rid of the whole, as 
was shown by Gestalt psychology which regarded it as 
a primary mode of thinking, urging that all points are 
conjoined within structures. The way we perceive an object 
depends on the field where it is situated, is the Gestalt 
diagnosis.21 We cannot eliminate systematic thinking, 
as it is noted by Ludwig von Bertalanffy,22 who stresses 
both the processes of homeostasis (the maintenance of 
equilibrium within a social group, person, etc.) and the 
processes of heterostasis (the dynamics within a system). 
Still, thinking through points is what applauds ambiguity; 
it is not easily arranged into stable blocks of knowledge, it 
is indeterminate, epistemologically inconclusive. It always 
eludes generalizations since this is the nature of a point. 
The crucial questions for anthropology all derive from 
a  point, no matter to what extent our cognition opens 
up towards what is human, all too human, non -human, 
animal -like or divine. Why does a human being need points 
in order to perceive things? Why cannot a human, while 
experiencing herself or himself, the others and space, do 
without the points of support he or she constructs? Why are 
perspectives as points of view (disregarding the statements 
of universality or relativity of one’s judgments) the only 
traces after the movement of thought that can only be 
point -like? Why is a human only to be grasped through 
points of convergence or divergence within the network 
20 Jean Baudrillard, Simulacra and Simulation. The Body, In Theory: 
Histories of Cultural Materialism, trans. Sheila Faria Glaser (Michigan: 
University of Michigan Press, 1995).
21 Calvin S. Hall, Garney Lindzey, John B. Campbell, Theories of 
Personality (New York: John Wiley and Sons, Inc., 1997).
22 Ludwig von Bertalanffy, General System Theory: Foundations, 
Development, Applications (New York: George Braziller, Inc., 1976).
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of relations? Why is the fragility of a human uncovered at 
particular points of his or her existence rather than in the 
continuum of her being? Why is a point, something tiny, 
marginal and strange, the place that is genuine? Why is it 
only a point that is capable of revealing a human being in his 
or her basic existential dimension, without ideologizing and 
mythologizing of the world? Why shall the ethical horizon 
of events that we delineate around a human concentrate 
on the points of his or her experience, points of his or her 
existence or critical points (as long as it is genuine and does 
not solely constitute the body of knowledge)? Why does 
a human bring up the truth of the area on condition that 
he or she is presented through points and at a particular 
point of space-time continuum? Why is it only by following 
molecules of the matter point by point that one is able to 
show the complexity of the world? Why is the point -like 
description to be regarded not only as a mere escape from the 
burden of synthesis and generalization but as a movement of 
thought that attempts to get as close as possible to a human 
and the nature of events? Last but not least, there is also 
a question of the form of the humanistic reflection that is 
point -like because it is close to a human in its thinking.
What would the Anthropology of Points be Like?
What would pedagogy be construed as a  strategy of 
thinking and experience which aims at the transformation 
of human space?
Why do we seek support from anthropology? Due to 
its broad interests and diversity of methodological tools, 
this field of scholarship makes it possible to coordinate 
cultural research which is not unequivocally allotted to 
one of the existing disciplines. Yet the abovementioned 
approach of the anthropology of points is less a specialized 
and institutionalized academic field than a  humanistic 
practice that seeks to unearth anthropology in its 
etymological reference, not only by combining anthropos 
(Greek άνθρωπος) and logos (Greek λόγος), but also by 
recognizing the imperative to follow and closely read the 
Aleksandra Kunce88
human. Construed as such, anthropology remains prior to 
the scientific division of labour that differentiates between 
physical, social, cultural and philosophical branches of 
anthropology. Bearing in mind the distinction between 
the Kantian question “What is a man?”23 followed by his 
pragmatic anthropology project and Max Scheler’s and 
Helmuth Plessner’s view of philosophical anthropology, 
as well as the distinction between a discourse that situates 
a  human empirically in terms of functional, structural 
or configurationist anthropology,24 and the kind of 
anthropological space cultural studies posits,25 we have 
yet to inquire about this primary dimension of the study 
of a human being. Anthropology touches upon the human 
in its immediate environment, it inquires about human 
experience in the dynamic relationship between what is 
individual and what is common, furthermore, it bridges the 
gap between the universal and the contextual, between the 
recurrent and the unique. Anthropology stripped of its cloak 
of scientific divisions is able to once again pose a question 
of what a human is, seeking a narrative that would embody 
human experience. That is why it is essential to place it 
beyond any further divisions of the study of a  human 
being (anthropology of image, anthropology of music, 
anthropology of architecture, etc.). Such an approach, in 
connection with the inquiry into human experience, may 
raise doubts: is it not the case that anthropology in general 
is a risky formula and an imprecise umbrella term under 
which diverse research orientations are located? Still, 
while defending the status of undivided anthropology we 
23 Immanuel Kant, Logika. Podręcznik do wykładów, ed. Gottlob 
Benjamin Jäsche, trans. Zygmunt Zawirski, „Filo ‑Sofija”, Bydgoskie 
Towarzystwo Naukowe. Rocznik Komisji Filozofii 2 (2002), A 25, p. 141. 
24 Applied (empirical) anthropology has its methodological basis in 
tools created and utilized in empirical research. Cf. Alexander M. Ervin, 
Applied Anthropology: Tools and Perspectives for Contemporary Practice 
(Boston: Pearson/Allyn and Bacon, 2004).
25 John Storey, Cultural Studies & The Study of Popular Culture. 
Theories and Methods (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 1998).
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appreciate the absence of separate fields within the study 
of human, which does not translate into a thorough and 
systematic view of a human being. Contrariwise, we wish 
to stress the point -like character of human thoughts and 
actions. Our approach contributes to the self -fashioning of 
a human who is able to alter her inner disposition by being 
attentive to points in her reception and understanding of the 
world. Education in the spirit of the anthropology of points 
is a strategy that leads to the opening up of pedagogical 
methods and pedagogy itself, in order to provide a basis for 
thinking within other academic disciplines.
Anthropology of points is an attempt to frame a research 
perspective which focuses upon a point, measures from 
point to point and marks distinctive orientation points as 
well as limit points. It records the density of the distribution 
of points, of their regularity and irregularity, and finds 
its starting points in observations and recognizable 
figures of human thought and conduct. At the same 
time, it yields a provocative question of how to carry out 
a point -like investigation which is true to the point -like 
nature of experience. It wonders whether it is possible for 
a  point -like interpretation to act as an effective way of 
avoiding synthesis and generalization in the constructs 
of knowledge. It discusses the role of configurations of 
points by indicating that they are singled out by syntagmas 
and metasyntagmas, that is to say, they contribute to the 
making of relationships, all -inclusive structures and 
systems. What could be stressed here is either a whole figure 
drawn or a point as an autonomous entity. Anthropology 
of points, far from disregarding the dynamics of the whole 
and the part, claims that a point exists within a network 
of connections. However, all the conjunctions, even 
systematic ones, are unable to obliterate the distinctiveness 
of a point. Anthropology of points is focused less on static 
forms that would form human knowledge and experience 
as figures and solids, than on the ceaseless movement of 
transformation and mediation between the point -like and 
the figural. That is why it is primarily interested in points 
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in the perception of data, perspectives as points of view, 
and points of support we construct while experiencing 
ourselves, the others and space.
A point is not just a static element in the geometry of 
human conglomerations since it belongs to action and 
movement. It forms lines or figures which constitute the 
substance of life. One should not contrast line and point, 
as Kandinsky did,26 claiming that it is only the former that 
is dynamic, a trace of a point in motion. On the contrary, 
the two are coupled and constantly interacting. We can 
perceive a point as a dynamic point of activity, a junction 
of forces. A  point is an accumulated activity. In and 
through points something of a human being is captured. 
Anthropology implies looking at a human being through 
the points of her accumulated activity. It aspires to the 
integral knowledge of a  human. It fuses the empirical 
and general, all that a reflection on a human is concerned 
with. That is why anthropology needs a point as a mental 
construct in order to capture a human being in the sudden 
occurrence of his or her experiences and to reveal a number 
of particular, along with general, dimensions of space-
time continuum. It makes use of the hermeneutic notion 
of experience,27 as well as of Lévinas’s ethical experience 
of the encounter with the Other but it cannot be reduced 
to any of them.28 Anthropology focuses on the point -like 
quality of experience, that is to say, on its constant being 
in motion, on that which is common, momentary, unstable 
but also perennial, on that which is only partly graspable 
26 Wasyl Kandinsky, Punkt i  linia a płaszczyzna. Przyczynek do 
analizy elementów malarskich, trans. Stanisław Fijałkowski (Warszawa: 
PWN, 1986), pp. 53–55.
27 Martin Heidegger, Bycie i czas, trans. Bogdan Baran (Warszawa: 
Wydawnictwo Naukowe PWN, 2007), pp. 81–145; Hans -Georg 
Gadamer, Prawda i metoda. Zarys hermeneutyki filozoficznej, trans. 
Bogdan Baran (Kraków: Inter Esse, 1993), pp. 324–337.
28 Emanuel Lévinas, O Bogu, który nawiedza myśl, trans. Małgorzata 
Kowalska, prefaced by Tadeusz Gadacz SP, (Kraków: Znak, 1999), 
pp. 59–61, 225–234.
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and heterogeneous. To focus on the experience of culture 
is to concentrate on what occurs to us daily.29 Hence the 
possibility of reinforcement through a particular experience 
construed here as Benjamin’s momentary (point -like) 
event30 or as Simmel’s pulsating and microscopic forms of 
social experience.31
To get hold of a human in the community may mean 
today to concentrate on the points of his or her experience 
in order to manifest the fragmentary nature of perception 
of the object under scrutiny and to trigger thinking 
through points that does not conceal its creativeness but 
at the same time is focused on the object, exhibiting the 
old anthropological humility towards truth. Nowadays, 
the challenge is to create a  new perspective, no longer 
methodological, freed from epistemological arrogance, 
one that would be able to highlight the point -like mode 
of experience, which can be ornamental, focal, central, 
momentary, situated on the margin or at the intersection 
of social relations, which hurts, cuts to the quick, pierces 
and reveals a landscape that is fundamental to a human 
being and allows one to transgress one’s individuality.
Such humanistic study halts its reflection at a point, 
attempting to scrutinize the nature of experience, trustful 
towards details rather than a synthesis. It carefully selects 
points of view, deeply aware of the fact that perception 
is never continuous and systematic. It makes a  point 
by stating that its observations are made from a certain 
point of view which has been constructed. It indicates the 
points of support wherein its own philosophy of culture 
is anchored, yet it is readily affected by the questioning 
of its own statements, often altering its perspectives and 
localizations of the scrutinized object. Undoubtedly, 
29 Aleksandra Kunce, Tożsamość i  postmodernizm (Warszawa: 
Elipsa, 2003).
30 Walter Benjamin: Charles Baudelaire: A Lyrical Poet in the Era 
of High Capitalism (London, 1983). 
31 Georg Simmel, Most i drzwi. Wybór esejów, trans. Małgorzata 
Łukasiewicz (Warszawa: Oficyna Naukowa, 2006), p. 185. 
Aleksandra Kunce92
it is a  deeply focused reflection, moving from point to 
point, although not in straight lines or in one direction. 
This type of thinking frequently retracts, repeats, stops, 
suddenly accelerates, mediates and triggers various modes 
of perception. It does not invalidate the existing and stable 
networks of relations or conventional cultural routes, 
but when choosing points of intersection it attends to 
dispersion, vagueness and incoherence.
Such perspectivism is not only close to the human 
epistemological condition but is also what delineates the 
ethical horizon of events. It detects a human in what is 
tiny, concentrated, dispersed, fragmentary, fragile, wary 
of synthesis, yet close to the event and object. Point- 
like thinking and point -like observation, followed by 
their record, are mindful of the complexity of things 
and take great pains to stay near the nature of events. 
It is both necessary to single out and mark something 
with geometrical precision, and to situate it in a network 
of points, drawing straight lines, indicating intersection 
points, and delineating the domain of a point, as is the 
case with a static drawing made with great precision by 
a  draughtsman on the vellum. And yet anthropology 
eventually goes beyond such fixity. It undermines the all 
too simple geometry of thinking. What a point leads us 
to and what formerly found its expression in Archimedes’ 
measuring of the earth, in his desire to measure each and 
every grain of sand, displays an important attribute of point-
like thinking, an imperative that the world be fathomed in 
its foundations, in that which is minute, point -like. Yet, 
this measurability can easily be replaced by a mere wish 
to penetrate the grain of sand without the mathematics 
in the eye, as was the desire of William Blake who all of 
a sudden turned towards the genuine and primal.32 Blake 
was far from valuing the measurable and limited world. 
Still, anthropology of a point cannot dispense with the will 
to measure, since it wishes to measure humbly, describing 
32 William Blake, Auguries of Innocence (Yardley, 1975).
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the world in its very foundations, in proximity to what is 
elementary, even if it appreciates suddenness and eschews 
conclusiveness. It refers a point to time, to space and to 
motion. On the basis of the primal and minute, it explains 
other attributes, without skipping a  point on the way. 
The smallest is treated as fundamental, the discriminate 
as something that is not bound by a system and cannot 
be defined by anything else. Extreme and critical points, 
border points, points of convergence and divergence, gravity 
points – all of them define the principles of anthropological 
thinking which needs to find the way to express what is 
beyond a  word, a  cultural reality which is not directly 
graspable. Yet the task of this anthropology is not only to 
mark points in that space, and to recognize boundaries that 
are significant to a human being as her acts of separation, 
but also to indicate the blurring of the sacred delimitation 
points. It follows the idea that we experience the world in 
a point. It explores points of waning, dead points within 
the communal space, those that enclose the space and 
help delineate the horizon of events. It investigates poles, 
cardinal points, gravity points, density points within places 
and human relations, recording in a point -like manner the 
differences in the condensation of cultural matter. A point 
becomes a stigma, a sign, a concrete form inscribed on the 
body, a stream of relations. It is what cuts to the quick. It is 
a climax, a destination of the anthropologist’s expedition 
to the ends of the world, a turn towards the Other as well as 
to oneself, the beginning and the end, alpha and omega. It 
constitutes axis mundi, it reveals itself in stations, frontier 
posts, unimportant and stable places which give support 
and mislead. It is present in the places of junction and 
contiguity of objects, in both the stable and the dynamic. 
Anthropology passes quickly all the information points or 
measurable points that perform a useful function within 
cultural space, and gets an insight into those sites of culture 
that represent various perspectives of experience and 
thinking, different logics of defining space -time continuum 
and human relations.
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The research perspective rooted in the notion of a point 
opens up a space around a human being, in accordance with 
the principles of geometry and drawing which recognize 
the potential of a point. It has a sudden quality. Whereas 
drawing is what closes up since a line marks the end by 
providing a distinct outline of things, a point is what opens 
the world. A point is a place where life is pulsating. It opens 
up towards other points, creating networks of references, 
being constantly on the move. A point opens the world by 
bringing together different orders of nature, social life and 
metaphysical existence. Anthropology of points explores 
this dynamics and allows us to decipher human space by 
means of the epistemologically refined notion of a point.
It seems that the presented project of the anthropology 
of points may also be utilized as a pedagogical strategy, on 
condition that it is treated as a broad worldview underlining 
concrete educational proposals. Not only is it capable of 
transforming existing pedagogical methods, but it may 
also become an exacting philosophy of education which, 
by altering the tools for knowing the world and fashioning 
one’s self, reorganizes social relations and human space. 
At the end of the day, anthropology of points is as yet an 
uncultivated land, a project of insight into the space of 
experience waiting to be applied, but it is also a chance to 
invent new educational strategies capable of recognizing the 
contemporary world as dispersed and indeterminate. For 
education cannot be solely based on the reference to moral 
and aesthetic values, or concepts and categories derived 
from scientific, national, international and multinational 
schemes of knowledge. The knowledge of what is in -between 
(inter -) and remains correlated with the idea of solidarity, 
tolerance or communality, needs to be anchored in a novel 
style of thinking which thoroughly teaches how to confront 
oneself and the Other within the common space, while the 
care about this thorough modelling of one’s participation 
in the social is solely derived from the choice of an 
anthropology as a select interpretation of a human being. 
An interesting proposal here is that of the anthropology 
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of points, which could be found conducive to shaping 
a human and developing methods in the field of education. 
For it is a point -like interpretation of the world, an ability to 
respond in a point -like manner to fragile human bonds, and 
a point -like outline of knowledge capable of dismantling 
petrified edifices of ideology or national narrative, that 
provides an opportunity for an insightful and precise, 
far from superficial, reading of lived experience. It is also 
a chance to develop creative and markedly humble projects 
of the self in the dispersed and multicultural, and hence 
dialogic, world. 
The condition of being dispersed and point -like is 
not a fault and a blind alley of the post -thinking but an 
affirmation of the route of a point which raises doubts and 
dismantles ideological beliefs and all -too -domesticated 
structures of knowledge. Although the point -like quality 
leads to the discovery and propagation of epistemological 
impotence, it does not translate into the weakness of 
the humanities. Undertaking enlightened social (and 
educational) projects that would explore the notion of 
a point and create a space for the anthropology of points 
is not an intellectual fashion. It is a necessity of embarking 
upon new humanistic projects based on punctum which 
would correspond to a dispersed nature of social reality and 
contribute to the transformation of ourselves as we learn to 
humanistically shape the substance of culture.
Punctum as that which is minute and fragile, which 
injures and has a bitter taste, which can be a focal point, 
a sign and a stigma, which can be curious, peripheral and 
cardinal, what can melt away, etc., is a promising route 
combining scholarly insight and pedagogical strategy. 
Aleksandra Kunce
Towards the Integral Humanities*
Despite many attempts at reconstituting the humanities 
in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, the concern 
about its current condition is hardly passé. Discontent 
with the very shape the humanities take is common 
to the advocates of scientific research on nature – who 
confide in hard science as the march of facts – and to the 
followers of arts as a field of interpretation which yields 
truths about a human being in a distinct metaphorical 
language. This article attempts to answer the question of 
how the humanistic reflection may be conceived of as long 
as it is discussed in the framework of the philosophical 
presuppositions of postmodernism. Does it contribute to 
the integral vision of the humanities?
The postmodern thought is significantly embedded 
in the history of ideas. One of such focal points is the 
reflection of Friedrich Nietzsche, a philosopher who sought 
to unify art and theoretical insight, who urged that there 
be no divisions, who allowed linguistic creativity and 
metaphorical expression in the humanities, and finally who 
shunned sedentary and cautious knowledge, one that was 
cultivated by scholars in the cool shade.1 This is a reference 
* The chapter first published as:“Towards the Integral Humanities,” 
International Journal of the Humanities, vol. 4, issue 2 (2006) 9–14.
1 Friedrich Nietzsche, Thus Spoke Zaratustra, in The Portable 
Nietzsche, trans. Walter Kaufmann (New York: Penguin Books, 1976), 
p. 237. 
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to the humanities which are close to living, close to the flux 
of reality; but also to the humanities which impose ethical 
obligations. And this trail is what we have to remember.
Another important moment in history is the 
antipositivistic turn in the late nineteenth and early 
twentieth century which brought about the notion of 
“spiritual sciences” (Geisteswissen ‑schaften) coined by
Wilhelm Dilthey, or Rickert’s “cultural sciences” 
(Kulturwissenschaften). Demolishing positivistic con-
clusions, it moved closer to living – by treating the very 
subject of inquiry, mainly a  complex sociohistorical 
reality, as distinct, and by selecting a distinct methodology 
based on understanding. In 1883, Dilthey resolved that 
Geisteswissen ‑schaften should approach living at the 
intersection of life, expression and understanding.2 This 
is where postmodernism, as a conceptual edifice, has its 
foundation. 
One of the most significant aspects of postmodernism is 
an attempt at reinterpretation of the modernist world -image. 
The modernist perspectivism is what in the European 
culture determines the path of attachment to the whole, 
truth and reason. Only that which guarantees totality, 
necessity and evidence is able to offer an adequate way of 
cognition, explication and even understanding.3 At the end 
of the day fragments always constitute the whole, analytical 
reasoning leads to synthesis, the only right progress implies 
attaining ever higher degrees of knowledge, and difference 
becomes subordinated to identity. To know truly is to 
acquire synthetic knowledge of the One, Complete and 
Essential. This widespread language practice is obviously 
2 Wilhelm Dilthey, Einleitung in die Geisteswissenschaften in 
Gesammelte Schriften (Stuttgart -Göttlingen, 1958–1982), vol. 1. 
3 René Descartes, Discourse on the Method of Rightly Conducting the 
Reason, and Seeking Truth in the Science, in René Descartes, A Discourse 
on the Method. Meditations and Principle, trans. John Veitch (London: 
Orion Publishing Group, 2004), pp. 3–61; Georg W. F. Hegel, 
The Philosophy of History, trans. John Sibree (New York: Prentice Hall, 
1956). 
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far removed from pragmatist contingency.4 What is its 
aim? To close, bring to an end and complete the process 
of thinking. The movement of totalizing thought – always 
audacious in its undertakings – is synchronized with the 
European culture in full spate. Its global enterprises – such 
as territorial expansion – are merely a  reflection of the 
formed mental space.5 “Behind the surface, into the depths, 
towards the essence” – the echoes of this call can easily be 
heard in methodological, economic and political pursuits. 
The first ones are of most interest here. To explore the deep 
structure of thinking, to arrive at the basic oppositions 
governing cognition is a task that faces the most European 
of European methodologies – structuralism.6 To determine 
necessity, to complete thinking and to merge in the name 
of totality and systematicity is an aim of the Philosophy 
of Certitude.7 To reintroduce unity into a  number of 
scattered traces, to rediscover the relationship through 
understanding, to indirectly get to the bottom of things, 
to take root in language – is an aim of the less so certain 
methodology of hermeneutics.8
These are just a  few routes of European cognition. 
But would it be so simple as to allow us to think that 
there is a  parallel or criss -crossing undercurrent of 
discrepant thinking: the cult of a fragment, difference and 
4 Richard Rorty, Consequences of Pragmatism (Univeristy of 
Minnesota Press, 1982); Richard Rorty, Contingency, Irony, and 
Solidarity (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989), pp. 73–95.
5 Pierre Chaunu, La civilisation de l’Europe des Lumières 
(Flammarion, 1997). 
6 Claude Lévi -Strauss, Structural Anthropology, trans. Claire 
Jacobson and Brooke Schoepf (New York: Basic Books, 2000), pp. 277–
381. 
7 Hegel, The Philosophy of History. 
8 Hans -Georg Gadamer, Philosophical Hermeneutics, trans. 
David E. Linge (Berkeley and London: Univeristy of California Press, 
1977), pp. 3–17; Martin Heidegger, List o „humanizmie”, trans. Józef 
Tischner, in Martin Heidegger, Znaki drogi, trans. Seweryn Bladzi et al. 
(Warszawa: Fundacja Aletheia, 1995), pp. 129–168; Martin Heidegger, 
Holzwege (Frankfurt am Main: Vittorio Klostermann, 2003). 
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indeterminacy – the micro -current? Is it simply about the 
Manichean hierarchy of importance: either Parmenides or 
Heraclitus, either structuralism or postmodernism, either 
Hegel or Nietzsche? Can one believe in the opposition of 
micro - and macro -style of thinking? Does the thought 
develop simply by following the path of either mythos or 
logos? The duality was repeatedly questioned by Jacques 
Derrida, who traced the area of shadow, boundary, and 
the uncertain within the examplary philosophies of 
essentialism, like those of Plato or Edmund Husserl.9 We 
have also seen Jean -François Lyotard on the trail of the 
postmodern in Kant or Aristotle.10
The main finding of postmodernism is that the very 
thinking is a movement simultaneously prone to macro - and 
microscopic influences. Let us trust the unity and inability to 
separate with reference to the humanities. Postmodernism 
– this is what interests us here – transgresses the divisions 
of the modernist project of scholarship. It denotes openness 
to an integral field of knowledge, one that additionally 
binds elitism to the popular, while stressing the necessity 
of a sense of moral duty as well as the everyday concern for 
communal betterment and what stems therefrom. 
Suspicious scholarship
Modernist scholarship in its post -Enlightenment (and 
especially neopositivistic) version was supposed to provide 
definite answers.11 Postmodernism finds this imperative 
 9 Jacques Derrida, Of Grammatology, trans. Gayatri Chakravorty 
Spivak (Baltimore, MD: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1998); 
Jacques Derrida, Kres człowieka, trans. Paweł Pieniążek, in Pismo 
filozofii, ed. Bogdan Banasiak (Kraków: Inter Esse, 1992), pp. 129–160.
10 Jean -François Lyotard and Jean -Loup Thebaus, Au Juste (Les 
Editions de Minut, 1979), p. 52; Jean -François Lyotard, The Postmodern 
Condition: A Report on Knowledge (University of Minnesota Press, 1984). 
11 Jean -François Lyotard, The Postmodern Condition: A Report on 
Knowledge (University of Minnesota Press, 1984). 
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irrelevant and outdated. Besides, the scholarship, as 
scientistically conceived, was to be consistent through 
systematicity and unambiguous through application of 
logical rules – which were treated as a revelation of the 
highest laws of thinking (in the tradition of Aristotle or 
Descartes) and not merely as rules of a rhetorical game 
(in the tradition of Greek sophists). Finally, modernist 
scholarship was to be marked by completeness. René 
Descartes, laying the foundations of the modern horizon 
of scholarly investigation (together with Francis Bacon and 
Isaac Newton), set in motion a methodological machinery 
which was to control thinking and to guarantee its veracity 
manifested in simplicity and evidence.12 Induction or 
deduction – both paths of inquiry were to legitimize the 
correctness and veracity of conclusions. Such scholarship 
had to put faith in denotative sentences – which are 
questionable insofar as they are open to verification as 
a gesture of confirmation Thomas Kuhn wrote about,13 or to 
falsification, which in Karl Popper’s words is a guarantee of 
progress.14 Such scholarship needed a “lodge of legislators” 
to become an institutional game appealing to many due 
to its well -developed and long -sanctioned rules, with 
legitimacy and correctness of an utterance as a guarantee 
of its quality.
Such scholarship has had to give rise to justifiable 
postmodernist suspicions, a topic repeatedly broached by 
Zygmunt Bauman15 or Jean-François Lyotard.16 Nevertheless, 
it is still a recognized academic practice, immensely popular 
and difficult to dispose of. As Kuhn notes, scholarship is 
12 Descartes, Discourse on the Method, pp. 3–61.
13 Thomas S. Kuhn, The Structure of Scientific Revolutions (Chicago: 
University of Chicago Press, 1996), pp. 10–34. 
14 Karl Reimund Popper, Objective Knowledge: An Evolutionary 
Approach (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1972), pp. 4–51. 
15 Zygmunt Bauman, Liquid Modernity (Cambridge: Polity Press 
2000), pp. 53–90.
16 Jean -François Lyotard, The Postmodern Condition: A Report on 
Knowledge (University of Minnesota Press, 1984), pp. 11–17. 
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based on puzzles which are formulated by scholars of great 
eminence and then solved by them according to system 
rules in order to confirm and strengthen their professional 
status. They work to provide us with a  transparent 
world -image, one already disclosed. Such scholarship, 
particularly disturbing to the humanities, becomes closed 
and presents itself as a model of the world which – in Michel 
Serres’s view – has long imposed the imperative to combat 
disorder, to pursue coherence at any cost, to stay separate 
from other domains of life, to refuse to face the fact that 
foundations of all theories crack because reality itself is 
unstable.17 Such scholarship is alien to the god Hermes, who 
borrows, mediates, initaties and breaks the discourse open. 
And it is contrary to the thought of postmodernist -minded 
Serres, who inclines towards whatever is open, changeable 
and discontinuous in reflection. This is another important 
theme for the postmodern humanities.
Modernist scholarship is far remote from art and the 
experience of mystery. The undecidable is no subject of 
inquiry, it is deferred or postponed in accordance with the 
belief in the development of research tools and methods. 
Scholarship, if confronted by a mystery, has no difficulty 
in dealing with it – simply declares its surrender. In this 
way institutional scholarship frequently incapacitates 
itself, as it is confined to social praxis which makes 
a distinction between the rational and the wise. Entrusted 
with solving puzzles instead of approaching mystery, the 
scholarship turns into an efficient and functional lifestyle, 
accompanied by an analogous way of thinking. Not 
necessarily a demanding way of being in the world, it is 
what scholars actually desired, having distanced themselves 
from metaphysicians in order to make their pursuit more 
efficient. If there is any mystery in modernist thinking, it 
can be found in a discourse radically different from the 
17 Michel Sarres, Hermes: Literature, Science, Philosophy, eds. Josue 
V. Harrari and David F. Bell (Baltimore, MD and London: The Johns 
Hopkins University Press, 1983).
Aleksandra Kunce102
scholarly language, the discourse of great thinkers and 
critics of Western scholarship, such as for instance Martin 
Heidegger. He wreaked havoc with the Western calculating 
thinking, and in doing so, he wished to plant anew and 
cultivate the concern for Holzwege, a  contemplative 
insight and closeness to mystery.18 The route of mystery 
is a well -known path of reflecting; it is however a much 
unappreciated path of scholarly practice.
A scholarship which would reestablish its connection 
to the first questions without seeking to eliminate 
mystery and ambiguity might be the most favourable 
environment for contemporary humanistic thinking. 
The contemporary world is consumed with the conflict 
between incommensurable orders of knowledge; to remedy 
the situation one need not, however, try to constrain the 
plurality (in itself a desirable condition) in the name of 
unity. On the contrary, one should emphasize it even more, 
or foreground the existing tension, the entanglement, the 
unique rhythm of living. It is behind the conceptual wars 
fought in the name of rationality and irrationality that the 
same ostentatiously manifested unpredictability, inability 
of self -expression, ambiguity, absence and intangibility 
resides. This is what in fact is lacking in scientistic thin- 
king (which remains ever on guard against the vague, 
inexplicable and non -falsifiable), but this is also what 
paralyses postmodernist thought (by its reference to the 
abyss and metaphysical depths, while the most promising 
developments are associated with events, writing and 
surface). 
Contrary to appearances, the underlying mystery 
is visible in the shreds of discordant knowledge: in the 
methodological credulity of natural sciences, in the 
discourse of analytical philosophy, in the theological 
approach to particular issues, in the rational fondness 
for solving puzzles in social sciences, in the positivistic 
developing of any histories of facts and ideas, in the 
18 Heidegger, Holzwege. 
103Towards the Integral Humanities
empirical -based argumentation in social anthropology, 
and, last but not least, in the inclination towards 
metascientific investigations into the old scholarly 
discourse, as well as the fondness for the postmodern mode 
of reflection, one confiding in paralogy, creationism and 
artistry of language.
Mystery is a  false bottom of postmodernism and 
modernism, both of which attempt to steer clear of 
obscurity on various levels. This is why we need to address 
the problem of integrity. Obscurity identifiable as mystery 
proves crucial to postmodernism inasmuch as it is the 
reverse of the apologia of the surface. Because while the post-
trend flees from the source, essence, depth, metaphysical 
mystery, it also recognizes their significance, even if it seeks 
to invalidate them by preaching a cheerful play with surface 
(in)scription.19 Postmodernism is after all well -aware of the 
fear of the mighty old narrative of mystery which translated 
into diverse social orders, ones seeking to legitimize even 
extreme violence by means of the mythology of the depth 
they created and fostered. Therefore, postmodernism 
yearns to be freed from the obsession and obligation to serve 
the compulsory mysterious interpretation of the world, 
whether in the name of metaphysical reality or the ascent 
of the spirit, the idea of purpusefulness of history, universal 
human progress or civilizational primacy.20 The obscurity 
of mystery is then transferred onto the level of superficial 
opacity. The discourse becomes flat, devoid of fundamental 
issues. But we can ask: Does it not provide a heightened 
sense of the obscurity of the world? It is not only the nature 
of things that becomes impenetrable; it is also the sphere 
of linguistic convention or behavioural code that tends to 
be blurred. Contrary to common opinion, postmodernism 
sides with the simultaneous yet incoherent recognition of 
the power of mystery and apologia of impenetrable surface. 
19 Derrida, Of Grammatology.
20 Gilles Deleuze, Difference and Repetition, trans. Paul Patton (New 
York: Columbia University Press, 1994). 
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It is not just an innocent play in the name of (dis)sense. 
Obscurity, emphasis on paralogy, deferment, absence and 
openness – these are signposts that paradoxically lead to 
rootedness in the consideration of mystery. The humanities 
are humanistic insofar as they make a  sustained effort 
to face up to mystery and obscurity of things without 
yielding to the temptation of easy solutions to the human 
existential puzzle. And this is the common basis of different 
humanistic disciplines which cannot remain separate as 
long as they guard mystery. In this sense postmodernism 
is what bridges gaps and mediates between various fields 
of knowledge. 
Towards the integral humanities
The integral humanities, which are not totalized, may 
be aided by the ambivalent cognitive situation of the 
researcher. This seems to apply to a sociologist, philosopher 
and anthropologist alike, who are encouraged to cherish 
their cognitive impotence. Obviously it will only take 
place after they have recognized their own inability and 
debunked the illusions harboured by their predecessors as 
to the conclusiveness of intellectual speculations. Hence 
their sense of satisfaction will stem from some kind of 
confidence in their cognitive powers; otherwise they 
would not be able to regard anything as unknowable. 
Paradoxically, cognitive impotence is thus tantamount 
to potency. It is connected with one’s powers being based 
on the acknowledgment of the obscurity of the world and 
on development of linguistic formulae that would make 
it possible to describe the obscurity. It is however quite 
pointless to talk indiscriminately about all the seekers 
after obscurity and transparency. It seems that those who 
announce their epistemological impotence – after the 
postmodernist reworking of key categories – are marked by 
humility manifested in refusing the title of priest, master, 
teacher or judge. One is merely a participant in language 
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games that society plays;21 but a participant with moral 
duties. There is also an element of excessive pride but it is 
rather tied to one’s linguistic self -awareness, whereby the 
individual does not attempt to conceal his or her creativity 
and contingency of his or her vocabulary, as Richard Rorty 
puts it.22 Eventually what dominates is a  sense of one’s 
cognitive impotence and a concern related to the inability 
of stating the truth in the clear bivalent logical description.
The strength of the humanities lies in that they 
refuse to assimilate to hard science and are not prone 
to fragmentation while eschewing from giving simple 
diagnoses and drawing easy conclusions. And it is 
postmodernism that casts a new light on the humanities. 
It testifies to the inability of arriving at the truth of the 
world and, by projecting an image of things that focuses on 
the unpredictable, chaotic, inaccessible and unnameable, 
it celebrates the aforementioned route of mystery. With all 
its emphasis on anonymity and intertextuality, it is a truly 
original current, one originally preaching “the death of 
the author” and creatively juggling patterns. The creativity 
of the knowing subject actually means establishing the 
principle beyond all principles. It concerns a  principle 
inherent in us, in our response to the old order, a principle 
that denies transparency. This principle, contingently 
erected and trusted, is simply obscurity. The key, present 
in the tradition and used to disentangle meaning, fails us, 
as does our learned epistemological attitude – powered by 
the will to know and belief in the systematicity as well as in 
the effect measurable both quantitatively and qualitatively. 
Another crucial aspect of obscurity, one often broached 
by the humanities, is writing. This is one of postmodernism’s 
greatest achievements. It consists in signalling – by 
21 Ludwig Wittgenstein, Philosophical Investigations, trans. G.E.M. 
Anscombe (Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice Hall, 1999); Jean -François 
Lyotard, The Postmodern Condition: A Report on Knowledge (University 
of Minnesota Press, 1984).
22 Richard Rorty, Contingency, Irony, and Solidarity (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1989), pp. 73–95. 
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means of the adopted style of thinking and description – 
a departure from the notion of language as a mirror of 
nature.23 But also in showing the inapplicability of logical 
rules or the absence of a system. This in turn is connected 
with the practice of following textual displacements by 
pointing to the dissemination of (dis)senses, unmasking 
gaps and ruptures in the essentialist discourse, creating 
ever new metaphores in the hope of developing interesting 
language games, and breaking open holistic accounts in 
favour of fragmentation. The postmodernist discourse 
ostentatiously celebrates its stylistic obscurity, which is 
a further testimony to the existence of cognitive impotence. 
Above all, however, it points to the literary quality of 
scholarly accounts by stating that writing is an instrument 
for producing metaphors. Each scholarly text is literature. 
And this is an important remark for the humanities, which 
self -consciously embark upon scholarly considerations, 
having first acknowledged their provisional character and 
rhetorical appeal. 
The uncertainty underlying the humanities, which 
is both their distinctive feature and a guarantee of their 
integrity, contributes to the description of a human being. 
The tension between an apologia for and rebellion against 
the order of culture, between the simultaneous taking root 
in and uprooting oneself from the soil of collective ideas 
merely paves the way for the description of a human. But 
it is the simultaneity that provides a clue to humanistic 
thinking – an insight which, by formulating systems of 
knowledge, reinforces the belief in the power of rootlessness. 
It achieves this aim by constructing tools which serve to 
dismantle blocks of knowledge. It stresses the instrumental 
and contingent function of language, which we can use, 
in Rorty’s words, like a toolbox, searching for ever more 
appealing metaphors.24 It requires a creative activity that 
would withstand disharmony within the human being 
23 Rorty, Contingency, Irony, and Solidarity, pp. 73–95, 3–22.
24 Ibidem.
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and world – a Nietzschean demand for writing that would 
tantalize language conceived of as an existential call. 
This is how, by blurring the gap between the domains 
of knowledge and art (as well as ethics), the humanities 
dismiss the possiblity of human fragmentation. The 
humanities come close to the simultaneity in human 
experience and by doing so they protect themselves 
against one -track knowledge, one developing a single line 
of thinking and generating various theories of human and 
world development with one central idea and a closed list of 
categories in mind. We could say that the humanities need 
a sudden vision of the human being – which is in a sense 
a total, instant and frayed image. They cannot act as a shell 
that rigoristically forces manifestations of human activity 
into established orders and gives encyclopaedic overviews 
and classifications. Significantly, the humanities should 
never overshadow a human being, separating him or her by 
means of various fields of knowledge. Their task is to guard 
the good cover, one that does not allow ostentation and 
medical precision in thinking, does not permit annihilation 
of chance and, of the same time, does protect the human. It 
is the cover that prevents from being stripped by a method 
and protects against the abuses of the bombastic faculty of 
cognition. Paradoxically, shielding a human being from the 
possessive knowledge that takes place in the humanities 
bears much resemblance to protecting the individual from 
being exposed in cultural practices. It secures the acts of 
taking root and uprooting, a good secret of a human.
The gesture of demolition obliges since it gives rise 
to a  sense of responsibility for the whole construction. 
Nietzsche, in stressing the role of destructive energy, set 
unprecedented requirements with reference to the genius 
and greatness of created effect.25 Heidegger, in his Letter 
on Humanism,26 contesting forgetfulness in the Western 
thinking on Being, erected a new edifice, a new world-
25 Nietzsche, Thus Spoke Zarathustra.
26 Heidegger, List o „humanizmie”, pp. 129–168.
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image which alternatively, through destruction, restored 
a human being. No thinker more than Derrida eschewed an 
unequivocal interpretation of destruction and repudiation,27 
yet the idea of deconstruction was well anchored in the past 
and attached to textual experimenting. Above all, it was 
a gesture of responsible friendship which inquired about 
ways of sublating humanism and metaphysics. Destruction, 
deconstruction and reconstruction are a merit because they 
guard the cover with its good “darkening” quality, or what 
provides the shelter in the humanities. Such humanities are 
a challenge, but most of all they presuppose duty and aim 
to protect a human being. In doing so, they become a field 
open to exploration in the realm of language as a descriptive 
tool, but first and foremost in the sphere of creation and 
reinterpretation of concepts, as well as creation of mental 
space which is marked by the tension between the cultural 
and the particular. 
Let us repeat, the humanities are still a challenge and 
duty. We could figuratively say that the humanistic insight 
is simultaneously a matter of lightness and burden. Hence 
the requirement to conceive humanistic generalizations – as 
long as they wish to address the complexity of phenomena – 
as a  sort of light covering of well -disposed (“friendly”) 
theory for the items being researched or constructed. And 
the theory, as long as it desires to approach things, should 
be close to life and cracked. We exist in the mental space 
of displacement, transplantation and transformation. 
That is why all the attempts at undermining and silencing 
cultural narratives which grow humble faced with the 
indeterminate course of events are a challenge. That is why 
the discourse which dismantles the systematicity of seeing 
– through reflection revolving around the exhausted, the 
unnameable, the ineffable, the unknowable, the silenced 
and the dispersed – multiplies gaps that allow us to 
sense the rhythm of experiencing. The humanities watch 
over epistemological borders within which we approach 
27 Derrida, Kres człowieka, pp. 129–160.
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things. In this sense, the integral humanities protect and 
preserve cracks and scratches, impossible steps in research, 
incoherence of the system, any blurs or specks that testify 
to the missing route to transparency.
We can conclude that the contemporary humanities – 
as long as they do not settle for the simple fragmentation 
of knowledge – have to take account of the postmodernist 
narratives highlighting the obscurity of the world. If the 
humanities are to provide any sort of lively description and 
not just a sample of academic systemizing, they have to be 
contaminated with obscurity, not merely on the linguistic 
level but also on the level of ideas. The long -term aim of 
humanistic thinking is a creation of an interdisciplinary 
platform combining philosophy, cultural anthropology 
and art theory, but also borrowing metaphors and findings 
from natural sciences. Most importantly, the humanities 
need to be well anchored in ethics, since, as we said before, 
they are supposed to protect a human being and blur the 
gaps between scientific and ethical domains. Admittedly, 
though, the construction of the humanities as a field open 
to exploration in the realm of language, in the sphere of 
creation and reinterpretation of concepts, as well as creation 
of open mental space – is a difficult task. But one that poses 
a cognitive and ethical challenge. 
Maria Popczyk
Art Museum:  
The Place of the Visualization of Modernity*
The public display of artworks is so inarguably valu- 
able and self -evident that it raises no suspicions, especially 
among the general public. The atmosphere of the 
communion with artistic, aesthetic and cultural values 
makes it possible for the discourses of modernity to enter 
into the social consciousness effortlessly and smoothly. 
Art museums enjoy a  unique position in this respect, 
since in the aesthetic medium, that is the medium which 
preserves the social sense of security and, at the same 
time, assuages the sense of guilt, it visualizes the myth 
of progress, the myth of the emancipation of the Spirit,1 
the myth of the superiority of the Western culture over 
other cultures. When Georges Bataille likens a museum 
to a  mirror, not without a  touch of irony and clearly 
referring to the Lacanian mirror stage, he also stresses our 
innate need to create the image of the world in its totality 
with which a community can identify. Donald Preziosi 
sees a museum as an optical device, the machine which 
focuses the viewer’s sight on the object and in the process 
* The chapter first published in Polish as: “Przestrzenne 
praktykowanie muzeum,” Anthropos? 14/15 (2010): 82–91.
1 What Lyotard calls metanarratives. Cf. Jean -François Lyotard, 
Kondycja ponowoczesna. Raport o  stanie wiedzy, trans. Małgorzta 
Kowalska and Jacek Migasiński (Warszawa: Fundacja Aletheia, 1997), 
p. 19.
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allows the culture of the West to create its own image and 
measure other cultures against its standards.2 Thus the 
museum is the place where order is being imposed, the 
world tamed, and chaos brought under control. However, 
the museum generating the systems of meanings which 
delineate the boundaries of the cultural and individual 
identity undergoes transformation itself, due to the fact 
that, as time passes and the world around changes, some 
forms of museum exhibition lose their explanatory power. 
Modernity negates itself and the transformation of the 
present is destructive as well as creative, as demonstrated 
by Jürgen Habermas, who recognized Hegel’s philosophy as 
paradigmatic for modernism. The visualization of progress 
in arts and science essentially dominated in museums up to 
the 1950s, although particular exhibitions might have taken 
different shape. Only in the second part of the twentieth 
century did it slowly give way to other forms of exhibition, 
which cannot be easily categorized or assessed. The 
museum has attained a plural character, and consequently, 
alongside global museums and world -class collections, new 
types of museums emerge, frequently initiated by private 
collectors or small communities. Therefore, the discussion 
on the visualization of modernity is not limited to historical 
narratives but encompasses a variety of ways a museum 
exhibition can be employed to express social or communal 
attitudes towards the world.
Thus the question arises whether these transformations 
possess some unchanging qualities or whether we deal 
with completely new forms of exhibition and expression. 
Studying the transformations of modernity from the 
anthropological point of view, Odo Marquard supports the 
2 Donald Preziosi, “Brain of the Earth’s Body: Museum and the 
Flaming of Modernity,” in The Rhetoric of the Frame. Essays on the 
Boundaries of the Artwork, ed. Paul Duro (New York: Cambridge 
University Press, 1996), p. 106; Tony Bennett, “Civic Seeing: Museums 
and the Organization od Vision,” in A Companion to Museum Studies, 
ed. Sharon Macdonald (Oxford: Wiley -Blackwell, Malden, 2011), 
pp. 267–278.
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values represented by the museum seeing its emergence as 
an active process of supplementing losses and deficiencies 
created as a  result of demystifying the world and 
modernization. Having lost its biblical inviolability and 
becoming open to human interference the reality lost its 
beauty as well. A human being, however, has taken the helm 
of responsibility and, through the creation of artworks, 
has been trying to rescue the beauty.3 The experimental 
and technical brain has an alternative in artists’ works, 
aesthetics and art history. So when people find themselves 
under the pressure of tribunalization and the constraints 
of legitimization, they can take refuge in the museum 
which, being a domain of beauty and sensuality, offers them 
the reprieve from judgement.4 The institutionalization 
of a  sense of taste is a  result of the efforts to deal with 
the deprivation felt by people denied the Providence’s 
protection and guidance.5 The aesthetization of art in the 
museum constitutes an intrinsic trait of modernity whose 
significance cannot be overstated since it is the process of 
stripping the evil of its attributes. The museum collecting 
different types of art rehabilitates ugliness, the Dionysian, 
anxiety, or, in other words, all the things which need to be 
redeemed. Art invests them with value which in reflection 
is recognized by humanities.6 
The systems of values and meanings constructed 
through collecting and displaying works of art provide 
a means of resistance to the disintegration of the world, 
which is why each successive generation undertakes this 
3 Odo Marquard, Aesthetica i anaesthetica. Rozważania filozoficzne, 
trans. Krystyna Krzemieniowa (Warszawa: Oficyna Naukowa, 
Warszawa, 2007), p. 10.
4 “The aesthetization of art is a  relief from the Last Judgement 
[…] the state of grace in the world which is no longer eschatological” 
(translation mine). Ibidem, p. 11. Other spheres of escape are nature, 
travels and individuality.
5 Odo Marquard, Rozstanie z filozofią pierwszych zasad. Studia 
filozoficzne, trans. Krystyna Krzemieniowa (Warszawa: Oficyna 
Naukowa), p. 44. 
6 Marquard, Aesthetica i anaesthetica, p. 13.
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task anew. Moreover, art from its very beginnings has 
provided the primary medium enabling the individual to 
settle down in a community, as it combines individual 
and communal experience. Artworks constitute an inte- 
gral element of worship as well as both religious and 
secular rituals. They represent the people’s surroundings 
and their concerns. They express mental and emotional 
states. They help to set up a community of interpretations 
and experience. They create the world which is intimate, 
close and sensual. From the Renaissance the noblemen’s 
palaces were the places where art, politics and prestige 
united members of a given class and at the same time they 
delineated clear dividing lines between different groups of 
people. In modern times this is the role of public places 
while in art museums the historical process of works 
settling down has become the way of uniting a secular 
community and its rules are guarded by the authority of 
the state.7 The aesthetic quality of space and works allows 
a visitor to participate in what Hannah Arendt refers to 
as permanence, “lasting belongs to a higher order […]. 
And in the permanence of art […] the intuition […] of 
the immortal created by a mortal hand becomes tangible, 
it can shine and be seen […].”8 Jerzy Świecimski points 
to another aspect of such permanence, “The perception 
of certain objects which can only be viewed in their 
original form in the museum in some cases may evoke 
very strong emotions which exhibit the traits of genuine 
exhilaration.”9 Although the experience is arranged in 
public, it is experienced intimately and this neutralizes 
the sway of a metanarrative.
In the nineteenth-century museum, the temple of art, 
artworks brought in from different places and collections 
7 Carol Duncan, Civilizing Rituals: Inside Public Art Museums 
(London and New York: Routledge, 1995), p. 280.
8 Hannah Arendt, Kondycja ludzka, trans. Anna Łagodzka 
(Warszawa: Wydawnictwo „Aletheia”, 2000), p. 185.
9 Jerzy Świecimski, Wystawy muzealne. Studium z estetyki wystaw, 
vol. I (Kraków: Jan -Kajetan Młynarski, 1992), p. 12. 
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were accorded meaning and values were to form a complete 
whole. The success of the process enabling a secular society 
to settle down – and develop a sense of familiarity with what 
belongs to the past – depends on the forms of exhibition 
adopted, on how the environment of an exhibition is 
arranged. In the museum environment of a  modernist 
type,10 it is art history that helps visitors to become familiar 
with the past: it establishes the historical, geographical or 
axiological order in which artworks are to be presented 
with the canon of classical beauty serving as a determinant. 
The spatial layout of rooms allows viewers to feel as if they 
were placed in the heart of the artistic history of Europe. 
The sequence of trends, formal and qualitative differences 
between various painting schools, will demonstrate the 
transformations of art. And the bigger the collection, the 
stronger the sense of satisfaction resulting from being 
granted access to the history of art almost in its totality 
and from the participation in the myth of progress. This 
process of setting an individual in the course of history 
contributes to his or her identification with it, which is 
additionally strengthened by the individual discovery of 
various forms of beauty in his or her subjective aesthetic 
experience. Interestingly, in the nineteenth century, the 
heyday of the museum, Honoré de Balzac in La peau de 
chagrin described a private collection of human and divine 
works, where stuffed snakes and monkeys sit next to china, 
a Moorish weapon and masterpieces of fine art, and this 
“philosophical chaos”, the ocean of everything evokes the 
dark, infernal powers.11 In museums the rational system of 
classification is an exorcism performed by the enlightened 
mind in order to expel the mysterious, unique or ambivalent 
and it also manifests itself in the division of the space of 
10 I refer here to the Enlightenment type of art museums, the temple 
of art, as well as a modern museum of a historical type with the white 
cube space.
11 Honoriusz Balzak, Jaszczur, trans. Tadeusz Żeleński (Boy) and 
Julian Rogoziński (Kraków: Zakład Narodowy im. Ossolińskich, 1999), 
pp. 22–29. 
115Art Museum: The Place of the Visualization…
exhibition separating fine arts from natural objects and 
artefacts produced by other cultures.
The scientific exhibition, being self -evident, becomes 
an authoritative statement, since it draws its power from 
the ideology of scientism, according to which science 
never creates the laws of the world but discovers them. In 
a well -planned manner it conveys a general message and 
creates sensual stimuli and at the same time it anaesthetizes 
a visitor against the stimuli which it sees as undesirable 
for the appropriate reception. The space of exhibition 
and the architectural style of the building, rather than 
merely providing the background or being an addition 
to the artworks inside, comment on them and supply 
them with the context, so that the myth significant for 
the community can be established. This is the myth that 
unifies the community, transports it into the sphere of the 
invisible, to use the terminology employed by Krzysztof 
Pomian who determines the community -forming role 
of collecting objects (semiofors). The nineteenth -century 
museum of art, referred to as the temple of art or the house 
of arts, provided the stability of spiritual experiences. It was 
the space where a spiritual human being was at home and 
which stood in opposition to the changeable outside world 
filled with risks, undergoing modernization and as such 
incapable of providing any guarantee of security. It seems 
that nowadays the need to find such a place still exists, 
even though different means are employed in the search 
for it. The arguments substantiating such a claim can be 
found, for example, in the way the Guggenheim Museum 
Bilbao likens its foyer to the interior of a temple in the audio 
guide available to visitors. Half a century after futurists 
exhorted people to burn all museums, the newly -founded 
museum attempts to provide the temple -like experience, 
ignoring Frank O. Gehry’s architectural design as well as 
the message conveyed by the artworks displayed inside. 
In other words, it reverts to the old mechanism, which 
Pierre Bourdieu terms the sacralization of art: museums 
grant visitors access to the experience elevating them above 
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their everyday concerns, which in turn helps museums to 
attract crowds of tourists. At the same time they arrange 
the environment in a visitor -friendly way, conducive to 
interaction with art, which frequently rejects the aesthetic 
quality, and by this they determine the status of the works 
on the art market.
If we assume that what connects old and contemporary 
museums is the need for stability, which entails appropriate 
surroundings, physical space arranged to accommodate 
artworks, then we have to ask what is the source of it. 
Traditionalists maintain that it comes directly from 
the spiritual condition of a  human being who requires 
a  material medium to transcend finiteness. Sceptics, 
those who criticize the culture of the museum, emphasize 
the fact that it is a  constructed, fictitious world, whose 
function is at best therapeutic. It seems that if we look at 
the museum as an entity which combines contradictory 
tendencies and goals, it is possible to reconcile the efforts 
to provide an audience with the values of higher order with 
the spectacle. According to Giddens, a modern person is 
deprived of the relationship to the cosmic powers, which 
used to be established by means of rituals handed down 
by tradition. The loss of the ritual is “the loss of capability 
of taking part in these [cosmic] structures.”12 Secular 
rituals may be modelled on the religious ones, especially 
with regard to their aesthetic aspects such as monumental, 
ceremonial character of the architectural design, a sense of 
sumptuousness following from the accumulation of works, 
the staged itinerary of a visit, etc., but ultimately instead of 
granting us access to transcendence they anchor us in our 
own world. Marquard’s theory of compensation presents 
a similar view, which is also shared by Krzysztof Pomian, 
who argues that the objects in a collection play the role 
of semiofors: endowed with added significance they can 
12 Antony Giddens, Nowoczesność i tożsamość. „Ja” i społeczeństwo 
w  epoce późnej nowoczesności, trans. Alina Sułżycka (Warszawa: 
Wydawnictwo Naukowe PWN, 2001), p. 278. 
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transport a community into the invisible sphere of values 
and meanings, and in the process they allow the members 
of the community to exchange thoughts and ideas.13 This is 
the reason why every major reorganization of an exhibition 
requires serious reflection due to the fact that it entails the 
reorganization of the system of values within a particular 
community.
Although a  museum exhibition is at the centre of 
exhibition practices, museums by no means monopolize 
them. The home of an artist, especially a living one, enjoys 
a  parallel unique and privileged status. Such a  place 
embodies the unity of a creative life with art as a way of 
living and as such it constitutes a manifestation of settling 
down in the world. It attracts all those who subscribe to the 
particular conception of art proposed by the artist. Artists’ 
homes epitomize various forms of how an individual life 
can be fulfilled in art, and at the same time they stand in 
opposition to institutionalized academic forms of granting 
access to art, which tend to even out the unique character 
of an artwork, obliterate the aura of intimacy surrounding 
the artist’s life. Nowadays the homes of artists from the 
past have become museums displaying the life contained 
in the objects and the fact of their emergence expresses 
the persistent need to visit the places of past dwelling. 
The founding of such museums as Rembrandt’s House 
reconstructed at the beginning of the twentieth century and 
other biographical museums, including the Jan Matejko’s 
House or the Fryderyk Chopin Museum, follows not from 
the myth of scientism but from the desire to enrich one’s 
own life with the experience of familiarity with the place, 
the material aspect of everyday life and at the same time the 
work of those illustrious personages. The experience offered 
by those places transcends the usual aesthetic -cognitive 
experiences typically associated with museums and assumes 
13 Krzysztof Pomian, Zbieracze i osobliwości. Paryż – Wenecja XVI–
XVIII wiek, trans. Andrzej Pieńkos (Lublin: Wydawnictwo UMCS, 
2001), pp. 41, 63–64.
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the quality which Stephen Greenblatt calls resonance,14 that 
is a sense of transitory nature and fragility of the human 
world which used to fill this particular place with activity.
Greenblatt extends the notion of an exhibition to any 
cultural objects, from plastic art works and artefacts to 
literature, and refers to them as exhibition showcases, a kind 
of “ ‘textual’ relics”15, revealing at the same time the culture-
forming function of exhibition. Tracking the migration of 
objects and rituals from one exhibition zone to another, 
from a private home to the theatre and then to the museum, 
allows the historian to expose the social processes which 
initiate these travels and determine how their meanings 
change in the process. The added bonus is that treating 
those diverse areas of culture as exhibition practices diverts 
the attention from their autonomous character and focus 
on their affinity with one another, which in turn points 
to the same driving forces which endeavour to claim the 
world as their own.
On the other hand, not every exhibition constitutes 
a  creative reworking of outdated images of the world, 
capable of getting the message across to viewers and 
providing them with lasting impressions. Jean Clark and 
Jean Baudrillard believe that the democratization of art is 
bound to result in its dumping down and transformation 
of exhibitions into a mass spectacle which trivializes even 
the most highbrow art.16 Other critics call our attention to 
the ideological objectives of global exhibitions. Whatever 
doubts might be raised by the ideological and financial 
wheeling and dealing that goes on behind the scenes of 
major exhibitions, it must be stressed that they involve 
14 Stephen Greenblatt, Poetyka kulturowa. Pisma wybrane, trans. 
Krystyna Kujawińska -Courtney (Kraków: Universitas, 2006), pp. 174–
175.
15 Ibidem, pp. 159–160.
16 Jean Clair, Kryzys muzeów. Globalizacja kultury, trans. Jan Maria 
Kłoczowski (Gdańsk: Słowo/Obraz Terytoria, 2009); Jean Baudrillard, 
Spisek sztuki. Iluzje i  deziluzje estetyczne z  dodatkiem wywiadów 
o „Spisku sztuki”, trans. Sławomir Królak (Warszawa: Sic!, 2006).
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activities, innovative and experimental in principle, that 
seek to devise a wide range of new formulas for displaying 
artworks. These activities entail the revisualization of 
old contents, updating the ways in which the art of other 
cultures, or art from the past in general, is perceived, as 
well as attempts to find a creative way to introduce the 
contemporary art, typically perceived as difficult and 
demanding, accessible only to a sophisticated audience, 
into social circulation.
Thus one can observe a number of trends/efforts seeking 
to find appropriate means which will make the unique 
character of artworks from other cultures accessible to 
the general public, not through the translation of one 
culture’s values into another’s, but through building the 
platform of transcultural experience. This is how Andreas 
Huyssen sees the primary role of museums. After the times 
of metanarrative and the universal museum, the symbol of 
colonialism, the priority is given to individual experiences 
and small histories. “More and more people want to see 
and listen to other stories, to see and listen to the stories of 
others, whilst the identity is being formed in multi -layered 
endless negotiations between me and others, instead of 
being established once and for all.”17 Since for a long time 
the museum espoused the colonial discourse and it is 
still tempted to do so, now, according to Huyssen, is the 
time to overcome one -sided ideological thinking. Artists 
and independent curators are the most ingenuous and 
convincing in this respect and their presence in museums 
proves that the institutional space has become open to 
alternative discourses, which contributes to the gradual 
dissolution of the established patterns of seeing.18 Each 
17 Andreas Huyssen, Escape from Amnesis: The Museum as Mass 
Medium, in: Twilight Memories: Marking Time in a Culture of Amnesia 
(London and New York: Routledge, 1995), p. 34. 
18 On putting non -Western art on display, see, among others, the 
chapter: “The Study of Nation and the Museum,” in Museum Studies. 
An Anthology of Contexts, ed. Bettina Messias Carbonell (Oxford: 
Blackwell, 2004), pp. 221–310.
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exhibition, however, conveys an ideological message, puts 
forward a conception, an interpretation, which is the source 
of its power as well as its weakness, since in so doing, it 
puts aside some other ideas and interpretations, disregards 
other possible versions and perspectives. Injustice cannot 
be removed because it is inherent in the very conception 
of an exhibition, as Jean -François Lyotard puts it, there 
is no possible way to construct an exhibition containing 
all possible interpretations of its subject. Jacques Ranciére 
shares this view, but he emphasizes the fact that an art 
exhibition establishing space and time automatically 
establishes the social space.19 The collection of artworks, 
the selection of specific works combined with the layout 
of a  particular exhibition organizes a  community of 
people who are united behind the idea underlying this 
organization, regardless of the fact whether or not they 
are aware of that. While for Lyotard the statements 
expressed by a particular exhibition are untranslatable, so 
one can merely multiply them to accommodate every new 
interpretation and devise new ways to articulate the needs 
of those unable to speak out on their own behalf, Ranciére 
believes that many people may like an exhibition but the 
invisible force will unite only a certain community, since 
it speaks to what is shared by this specific community. 
From this perspective each art exhibition constitutes the 
visualization of the contents vital for a particular group, 
a community: explicitly or implicitly it unifies and excludes 
with the same gesture.
This might very well be the reason why independent 
curators and artists place the emphasis on the relations 
between people rather than on the place and the established 
time -space of a museum. Jan Hoet suggested that private 
homes should replace museums as the place for displaying 
art, so that the audience could see artworks in the specific 
19 Jacques Ranciére, Estetyka jako polityka, trans. Julian Kutyła and 
Paweł Mościcki (Warszawa: Wydawnictwo Krytyki Politycznej, 2007), 
pp. 24–25.
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space of dwelling.20 Even though the people living in the 
household allowed art to interfere into the privacy of their 
home, it certainly blasted out the warmth and intimacy of 
the home. On the other hand, it gave an opportunity to 
enrich the home with what is different, to let in the other, 
the visitor. Nicolas Bourriaud, in turn, points out that an 
exhibition could also function as a social gathering.21 In 
his view, art creates a peculiar kind of social contact and as 
such it can foster alternative political and cultural models. 
He follows Marx, who noticed that barter bypasses the 
economic circulation of capitalist economy and is located 
outside the capital market. In an exhibition in the form of 
an event Bourriaud finds a niche free from the influences 
of institutions in change of displaying artworks. A staged 
artistic event promotes the social aspect of art and when 
the performance is underway the meanings emerge 
spontaneously and collectively. What it amounts to is 
that an exhibition as a statement given to the audience to 
interpret is supplanted by the practice of art as its core. 
No ready -made story, which could constitute the subject 
matter of an exhibition, exists any more. Instead the 
activity is initiated by an artist and the audience joins in, 
and in the process the story develops while the meanings 
which emerge in the collective effort as well as emotional 
bonds never achieve a permanent expression but vanish 
when the exhibition ends. The work and the story appear 
in the practice. Art construed as a social gathering develops 
consistently from works designed to stimulate an audience, 
from the anti -museum works which continue the avant- 
garde ideas of Duchamp, El Lissitzky, Buren and others. 
Bourriaud holds that the art of this kind is accompanied 
by relational aesthetics. Arthur Danto seems to have the 
same in mind when he discusses Joseph Beuys’s actions and 
20 Cf. Jan Hoet and Rainer Metzger, “Chambres d’Amis, Gandawa 
1986,” in Kunst im Käfig. Thesen zum Thema Kunstausstellung, ed. 
Brackert Gisela (Farankfurt am Main: Black Spring Verlag, 1970), p. 238.
21 Nicolas Bourriaud, Relational Aesthetics, trans. Simon Pleasance 
and Fronza Woods (Paris: Les Pressem du Réel, 2002), pp. 14–21. 
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every kind of artistic activity based on social relationships, 
which cannot be subjected to documentation. This extra- 
museum art has its own aesthetics, which Danto refers to 
as participatory aesthetics.
The historical museum is also undergoing 
transformation not only by adapting new media 
encouraging visitors to act but also by employing the ideas 
of new historiography,22 which believes that the testimony 
of the past is provided by a subjective account, oral tradition, 
memory and emotions, rather than the construction 
of historical narrative. Theodor Adorno’s well -known 
observation referring to the possibility of writing poetry 
after Auschwitz becomes the herald of new art, whose 
purpose is precisely that – the expression of trauma. What 
is significant, trauma does not lend itself to presentation 
or representation, nor can it be understood. Therefore an 
exhibition cannot merely provide the information, present 
victims and perpetrators, but it has to put a viewer into 
the uncomfortable state of melancholy. Frank Ankersmit 
insists that the Holocaust is a kind of occurrence which 
should be remembered in a special way. He writes: “The 
memory of Holocaust has to remain an illness, a mental 
affliction which we can never stop suffer from.”23 The 
inconceivability of the Holocaust poses a challenge for 
artists whose works, installations and artistic projects 
keep a  viewer in a  peculiar state of tension.24 In the 
Museum of Architecture in Wrocław the exhibition of the 
22 I refer to such scholars as Frank Ankersmit, Hayden White, or 
LaCapra
23 Frank Ankersmit, Narracja, reprezentacja, doświadczenie. Studia 
z teorii historiografii, ed. Ewa Domańska (Kraków: Universitas, 2004), 
p. 425.
24 Jill Bennett, follows Hartman and LaCapra, and speaks about 
affect and empathy as the properties of art whose purpose is to shake 
a viewer from their indifference rather than helping them to come 
to terms with trauma; intellectual and emotional instants are merged 
in this experience. See Jill Bennett, Empathic Vision: Affect, Trauma, 
and Contemporary Art (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2005), 
pp. 10–11. 
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contemporary art and craft (stained -glass windows, tiles, 
door handles), as well as medieval church sculpture, is 
situated in the post -Bernardine church converted into the 
exhibition hall. Visitors walking around the display cases 
and installations suddenly hear a persistent male voice: 
“Why didn’t you hide Jews in this basement?” (Mirosław 
Bałka, 2008). Only after a while do they see the dots of 
light on the floor and notice the speakers from which the 
voice has come. The persistence of the repeated question 
affects everybody: young people are compelled to face up 
to the past and take the responsibility for their ancestors 
while for those who remember the times of the war it is 
an accusation, it makes them feel guilty. It also questions 
victims themselves in a painful way.
Museums always find a way to rationalize the memory by 
transforming it into a narrative, for example for educational 
purposes. However, the homogeneity of the environment of 
exhibition becomes disrupted, broken by the areas where 
the sense of loss, emptiness, suspension are experienced, as 
illustrated by the Holocaust Tower in Libeskind’s museum 
in Berlin. The permanent exhibition Kraków, the Times of 
German Occupation 1939–1945 (The Historical Museum 
of the City of Kraków) undertakes a  similar attempt 
to tie history with memory, intellectual narrative with 
emotions. The viewer becomes the participant -witness of 
the events taking place in successive rooms, which are like 
theatrical or film settings representing a particular place 
(the “Photographer’s Studio”, the “Barber’s Shop”, the 
“City Square”). The confrontation of everyday activities 
with the dramatically changing situation in which the 
city’s residents, Jews in particular, lived introduces optical- 
audio tensions. The dramatic effects of the acoustic 
landscape (private conversations, wailing, the sounds of 
announcements, soldiers’ orders, the sounds of gunfire) 
resonate with the diversified character of space (narrow 
streets, a meandering itinerary) and the setting of particular 
sites. The environment of the exhibition reflects a new way 
in which history is staged: participants of the exhibition 
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become its components with their perception, knowledge 
and emotions.25 Multiple narrative threads finally reach 
their culmination in the “Hall of Choices” where sayings, 
prayers and simple sentences (“I couldn’t make the ends 
meet”) spoken in different languages acquire a  prayer-
like sacral dimension, and the impression is additionally 
strengthened by the whiteness of the walls, rhythmically 
spinning prayer wheels, music and the while dome directing 
the participant’s sight beyond the present and the historical 
time. This way the memory of the moral choices, pain and 
the degradation of the victims becomes sacralized. Despite 
of the linear chronology which relates the successive years 
of German occupation, a viewer seems to be torn out of it 
by the multisensory installations.
Other solutions worth mentioning are those which 
seek to transform the museum experience in its entirety, 
especially those which relate to the plural rationality, the 
reality which is divided and experienced in many different 
ways. The Museum Insel Hombroich (Fig. 1) situated near 
Düsseldorf illustrates such an approach. It was initiated 
between 1982 and 1988 by the private collector Karl -Heinrich 
Müller and originally based on his own collection, and after 
his death the running of the museum was taken over by 
the Insel Hombroich Foundations. The eclectic programme 
refers to the essential topoi present in European culture: the 
symbiosis of nature, art and religion.26 The collector bought 
a  vast area of forests and meadowland, later expanded 
with the land belonging to the military base, and filled 
it with sculptures and small pavilions housing the finest 
artworks, including both old and modern art, masterpieces 
by European masters, artworks from Far East, Peru, Africa 
25 Rosmarie Beier -de Haan, “Re -staging Histories and Identities,” 
in A Companion to Museum Studies, ed. Sharon Macdonald (Oxford: 
Wiley -Blackwell, Malden, 2011), pp. 192–193. 
26 The nineteenth -century museums established the following 
relation: fine arts provided metaphysical experiences, while nature, 
examined and dissected, represented scientific achievements. Both art 
and science underwent sacralization in such museums.
125Art Museum: The Place of the Visualization…
and Indonesia, exhibits representing fine as well as applied 
arts. Approaching the site of the museum in a  car or 
a taxi (buses do not go there), a visitor follows the route to 
reach sixteen pavilions scattered on the museum grounds. 
He or she will face the vagaries of the weather, the road 
meandering through the forest wilderness and wetlands 
peppered with sheltered “galleries” of the white cube type 
containing Mycenaean masks, Rembrandt’s etchings or 
Indian sculptures. 
Fig. 1. “Labyrinth” Gallery, Insel Hombroich, 2010 
(photo by Maria Popczyk) 
In Müller’s founding text we can read that the 
quintessence of the museum is its insularity, which is 
femininity. For femininity, instead of dividing people, unites 
them. It constitutes the place of birth, the place of communal 
togetherness providing support. It is the place when one 
serves others but also the place of individual liberation. 
The island museum does not constitute the male field of 
organization, power and the demonstration of viewpoints, 
instead it opens the possibility for communal experiments 
integrating diverse areas of art, which is granted an equal 
status, as is nature: Kunst parallel zur Natur reads the motto 
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by the painter Gotthard Graubner.27 The imagery of island 
and femininity used as the premise of the exhibition is an 
express gesture rejecting the modern view of the museum 
as a place of education as well as political propaganda and 
the means of disciplining the audience. As such it attempts 
to formulate a conception agreeable to the post -utopian 
sensibility seeking formulas for the communal activity.
Thus it is hardly surprising that the museum is free 
of the flamboyant architectural concepts omnipresent 
in newly -founded museums. Since the times the first 
museum was built, architecture has been employed to 
express its ideological programme. What the Museum 
Insel Hombroich offers instead is the humble raw brick 
buildings designed by the architect Erwin Heerich whose 
elegant minimalist shapes blend in with the ubiquitous 
nature. Visitors enter directly from the gravel path, there is 
no cloak room for coats, bags or backpacks, even prams are 
allowed. Nature spreading unchecked appears to embrace 
the visitor from all sides. The itinerary offers no picturesque 
scenes of nature enclosed in fenced -in frames.28 Although 
the harmony of architecture and nature is billed as the 
finest quality of a number of museum buildings situated 
in parks or the ones employing the effects of water and 
transparency as exemplified by the Beyeler Foundation Art 
Museum designed by Renzo Piano in Riehen, none of them 
is a match for the Hombroich. The uncontrolled growth of 
vegetation is used to illustrate the pacific values with the 
creepers winding around the sculptures of soldiers (Fig. 2). 
27 Karl -Heinrich Müller, “Hombroich – An Open Experiment,” in 
Museum und Raketenstation (Stiftun Insel Hombroich, 2002), p. 251. 
The motto can be found on the museum website, accessed August 20, 
2011, http://www.inselhombroich.de/kontakt.htm. 
28 Phil Macnaghten and John Urry suggest that instead of creating 
aesthetic views of nature providing optical pleasure but being the 
indication of our control over it, spatial practices should be initiated; 
they refer in their views to the notion of dwelling formulated by Martin 
Heidegger. Phil Macnaghten and John Urry, Alternatywne przyrody. 
Nowe myślenie o  przyrodzie i  społeczeństwie, trans. Bogdan Baran 
(Warszawa: Scholar, 2005), pp. 264–265. 
127Art Museum: The Place of the Visualization…
Fig. 2. Insel Hombroich, 2010 (photo by Maria Popczyk) 
It is all by design: the gardener’s intention was to create 
a bucolic landscape.29 In summer the grass reaches up to 
an adult person’s waists, so a city -dweller, accustomed to 
manicured lawns, experiences a  sense of disorder. The 
freedom of choice is also incorporated in the routes open 
to a visitor, especially when one has to choose between 
a number of winding paths. It is easy to lose one’s way 
but one always reaches one of the pavilions on the way 
walking past an unexpectedly charming pond or a group 
of sculptures seemingly abandoned in the forest. The 
structures of the pavilions, the obelisks, the sculptures in 
the field or under the trees are all permeated by nature 
which creates a principal context for them determined by 
the scale and grandeur. What we deal with here is hardly 
visiting the attractions in the traditional sense: the reception 
of art undergoes a complete transformation. The modern 
and old artworks, furniture, terracotta works, theatrical 
costumes and installations are situated in close proximity 
29 Claude Monet’s garden in Giverny was an inspiration. Cf. Bern-
hard Korte, “Topos,” in Museum und Raketenstation, pp. 254–255.
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creating in effect what Andrè Malraux called the singing 
of transformation, the music of forms. The exhibition does 
not set apart different thematic, genre or geographical 
fields and thus it refrains from imposing judgements on 
the visitor. Instead its democratic character points to the 
fact that creative activity has been present in every aspect 
of life for centuries.
The traveller will come across pavilions designed for 
work with children, artists’ workshops, private building, 
but also empty pavilions, the acoustic sculptures inviting 
visitors to engage in vocal and physical activities (Fig. 3). 
Fig. 3. Graubner Pavillon, Insel Hombroich, 2010 
(photo by Maria Popczyk)
There is also room meant for religious and philosophical 
reflection. Among the trees we can find Ludwig Soumagne’s 
hermitage (Dichterklause), the testament of his stay there 
in the times when the artists’ communal work initiated the 
museum (1982–1984), which was not open to the public yet.30 
30 Accessed September 1, 2011, http://www.kunstmeditaties.nl/
index.php?in=meditaties/insel -hombroich -soumagne. 
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What catches a visitor’s eye in the open space is not only 
frozen sculptures of soldiers, huge stones and installations, 
but also religiously marked objects which invite a traveller 
to meditate. This is what the pavilion situated on the slope 
is intended for, with the philosophers’ works inspiring 
contemplation. And memory, an indispensable element of 
every museum, is symbolized by the grand circles marking 
the gatherings of previous generations: stone circles with 
an oak in the centre, the circle of chairs for murdered Jews 
(Fig. 4). 
Fig. 4. Intel Hombroich, 2010 (photo by Maria Popczyk)
The premise of the Insel Hombroich is that the 
exhibition is the statement encompassing all areas of 
culture and as such it constitutes a form of settling down, 
that is, the introduction of contents and initiated spatial 
practices into the sphere of individual experience.
The imagery employed by the Insel Hombroich is 
worth another look, since the association between an 
island and femininity brings to mind also other meanings 
apart from those suggested by the museum’s founder: it 
evokes the image of femininity which is as beautiful as 
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treacherous and seductive. Jean Baudrillard is perhaps the 
one responsible for drawing our attention to seduction as 
a strategy employed by postmodern culture. This culture, 
however, is meaningless and deprived of any roots: settling 
down is no longer possible. Another motif points to the 
island claimed as one’s own: the figure of Robinson Crusoe 
associated with the myth about the modern society, the 
myth of the male conquest and the male rule over objects 
and nature illustrated by Daniel Defoe.31 These two 
thematic fields, however, are absent from the premises 
of the Insel Hombroich. The interpretation which seems 
more appropriate construes the island as “the cosmos in 
miniature”, as Kopaliński explains, it is “complete and 
perfect, with highly concentrated cult value.”32 The cosmos 
which provides the refuge from the world and in which the 
space undergoes transformation and becomes the place of 
dwelling, the place of intimacy and community while the 
participation in the processes of creation is building which 
offers the sense of dwelling.33 Graubner, the painter who took 
an active part in the first stage of museum establishment, 
sees the island as a place of unity of writers, musicians, 
journalists, actors and politicians. What the visitor sees is 
the effect of the process of shaping the space, of the effort 
undertaken by artists working together in the pavilions 
erected one after another. Up to this day workshops and 
meetings take place here, but it is those times (1982–1988) 
that shaped this place which enables each visitor to gain the 
sense of settling down in culture.
To sum up, it can be said that a lot has changed since the 
scientific exhibition visualizing the achievements of science 
31 Michel de Certeau, Wynaleźć codzienność. Sztuka działania, 
trans. Katarzyna Thiel -Jańczuk (Kraków: Wydawnictwo Uniwersytetu 
Jagiellońskiego, 2008), p. 137.
32 Władysław Kopaliński, Słownik symboli (Warszawa: Wiedza 
Powszechna, 1990), p. 483.
33 Walter Biemel, “The Happenings of Truth,” in Museum und 
Raketenstation, p. 245. The author draws inspiration from Martin 
Heidegger’s writing. 
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was established. With time the growing awareness of the 
fact that practising science contributes to the construction 
of world models has enabled us to introduce a wide range of 
practices into the public space. A variety of different forms 
of displaying artworks, that is, a variety of diverse types 
of rationalization, has become a tool to impose order on 
culture, and at the same time it has allowed an individual 
to define his or her place within it.

Part Two
Public Space  
The Responsibilities  
and the Practices of the Institution

Maria Popczyk
The Presence of the City  
The Identity of the City. Berlin*
The presence of the city manifests itself in a  sensual 
impression as the presently observable moment of the 
presence, of its architectural and human substance in the 
process – impermanent yet ceaseless – of growth and fading, 
movement and silence, birth and death. This inevitable 
process allows Lewis Mulford to compare a  city to an 
organism, since it contains the potential for various forms 
of absence. Richard Shusterman identifies one of them lying 
deep in the phenomenal fabric of a city and pertaining to 
everything that manifests its presence through a range of 
signals, yet remains beyond the scope of direct experience. 
In this sense, absence represents a physical distance from 
the source of the signals and points to the presence taking 
shape “elsewhere.”1 This sensual kind of absence defines the 
uniqueness of a city and belongs to the spirit of the place, 
although it by no means exhausts it. Just like the toll of 
bells, the smell of water and the clamour of voices mingle 
to form a sensual map of Venice, in Berlin it is composed of 
the clatter of an approaching train, the beat of techno music 
* The chapter first published in Polish as “Berlin – miasto widzialnej 
nieobecności,” in Dylematy wielokulturowości, ed. Wojciech Kalaga 
(Kraków: Universitas, 2004), pp. 239–261.
1 Richard M. Shusterman, “Pragmatist Aesthetics and the Uses 
of Urban Absence,” in City Life. Essays on Urban Culture, ed. Heinz 
Paetzold (Maastrich: Jan van Eyck Akademie, 1997), p. 77.
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and the districts which, according to Siegfried Kracauer, 
are still redolent of the smell of political unrest. It is this 
inextricable link of presence and absence which makes up 
the identity of every city, and which in the case of Berlin is 
exceptionally striking.
The visual distancing of the presence was the process 
to which the Reichstag building was subjected. Stripped 
of its dome, abandoned, empty, its walls covered with 
inscriptions made by Soviet soldiers, its doors sealed after 
the division of Germany, it stood like a mute symbol of 
the lost national unity. In the summer of 1995, after years 
of preparations and negotiations, Christo and Jeanne-
Claude organized an outstanding spectacle of wrapping 
the old building in front of the crowds gathered to witness 
the event. One can agree with Shusterman that this act 
reinforced the building’s visibility and its presence in the 
space of Berlin. Tim Martin saw it as an exorcism expelling 
evil spirits of history. For others it represented the nation 
swathed in the shroud.2 Under the rolls of fabric the work of
Fig. 5. Christo and Jeanne -Claude, Reichstag 1971–1995 (after: Jodidio 
Philip, Nowe formy. Architektura lat dziewięćdziesiątych XX wieku 
(Warszawa: Muza S.A., Taschen 1998), p. 146)
2 Cf. Tim Martin, “Signs of Tragedy Past and Future: Reading the 
Berlin Reichstag,” Architectural Design 70, no. 5 (October 2000): 32–35.
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art gradually came into being: its columns, sculptures and 
windows vanished and the whole building turned a light 
colour and assumed a uniform, nonfunctional character 
(Fig. 5). The artistic actions neutralized the burden of 
history, liberated the audience from painful memories and 
replaced them with an aesthetic experience. A spatial shape 
of an imposing scale, angular volume and pleated texture 
was revealed in front of the viewers’ eyes: it took a warm 
colour in the light of the setting  sun whereas at dusk it 
shone illuminated with artificial light.
Art proved to be a  powerful tool of transformation 
soothing the memory of the nation: the old Reichstag 
became momentarily absent in its function and detail, 
invisible. Wrapped in the fabric it was like a blank screen 
ready to accommodate every possible projection. Thus the 
artistic project brought up the fundamental problem of 
transforming the semantics of the building, which paved 
the way for Norman Foster and his project to invest it with 
a new meaning.
In the stronger, not sensual sense, the presence of 
a city relates to the existence of a  form construed both 
as a  spatially organized arrangement with the clearly 
marked centre and as a  shape which can be captured 
visually. Benedetto Benvolo discussing the essence of 
a fully -developed city refers to this image of the European 
cities’ old centres growing over generations. This model of 
a city still constitutes the point of reference and theoretical 
backdrop for the identification of a city in the era of a post- 
city, but in the case of Berlin it has never gone beyond 
the planning stage. The specific character of the city,3 
an island agglomeration founded away from the major 
economic and cultural routes, where provincial mentality 
and stagnation alternate with the exceptional pace of 
transformations and changes driven by ideologies, has 
prevented each successive project of its reconstruction in 
3 Philipp Oswalt, Berlin – Stadt ohne Form (München, London and 
New York: Prestel Verlag, 2000), p. 27.
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the name of each new regime from achieving an intended 
and completed form. The endeavours aimed at establishing 
meaning, which embraced the plans of redevelopment as 
well as the ideological message of each particular building, 
arose every time from the political status of Berlin. Among 
them we find Karl Schinkel’s designs, brought up by Kurt 
Foster in the debate concerning the centre of the city after 
German reunification, Adolf Hitler’s plans and the places 
tainted with the brand of Nazi regime as well as the projects 
to build two separate centres of East and West Berlin. In 
the mid -nineteenth century, Berlin could still be described 
as a city where geometry served the military monarchy. 
Józef Ignacy Kraszewski wrote in his diaries: “[…] streets 
in a straight line, houses in a row forming squares like 
battalions, even monuments are dressed in uniforms, the 
military element pervades […].”4 Under Hitler’s rule, on the 
city’s main thoroughfare, Unter den Linden, the cheering
Fig. 6. Unter den Linden, 1937 (after: Stadt der Architektur, 
Architektur der Stadt. Berlin 1900–2000, published by Thorsten Scheer, 
Josef Paul Kleihues and Paul Kahlfeldt (Berlin: Nicolai, 2000),  
p. 195)
4 Józef Ignacy Kraszewski, Kartki z  podróży 1858–1864, vol. II 
(Warszawa: PIW, 1977), p. 415.
139The Presence of the City…
crowds marching along the file of lamps and pillars mer- 
ged with the symbols of Nazism to resemble war totems 
(Fig. 6).
Each time the presence was established on the foundation 
of the new order’s rules, the authorities divided the space of 
the city into zones, erected new statues and destroyed the 
old ones, changed emblems and symbols, gave streets and 
squares appropriate names. Yet, for the city this process of 
generating and focusing the being in the presence, which 
Jacques Derrida sees as a demonstration/display of power, 
proved transitory, although not less painful than the 
trauma of the war.
1
The founding of two German states in 1949 initiated 
the process of crystallization of Berlin’s dual identity. East 
Berlin was transformed into the capital of a new state and 
as such it gained a political and administrative advantage, 
while West Berlin became an island encircled by the 
borders of the foreign state. Although urban planners and 
architects in charge of creating the identity of the respective 
parts had at their disposals different legal and ideological 
instruments, a modernist designer starting from scratch 
could not hope for better initial conditions: deserted areas 
covered with rubble, degraded places, ruins of building, 
and people on the move: the residents returning to their 
homes and the refugees in search of a place to live.5 The 
predominance of destruction over construction is the 
reason why Oswald calls Berlin the city of Modernism, 
distinguished by the culture of destruction, understood 
5 Oswalt, Berlin – Stadt ohne Form, p. 55. The history of urbanistic 
plans and their completion is comprehensively presented in the 
publication accompanying the exhibition which took place in Berlin 
in 2000: Stadt der Architektur, Architektur der Stadt. Berlin 1900–2000, 
published by Thorsten Scheer, Josef Paul Kleihues and Paul Kahlfeldt 
(Berlin: Nicolai, 2000). 
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so well by the dadaists active in the city, which permeated 
Berlin both during and after the war.6 
The territory of East Berlin encompassed the old, 
historic part of the city, yet the authorities concerned 
with the identity of the socialist state’s capital altered the 
direction of the urban arrangement to the east. The new 
face of the capital’s centre was formed by the continuous 
monumentalized space marked with the fixed points: the 
Fernsehturm (TV Tower) towering over the city, the layout 
of the buildings on Alexanderplatz whose walls proclaimed 
the socialist ethos of the nation and the Karl-Marx -Allee, 
with the statue of Stalin, heading east. The government 
buildings, such as the Staatsratsgebäude (the Council of 
State building) and the Palast der Republik (the Palace 
of the Republic), were situated near the former Berlin 
Stadtschloss (Berlin City Palace) while the former Göring’s 
Reich Air Ministry building in Leipziger Straße housed the 
Parliament building, the culture centre and the Council
Fig. 7. The demolition of the Berlin City Palace, 1950 
(after: Stadt der Architektur, Architektur der Stadt. Berlin 1900–2000, 
published by Thorsten Scheer, Josef Paul Kleihues and Paul Kahlfeldt  
(Berlin: Nicolai, 2000), p. 231)
6 Oswalt, Berlin – Stadt ohne Form, p. 55.
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of Ministers. The reconstruction was completed in 1979. 
The historic space of the city was reduced to the museum-
like rhetoric: the alley of Unter den Linden lined with the 
reconstructed buildings led to the Brandenburg Gate closed 
off with the Berlin Wall in 1961. This city gate transformed 
into the triumphal arch modelled on the Propylaea in 
Athens, the symbol of German unity, the site where 
revolutionaries gathered and which the Nazis marched out 
from used to be located on the main communication artery 
of the city. After Germany was divided, the border crossings 
were situated in its vicinity and it became the gateway to 
nowhere. To stress the departure from the past in 1950 the 
Berliner Stadtschloss (Berlin City Palace), the residence of 
the Hohenzollern, was demolished (Fig. 7). This symbolic 
gesture was intended to reinforce the new state’s new forms 
of identification. 
The Palace, however, was not completely destroyed. One 
of the balconies, Liebknecht’s balcony, was preserved and 
incorporated in to the structure of the Council of State 
building situated in the vicinity. It owed its preservation 
to Karl Liebknecht who had declared the German Free 
Socialist Republic from this balcony on 9th of November 
1918. For years the preserved balcony reminded Berliners 
of the demolished Palace which left the empty site. After 
the reunification of Germany, in the 1990s the advocates 
of the reconstruction of the Stadtschloss recreated the 
façade in the form of a natural -size painting, which created 
the illusion of its actual volume. The imitation evoked 
memories and called for the Berliners to take a  stance. 
Now we know that the Bundestag has decided to rebuild 
the Palace and perhaps the preserved balcony will return to 
its original site. The dynamic and relatively fast rebuilding 
of the eastern section of Berlin which gave it a characteristic 
look with the dominance of block -type architecture posed 
a  challenge for the urban planners on the west side of 
the city.
West Berlin was made up of the outskirts and 
unconnected districts which, left without the old centre, 
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required radical urban planning solutions.7 One of the 
attempts to define the identity of the city was made in 
1957. Although never completed it reflected the apocalyptic 
attitude towards the space of Berlin. The proposal 
involved the construction of tower blocks surrounded by 
greenery in its centre, while the residential area was to 
be located in the suburbs, not unlike Le Corbusier’s Villa 
Contemporaine. If the project had been approved, the pre-
war tenement buildings would have had to be demolished 
and the residents relocated. Another project, completed 
between 1954 and 1961, incorporated the ruins of the old 
Gedächtniskirche (Kaiser Wilhelm Memorial Church) 
designed by Franz Schwechten, which was heavily bombed 
during World War II, into the new church designed by Egon 
Eiermann, boasting the prismatic structure constructed 
of metal and cobalt -coloured glass from which the blue 
glow emanates at night. However, despite a  number of 
architectural competitions, no comprehensive programme 
of the reconstruction of West Berlin was ever accomplished. 
It is worth noting that the urban planners in West Berlin 
represented two viewpoints regarding the space of the city: 
some of them strove to develop a layout of a new western 
centre, while the others considered the city in its entirety. 
Those two stances can be found in a number of public 
statements and projects concerning the redevelopment of 
the city, and in the case of the latter the border dividing the 
city was often disregarded.8
The new attitude towards the historic fabric of West 
Berlin, critical of the urban redevelopment ideas of the 
1950s, was represented by the Internationale Bauausstellung, 
7 It must be borne in mind that West Berlin was under the 
administration of three different Western Allies: the British controlled 
the planning institutions according to their own law, the French 
promoted the philosophy of functionalism (CIAM) which stood in 
opposition to the historic face of the city and the local projects, while 
the Americans focused on the housing problems.
8 Klaus von Beyme, “Ideen für eine Hauptstadt in Ost und West,” 
in Stadt der Architektur, p. 248.
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IBA (the International Building Exhibition, Berlin). Its high 
status and significance was attested to by the participation 
of the architects of international renown as well as by 
the comprehensive approach to the problems of the city 
reconstruction. The objective of the IBA was to rebuild the 
centre of Berlin and give it a look befitting a metropolis 
as well as meeting the residents’ housing needs through 
architectural solutions and the reconstruction of the 
old houses of the city. The programme was scheduled 
for completion in the 1980s (in 1987 Berlin celebrated its 
750 anniversary). From the initial conceptual stage to 
the actual construction work, the IBA created a platform 
initiating a discussion regarding the shape of the city and 
its identity, whereas its pluralistic approach to the city’s 
housing entailed the active involvement of the residents.9 
In those times Berlin’s lack of identity was construed as 
the lack of context, therefore the attempts were made to 
define the essential constituents of the actual character of 
the city. The space of the city was seen as the existential 
space where its identity could be recreated in the sphere of 
dwelling: this conception of the city space was suggested 
by Christian Norberg -Schulz and Leon Krier invited to 
the Berlin programme.10 The important component of the 
project was its exhibition aspect present in its name and 
represented by its institutional organizational structure 
which encompassed publications (maps, magazines), 
museum exhibitions, congresses and conferences which 
later gave the interested parties (specialists, tourists) the 
 9 The programme and the analysis of the particular solutions in the 
special issue of International Building Exhibition Berlin 1987 (“A+U”, 
1987). W. Miller, “IBA’s ‘Models for a City’: Housing and Image of Cold-
War Berlin,” Journal of Architectural Education 46, no. 4 (May 1993): 
202.
10 Norberg -Schulz Christian, Bycie, przestrzeń, architektura, 
trans. Barbara Gadomska (Warszawa: Wydawnictwo Murator, 2000), 
pp. 14–36. The Krier brothers call for the small scale and public space to 
be restored to cities, cf. Krier Leon, “A City within a City,” Architectural 
Design 3 (1977): 207.
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opportunity to visit certain routes in order to compare 
the actual development with the original intentions. 
The space of the city under construction was treated as 
a  prolonged exhibition which offered the opportunity 
to see Peter Eisenman’s buildings (Checkpoint Charlie), 
Arata Isozaki’s blocks and Charles Moore’s and Robert 
Stern’s housing development in Tegel Harbor district. The 
exhibition gimmick was employed again in 2000 when the 
large part of the urbanistic process of unifying the city was 
already completed. The number 100 double -decker bus took 
tourists for a drive around new Berlin. In both cases the 
exhibition practices had the unifying value with the image 
of the city being created in various spatial dimensions: in 
the conceptual space by means of the blueprints and scale 
models, in the conceptual sphere by the people living there, 
and in the aesthetical dimension when visitors created 
the image of the city on their own by associating and 
consolidating its numerous diverse fragments. 
Rem Koolhaas, steadfast in his scepticism concerning 
the possibility of creating a uniform image of West Berlin 
which would combine the past (buildings of the old type) 
with the present (the solutions reflecting the modern trends 
in architecture), together with Oswald Matthias Ungers 
opposed the plans of Berlin redevelopment as proposed 
by the IBA. According to the architects, to stay true to 
the history of the city one should not strive to restore it 
to its past appearance but rather to preserve what is so 
characteristic for Berlin: the damage, the division, the 
split inherent in its history.11 Eisenman represented a new 
approach to design and architecture. At that time he 
departed from the conception of the building constituting 
a  site and representing clear meanings and introduced 
additional grids into the layout of the building adjacent to 
Checkpoint Charlie, as a result of which the building does 
11 Rem Koolhaus, “Housing Kochstrasse/Friedrichstrasse, Berlin, 
Germany, 1980,” in Small, Medium, Large, Extra ‑Large. Office for 
Metropolitan Architecture, eds. Rem Koolhaus and Bruce Mau 
(Rotterdam: The Monacelli Press 1995), pp. 257–258.
145The Presence of the City…
not form a static place but rather a series of spaces slightly 
dislocated in relation to one another.
Apart from the officially approved projects there was 
always a  tendency, partly included in those projects, to 
look at Berlin in the context of the capital in its entirety. 
The example of such an approach is the construction of 
Kulturforum on the outskirts of the city in the vicinity of 
the Berlin wall and, non -existent at the time, Potsdamer 
Platz, which only now appears to make sense when the 
south side of Potsdamer Platz is filled with the Sony Centre. 
Similarly, certain sites were left empty, intended to house 
future government offices long before the reunification of 
Germany while some of the communicational links were 
designed in such a way that the city motorways seemed 
to come to an abrupt dead end, but after the reunification 
were easily connected.12 Although the political differences 
were partly responsible for the striking stylistic disparities 
on the opposite banks of the Spree River, they can also 
be explained by the efforts aimed at constructing urban 
references. Thus the grand scale of Ernst -Reuter -Platz was 
to be equivalent to Alexanderplatz, whereas the cityscape 
designed by Hans Scharoun was intended as a juxtaposition 
to the monumental axis of the Spree on the east side of 
the city. 
2
The establishment of the separate identities of Berlin 
through the rearrangement of the space divided by the wall, 
after its collapse revealed the polycentrism, formlessness 
and unconnectedness/discontinuity of the city. Geometry 
and spatial composition, which could guarantee the 
eternal presence, could only be seen in the fragments of 
the buildings embodying the ideas of past ideologies, and 
the prevalent diversity resulted in the city resembling 
12 Beyme, “Ideen,” p. 249. 
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Derrida’s Tower of Babel characterized by the excess of 
architectural orders and languages. As Oswald points out, 
the identity and structure of the city resulted largely from 
the unplanned, uncontrollable elements and its growth 
was influenced to a  greater extent by automatic urban 
planning than ideal designs or organized development. 
In this context, the reconstruction of Berlin in the 1990s 
turned into the Europe -wide debate on the difficulty 
inherent in the articulation of the identity of the city and 
on its recognizable formlessness and inbuilt disparities.13 
Derrida proposed a new approach to the reconstruction 
of Berlin. He saw the act of founding a new city not by 
disposing of the old in the name of the new founding myth, 
but in the name of construction which would accept the 
responsibility for the past and find its fulfilment in the act 
of creation free from the rules: “Berlin is not recreated but 
created anew.”14 Thus the law constituting the foundation 
of a  newly -founded Berlin would be Berlin itself, its 
inhabitants together with the existing condition of the 
city and whatever was absent – materially or spiritually. 
Although the idea of the communal creation taking the city 
as its medium must inevitably bring to mind the association 
with a happening and its audacity is amazing, what seems 
to be the point here is the attempt to formulate a  new 
approach to the city’s openness construed on a number 
of levels as well as the design as a rational definition of 
this openness. Derrida proposes that the imperfection, 
the incompleteness of actions should be introduced into 
the design, while Foster acknowledges the completeness 
of the design but he intends to dismantle the project 
while under construction. It is worth mentioning here 
that Koolhaas describing a modern city as a  featureless 
area, the peripheral rather than historical city, points to 
the end of designing: the sentiment echoed in Oswald’s 
13 “The Berlin City Forum. Jacques Derrida, Kurt Foster and Wim 
Wenders,” Architectural Design 11–12 (1992): 46–53.
14 Ibidem, p. 47.
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automatic urbanization. The introduction of the elements of 
imperfection, incompleteness and dislocation into thinking 
about design constitutes a deliberate attempt to offset the 
administrative activities aimed at centralization, it presents 
an opposition to the processes intended to create a complete, 
spatially closed Berlin. This fear of a design too narrow in 
its identification of the city expresses a negative attitude 
towards the Eurocentric rationalism and goes far beyond 
planning problems of Berlin, especially with its twentieth-
century history proving that it is the city of failed plans 
rather than completed designs. Even the IBM’s pluralistic 
intentions never yielded expected results due to financial 
and administrative constraints, which were ultimately 
responsible for the unplanned elements being introduced 
into the original plans. Now, urban planners, architects and 
philosophers want to include the incompleteness in their 
designs so as to preserve the uniqueness of Berlin, whose 
true face is revealed not in the dialectics of the new and the 
old, presence and absence but rather in “the multi -layered 
game […] of absences.”15 Thus whereas Derrida wants to 
expand the openness of the city with new dimensions, 
such as responsibility, Oswald points to particular traits 
of openness and instability in Berlin, such us ugliness, 
vulgarity and emptiness: “Berlin is hideous but intense.”16
15 Shusterman, Pragmatist, p. 79.
16 Oswalt, Berlin – Stadt ohne Form, p. 29. The example of 
reconciliation with the history of Berlin combined with the 
responsibility for its architectural heritage is provided by the current 
accommodation of the ministries: the Foreign Office has moved into 
the former Reichsbank building, the Federal Ministry of Finance has 
its headquarters in the former Göring’s Air Ministry Building (which in 
the German Democratic Republic was the Haus der Ministerien, House 
of Ministries), the Federal Ministry for Labour and Social Affairs is 
located in the building formerly used by Goebbels’ Propaganda Ministry 
whereas the Chancellor’s offices found their place in Honecker’s 
Bundesrat (although they were relocated to Bundeskanzleramt, the new 
Chancellery building in 2001); after Rumpf Peter, Städtebauliche und 
architektonische Entwicklung von 1990 bis 2000, in Stadt der Architektur, 
p. 370.
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Let us have a  closer look at emptiness, which seems 
to constitute one of the forms of deliberately attempted 
visualization of absence. Aldo Rossi in his notable work 
on the city describes emptiness in negative terms, as 
the lack of architecture, that is the lack of the authentic 
testimony of what is human, spiritual.17 By contrast, in the 
debate concerning the image of Berlin it turned out that 
the city planners were required to leave empty spaces. For 
Koolhaas, empty spaces are supposed to provoke active 
interpretation. Wim Wenders recalls the old Berlin and 
proposes that no buildings should be erected in the empty 
mid -spaces, which could trigger off unexpected activities, 
for instance pitching circus tents. Furthermore, he argues 
that “the quality of a city relies on the fact that one can see 
the sky” and these empty areas set Berlin apart from other 
metropolises: in Berlin we can watch the sky. And he does 
not mean spaces which are intended to be remain empty or 
the sites intended for viewing, but the places where nothing 
is going on, where one passes through the areas which 
are not occupied, apparently left behind.18 For Oswald, 
emptiness is ambivalent: it is “the place of memories and 
the place of what will be.” It is spatially and temporally 
unstable. It is a state of “not any longer” and “not -yet.” It 
differs from the permanent and determined build -in areas 
due to its openness, willingness to accept everything in an 
unconditional, unrestricted way following from the fact that 
it has no structure, no form, no direction.19 The campaign 
for the preservation of emptiness is set against the process 
of filling the city with the fabric of buildings and streets, but 
it has to be borne in mind that the emptiness was inbuilt 
in the divided Berlin and, alongside the wall, comprised 
the centre of the city. It also epitomized this division: it 
was the border zone, the territory where the road and 
railroad tracks terminated; it was the land of confrontation, 
17 Aldo Rossi, The Architecture of the City (Cambridge, Mass. and 
London: The MIT Press, 1991), pp. 100–101.
18 “The Berlin City Forum,” p. 53.
19 Oswalt, Berlin – Stadt ohne Form, p. 62.
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the “place” of death, the no man’s land where those who 
wanted to get to the other side died. After the reunification 
the same empty areas were gradually filled with buildings: 
this was the manifestation of the unwillingness to confront 
the emptiness. Emptiness can be seen as a vague field of 
absence of something or somebody that can only be 
revealed through the effort of memory. Absence of this kind 
cannot be returned to presence, it is not a distant signal 
or the form of a city but resembles the Berlin wall whose 
aura of division can no longer be reconstructed. And yet 
the attempts are being made to make this kind of absence 
visible in the space of Berlin in order to make it part of the 
present. The visualization of absence involves the exposure 
of destruction as well as the aesthetization of absence 
which entering into the realm of architecture reveals the 
harbingers of absence. Such an approach to emptiness seen 
as the arranged visualization of absence is exemplified by 
the Jewish Museum Berlin designed by Daniel Libeskind. 
The site of the Museum, on the intersection of old baroque 
streets whose glory is long forgotten, appears to serve as an 
invisible matrix triggering the process of bringing back the 
memories of centuries-old relationship between Germans 
and Jews. The entire conception is based on the clash of four 
aspects and each of them is dominated by the dimension 
of emptiness (the Void) construed as what is invisible and 
absent.20 The Void, the empty space, is not only a marked 
out area of the museum, but it also constitutes the space 
for whatever cannot be put on display. Libeskind recalls 
the names and addresses of the deceased Jews, including 
artists, poets, composers: the real people who used to live 
in Berlin. They were the ones who contributed to the city’s 
glory, they were Berliner Luft. Their addresses, the places 
which no longer exist, form a grid of intersecting lines 
serving as an anchor for the project. In addition to this, 
20 The project is presented by the architect in the text: “Between 
the Lines”, in D. Libeskind Radix ‑matrix. Architecture and Writings 
(München and New York: Prestel Verlag, 1997), p. 34.
Maria Popczyk150
Libeskind has chosen Arnold Schönberg’s unfinished opera, 
Moses und Aron, which was written when the composer 
lived in Berlin. Cut off in the second act, it is continued 
in the architectural dimension where two lines intersect. 
Another aspect is associated with the lists of the names 
of the Jews deported during the Holocaust. In one of the 
Museum rooms the information about the dates and places 
are displayed on the transparent helium flowing from the 
ceiling (the exhibition in 2000). It is worth noting that the 
inscriptions are not engraved in granite but, due to their 
ephemeral luminous form, they fade away. This moment 
of calling the people by their family name and surname 
appears on the structural level: the scale models of the 
subsequent segments of the building are fixed to the floor 
on which the names are printed, creating the impression 
that the walls of the museum emerge from the virtual 
space of individual lives. The final aspect is associated 
with Walter Benjamin’s One Way Street whose content is 
an inspiration for the building’s zigzag shape representing 
the apocalyptic vision of Berlin. Emptiness is not nihility 
wiping everything out, but the absence of what is distant 
and forgotten, obliterated. The Voided Void materializes 
in the Holocaust Tower. Marked in such a way it belongs 
to the hidden structure of the building and becomes an 
open field of endless calling – of names, events and facts. 
Libeskind offers the following comment: “Emptiness and 
what is invisible constitute structural features which have 
been gathered in the space of Berlin and exposed in the 
architecture, in which what is unnamed remains in the 
silent names.”21 The attempt to resurrect the distant events, 
to revive the forgotten individuals, whose routes intersect 
in the spaces of Berlin, becomes extended with the material 
21 Jewish Museum Berlin D. Libeskind (Berlin: G+B art International, 
2000), p. 30. Derrida highlighted the differences in the way both terms, 
emptiness and absence, are understood, pointing to the relation of 
emptiness and place and structure and also to differentiate it from 
chora and chiazma in: Jacques Derrida in “Between the Line”, in Daniel 
Libeskind, Radix ‑Matrix, p. 111.
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tectonics of the building (Fig. 8) which is intended by the 
architect to determine the future shape of the city. 
Fig. 8. Daniel Libeskind, the Jewish Museum Berlin (interior), 2008 
(photo by Maria Popczyk)
The emptiness constituting the space between the 
thought and the reality, between the past and the future 
demonstrates what it means to be an inhabitant of the 
place founded on the places which exist no longer. 
Emptiness possesses no symbolic meanings, since it 
does not refer to any latent senses, but constitutes the 
field designed for temporal discontinuity and spatial 
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disruptions: introduced into architecture it counters the 
beliefs that the objective of architecture is to communicate 
obvious and expressible contents, which for Libeskind 
equals violence. What Libeskind’s building is opposed to 
is a fossilized, ideologized way of expressing identity in 
architecture, inseparably linked with the administration 
of power.
Libeskind’s work makes us aware of one more aspect of 
absence, which is a murdered alien, a fallen alien. Here we 
touch upon the issue of the nation, extremely important 
for the German mentality and inextricably linked to the 
determination of whom it comprises: the community of 
the people sharing the same language, territory and law, or 
the people participating in the common tradition, religion 
and culture. In this context, it is crucial to formulate 
Germans’ attitude to other nationalities, Jews in particular. 
Oswald argues that the population of Berlin is not, and has 
never been, homogenous. For the most part it is deprived 
of its roots and successive migrations, deportations and 
emigrations make the city open to new arrivals with each 
wave of refugees contributing to the city’s varied changeable 
identity.22 Even the most superficial knowledge of the status 
of Jews in pre -war Berlin demonstrates that they were very 
well assimilated and participated in all areas of the city’s 
life. After the war, the issue of Jews was ignored, distorted 
or manipulated for propaganda purposes.
When Helmut Kohl was the Chancellor of Germany, 
the initiative to build the Memorial to the Murdered Jews 
of Europe was created. Two competitions for its design 
gave rise to a great deal of controversy. It was decided to 
situate it in a special place: on the site below the Reichstag 
and the Brandenburg Gate, on the other side of Potsdamer 
Platz. The winning proposals of the first competition 
were eventually vetoed, while in the next competition the 
Bundestag decided in favour of the design by Eisenman 
and Serra, which ultimately went under construction. The 
22 Oswald, Berlin – Stadt ohne Form, p. 28.
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designers intended to cover the irregular area with four 
thousand rectangular slabs or “stelae” varying in height 
with the tallest reaching seven metres. They were to be 
arranged in rows leaving the paths so narrow that only one 
person could walk between them. The entire construction 
formed an abstract space separated from its surroundings 
by the road. The traditional notion of a monument, since 
the times of the Roman Empire understood as a spatial 
figure designed for viewing and evoking memory, was 
radically altered, since here not viewing, but penetrating, 
exploring the mass of condensed space became the only 
way to trigger experience. A participant introduced into 
another dimension of space, moving among the pillars, was 
to become a living element, a component of the memory.23 
Such a building deprived of either narrative or aspects of 
spectacle, offering a visitor nothing but the exertion of
Fig. 9. Peter Eisenman, The Memorial to the Murdered Jews of 
Europe, 2008 (photo by Maria Popczyk)
23 Astrid Schmeing, “Eisenman’s Design for the Berlin Holocaust 
Memorial – a  Modern Statement?” Architectural Design 70, no. 5 
(October 2000): 62–63.
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the strenuous wander among the huge austere blocks of 
stone could prove to be repressive in reception. An anti- 
monument preventing visitors from performing social 
rituals would be ambiguous, multifunctional. However, 
the project as described above was not approved and the 
proposed changes significantly altered its original message, 
which also resulted in Serra pulling out. Eisenman’s new 
version, likened to the field of corn, amended the scale of 
the slabs and their number (2,711). They no longer dominate 
the surroundings with their strangeness, but enclosed by 
the trees are incorporated in to the surrounding area. The 
grid pattern of the rectangles forms a shape modulated 
like a rippling sheaf of corn, which can be viewed from 
a distance (Fig. 9). 
Interestingly enough, the stelae not only can be viewed, 
but also used. Tourists are eager to sit on them and children 
play on them: on the edge on the east side they form low 
rectangles. They can also be seen, however, as the rows of 
anonymous graves bringing to mind not only absent Jews but 
also German soldiers killed in war. This way the application 
of the universal form has united religions and nationalities. 
This version of anti -monument is the answer to the Alien, 
but the Alien is not identified as a Jew or as a victim. The 
objective seems to be getting to know the Alien through 
the place beyond the place. Bernhard Waldenfels points 
out that the “place from which we respond to the alien 
does not belong to us: it is extraterritorial, it is a blank 
space on the map and the calendar of history.”24 The field 
of concrete slabs varying in height nevertheless forms 
the open grid of slabs/graves deprived of the centre. It 
enables the imagination to extend it ad infinitum. In 
fact Eisenman wanted the slabs to enter into the fabric 
of the city, which, however, did not meet with approval. 
Eisenman’s version of anti -monument has appealed 
24 Bernhard Waldenfels, Topologia obcego. Studia z fenomenologii 
obcego, trans. Janusz Sidorek (Warszawa: Oficyna Naukowa, 2002), 
p. 155.
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to Jews as well, since it reminds them of the graves in 
Jerusalem and the names of all known Jewish Holocaust 
victim can be found in the “Place of Information”, the 
archives located underground. Those who venture into 
the depths of the slabs, enter another reality of sorts, 
and slowly become cut off from the surroundings. The 
road descends while the slabs become taller and taller so 
that the entirety of the structure disappears from sight 
(Fig. 10). 
Fig. 10. Peter Eisenman, The Memorial to the Murdered Jews 
of Europe, 2008 (photo by Maria Popczyk)
The sense of claustrophobia and confusion triggers 
a specific sensitivity to light, sounds, the oppressive tactile 
weight of the slabs. In such a state of mind a silhouette 
visible for a fraction of a second makes us realize how fragile 
human existence is and how enormous it is that thousands 
of people were wiped out from the face of the earth.
The presence of the city is experienced in the present 
and crystallizes in the memory as a permanent veduta. The 
identity of the city substantiated by its material and visual 
presence directs our awareness towards the future. The 
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identity of the city, however, is complemented with a variety 
of forms of the visualization of absence, which makes it 
fuller and richer though at the same time ambivalent and 
impossible to express in words or clear vedute.
Aleksandra Kunce
On European Epistemological and Ethical Tropes:  
Honour, Dignity and Shame*
What are honour, dignity, and shame? To what extent are 
these tropes important in disclosing the epistemology of 
European culture? In what way do they indicate dominant 
cultural modes of comprehending Man?
 The object of reflection in this chapter are the 
transformations of European thought leading to the 
evolution of identity models, worked out by its intellectual 
tradition and manifesting themselves in the écriture of the 
humanities. The discourse presented here concentrates upon 
the identity models developed respectively by modernity and 
postmodernity, both understood as positions symptomatic 
of European thinking about culture, man, and ethics.1 Such 
a distinction is useful for the purpose of my argumentation, 
* The chapter first published as: “On European Epistemological and 
Ethical Tropes: Honor, Dignity and Shame,” International Journal of 
the Humanities, vol. 5, issue 3 (2005) 233–240.
1 The complex approach of postmodernism to “its own modern 
version” is well exemplified in a  variety of texts, including: Gilles 
Deleuze, Difference and Repetition, trans. Paul Patton (New York: 
Columbia University Press, 1994); Jean -François Lyotard, The 
Postmodern Condition: A  Report on Knowledge, trans. Geoffrey 
Bennington and Brian Massumi (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota 
Press, 1984); Jacques Derrida, La Voix et le phénomène: Introduction au 
problème du signe dans la phénomènologie de Husserl (Paris: Presses 
universitaires de France, 1967); Wolfgang Welsch, Unsere postmoderne 
Moderne (Munchen: Oldenbourg Verlag GmbH, 1994).
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as its very application seems to be inseparably bound with 
the issue of belief in the feasibility of the potentially viable 
project of modernity: the project stressing such qualities as 
continuity, causal relations, the interconnectedness of the 
past and the future, utopia, universality, the importance of 
classification and categorization, acknowledgment of the 
primacy of reason and of the self -presencing I.2 
A modernist view
The basic question to be addressed in the context of the 
relationship between the three central concepts of these 
considerations and the modern identity is how honor, 
shame and dignity contribute to its construction.3 In order 
to answer it, it is useful to approach each of these categories 
in terms of their cultural significance in each of the two 
discourses of my interest.
In modernist perspective, honour is a clear indication 
of ourselves, since it univocally defines our value, our 
singularity, and our status. It testifies to the existence 
of a  precisely delineated subject. To Aristotle, honour 
defines a  righteous man, excludes ignominious deeds 
or untamed emotions – such as shame.4 To Aristotle, 
honour is synonymous to emotional maturity, rational, 
socially approved “tameness.” In other words, to the 
Greek philosopher honour is an adopted and internalized 
knowledge of who one is, in respect to what, and in the 
2 See Jürgen Habermas, “Modernity – An Incomplete Project”, in 
Thomas Docherty (ed.), Postmodernism: A Reader (New York: Harvester 
Wheatsheat, 1993); Lyotard, The Post ‑Modern Condition. 
3 One of the clearest stances with respect to the modernist identity 
may be found in Anthony Giddens’s work. See Anthony Giddens, The 
Consequences of Modernity (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1990), 
also Giddens, Modernity and Self ‑Identity: Self and Society in the Late 
Modern Age (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1990).
4 Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, trans. Christopher Rowe, ed. Sarah 
Broadie (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001), 1107a–1138b. 
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light of what principles, conjoined with our own righteous, 
rational I. Honour thus understood performs distinctive 
functions: it establishes division lines and warrants man’s 
value. 
Conversely, shame, in such a rationalized, European 
perspective, appears to be but a “low,” second -rate emotion, 
which seems to unspecifically relate to Anyone; an Anyone 
understood instrumentally, i.e. Anyone in the context of 
breaching cultural norms. Shame, ashamedness – writes 
Aristotle – relate to an affect, yet without being a virtue; 
shame and ashamedness are corporeal, carnal entities.5 
Shame as such is never ascribed to a person (hierarchically) 
singled out in his righteousness; it is only an attribute of 
the irrational, uncertain, and yet simple behavioral norms. 
Shame is the opening up to what is collective and common, 
while honour definitely excludes the participation of 
Everyone. Such a  state of affairs is the consequence of 
the attachment of the culture of antiquity to hierarchical 
solutions selected on the basis of the criteria of ratio, the 
certainty of the path of cognition, and the clarity of the I vs 
group relationship.
The exclusive quality of honour is even clearer in the 
perception of Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz, who locates 
honour in the neighborhood of esteem, status, fixed division 
between the possibility and impossibility of separation.6 
It vouchsafes the hierarchically legitimized identity, 
its right to make claims, to assert its rights, to demand 
respect. It represents the realm of Someone’s possibility, 
and thus it indicates a coherent I, which is impossible to 
destroy, if destructive actions are dictated by rules negating 
honour. Such honour clearly programs our actions, which 
will thus always be nothing else but realizations of given 
laws. In the context of furthering the only proper vision of 
itself, a vision different from random, contingent aspects, 
5 Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, 1107a–1138b.
6 See Maria Ossowska, Ethos rycerski i jego odmiany (Warszawa: 
PWN, 1973). 
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incompatible with the rules of certainty, honour locates 
itself evidently within the space of the right of usurpation. 
Likewise, in the view of Charles de Montesquieu, it is in 
the nature of honour to claim acknowledgment, elevation, 
priority.7 
Irrespective of cultural differences between the 
intellectual upshots of the German, French or Greek 
thought, one has to arrive at the conclusion that in their 
overall, schematic, potential limits, the concepts under 
research are understood in a  similar fashion. It is so, 
since they have been formed on the basis of the same 
hierarchical patterns of thought and action, which evolved 
in Europe. What one encounters in the course of a scrutiny 
of these concepts is the common “pan -European” 
attachment to generality, universalization, hierarchization, 
acknowledgment of divisions traditionally rooted in the 
culture (including consensual epistemological limits) – 
and of the separation of that which is the same from that 
which is radically different. Finally, the analysis of the 
concepts in question indicates the shared tendency to rely 
upon the rational I, guaranteeing the “domestication” of 
emotional uncertainty, a quality rudimental in European 
thought. 
This form of thinking has translated itself not only into 
the actions of the Europeans oriented towards economic, 
political and intellectual expansion onto the areas of 
“otherness,” which potentially is “given to be subdued,” but – 
first and foremost – into the positive valuation of all entities 
related to, or associated with Europe. It is especially clear in 
Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel’s thought, which is nothing 
else but one of many texts of culture, reifying European 
perspective in the same fashion.8 Reason, conceptuality, 
freedom, spirit, development, self -consciousness, distance 
7 Charles de Montesquieu, The Spirit of Laws, trans. Anne M. Cohler, 
Basia C. Miller and Harold S. Stone (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 1989), book III, chapter 7.
8 Georg H. W. F. Hegel, The Phenomenology of Mind, trans. 
J.B. Baillie (London: George Allen & Unwin, 1949). 
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with respect to oneself, to objects, and to the world – all 
mark the same goal, which we incessantly strive to attain: 
ordering the world.
Summing up what has been written so far, it is possible 
to say that hierarchical thinking points to an “I” and that it 
allows one to adequately define moral horizons, i.e. not to 
extend their limits to include everything and everyone, but 
to reduce their capacity to entities of importance, capable 
to indicate Me, Us, merged in the same, honour -bound 
existence. Honour is inextricably bound with elitism. One 
is thus a separate(d) being, functioning safely in one’s own 
personal sphere, the limits of which one meticulously 
guards in order for the guard to retain the sense of stability, 
to live by his or her own, personally developed and unique 
principles of sanctioning and disqualifying the Other, 
and eventually to prevent the blurring of the lines of the 
carefully protected social order. Honour is founded upon 
separatedness, upon thinking in terms of identity and 
difference – one is who one is, and only who one is, and not 
someone or something else. Only someone like me – i.e. one 
participating in our Us owing to the fact that he or she is 
subjected to the same clear principles defining honour and 
dishonour – is capable of predicating of Me. Our similarity – 
in the epistemological reception of reality (i.e. in the shared 
evaluation of what is rational and what is emotional) – is 
the basis of the common discourse and of the presence in 
the unceasingly running process of identification, based on 
instances of confirmation and falsification. By virtue of the 
sameness of rules conditioning the elitist character of our 
Us, we are the same.
Shame, conversely, in its inferiority with respect to 
honour, is much less subjective; bearing in mind the 
modernist understanding of the subject as certain and 
rational, shame appears to be no more but a  crippled 
regulator of behaviours. 
Regulation of behaviours and social control as aspects 
of the discussed phenomenon were acknowledged by 
a  number of thinkers, including representatives of the 
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Tartu school,9 or scholars following the methodological 
principles of Eliasian psycho - and sociogenetic analysis.10 
It must be admitted, however, that shame may also point 
to itself, i.e. it may disclose itself and present itself in the 
context of experiencing shame before oneself, and not 
before others.11 Nonetheless, subjective presence, which 
shame discloses, appears to be much less certain than it is 
the case of the agency of honour. Shame – as it seems – is 
related to the level of praxis to a much greater extent than 
it is to the “meta -level.” It represents the values of hic et 
nunc repetitiveness, hic et nunc decidability, but, first and 
foremost, it is bound with emotionality and egalitarianism. 
It does not represent the space of reason, so helpful in 
constructing congnitive social space; instead, it locates 
itself in the realm of emotional being, of unitary control. 
It refers to particular, concrete situations rather than to 
the existence of rationality or righteousness as such. What 
shame -related acts or qualities disclose is not a rational I: 
one might even risk the claim that what they make present 
is nothing but aspectual existence, deeply immersed 
in a  multiplicity of behaviours, in norms requiring 
instantaneous confirmation, in social roles. Shame, thus, 
appears not to indicate Me; rather, it indicates the limits 
of the cultural norms, commonly accepted principles and 
thus also of the negotiated aspectuality of the cultural I. At 
the very best, shame discloses the I (invisible amidst the 
multiplicity of social behaviours) in some of its profundity 
for no more than a  fraction of a  second. The subject, 
understood as self ‑presencing I, is only a “flash,” while the 
guarantee of self -certainty appears to be at most a vague 
sense of a possibility of some deeper reference to Oneself. 
 9 Jurij Łotman, O  semiotyce pojęć strach i  wstyd w  kulturze 
rosyjskiej, trans. Jerzy Faryno, in Semiotyka kultury, ed. Maria Renata 
Mayerowa (Warszawa: PWN, 1970). 
10 Norbert Elias, The Civilizing Process. The History of Manners, 
trans. Edward Jephcott (Oxford: Blackwell, 1978).
11 Immanuel Kant, Critique of Practical Reason, ed. M.J. Gregor 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997). 
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Shame allows an individual to locate him or herself 
within the frame of cultural actions, it controls the “I”, and 
warrants the positive, socially functionalized image of the 
I, which is neither certain nor rational. At the same time, it 
awakens incessant concern about the image and about the 
social perception of the “I”. Shame lays bare what seems to 
be the lack of solid foundations to underlie our pragmatic 
righteousness. It is no more than consensual certainty, 
one decided upon in each particular situation and without 
reference to any general level, one founded upon a rational 
and elitist view of reality. 
Shame, undoubtedly, remains within the space of 
equality, yet neither the equality of shame, nor the 
egalitarian character of playing with shame opens up 
space, in which the highly individualized Everyone could be 
legitimized; at most, it may account for the egalitarian being 
of Everyone within the frame of the same mechanism of 
shame. Shame, activated in certain situations, accompanies 
everyone; it is too visible in its psychophysical tangibility 
for one to feel entirely free from it. Besides, it is impossible 
to univocally associate shame and freedom. Shame leaves 
one inert, and represents collectivity, stands guard to norms 
we interiorize and exteriorize most clearly when we are 
ashamed. Shame always prefers the collective Us, which 
dictates conditions. Thus, it appears to relate to the ethical 
discourse of freedom, rationality, or righteousness to much 
lesser extent that the honour does. It corresponds solely to 
the social aspect of the active I, which encounters itself and 
others when it is ashamed. It discloses the regions of shame 
and shamelessness and strips naked cultural taboos, i.e. it 
discloses spaces that provide the matrix in which what we 
are, rather than who we are, is univocally molded. 
Shame seems to be of local, momentary character, even 
though it leads to the disclosure of constant norms. It acts 
hic et nunc, restoring the social I into order. It is therefore 
less manifestly demonstrated; cultural presencing becomes 
its share less frequently than in the case of honour – and for 
those reasons, shame does not readily lend itself to being 
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tamed into the verbal order. Indeed, it is difficult to speak 
about honour, and yet it is always possible to find vocabulary 
fitting the general description of the I, Us, inseparably 
unified in the solidity of the state of righteousness. With 
shame, the situation is much worse. It is immersed in the 
space of behaviours to such an extent that the results of any 
attempt to single it out and to tame it verbally always appear 
inadequate. Shame is experienced, and not exemplified. 
In any case, shame is less open to possible endeavours of 
exemplification than is honour.
Let me complement the argument built above by 
weaving into its fabric a new thread: the concept of dignity. 
The understanding of dignity present in the European 
tradition is twofold: on the one hand, dignity is conceived 
of as a distinctive marker; on the other, it is understood as 
a quality refering to every person. The first understanding 
of the concept is akin to the perception of honour and 
pride, and serves the purpose of recognizing those who 
possess dignity (i.e. those striving towards self -development, 
defending values and expecting respect on the account of it), 
and distinguishing them from those devoid of this quality. 
Such exemplification, derived from the Aristotelian concept 
of righteousness, informs the work of Maria Ossowska.12 
However, it is only the second sense of dignity that appears 
to disclose its proper understanding in the context of the 
European cultural discourse, as it does not blur the limits 
of the concept in question in the homogeneity of what is 
honourable, respectful, righteous. Instead, it introduces 
a sharp definitional distinction, thus attributing dignity 
its own, separate sense. Dignity is “an ineradicable and non-
gradable value of humanity, deserving self -respect and the 
respect of others, to which every person without exception 
is entitled”13. 
12 Maria Ossowska, Ethos rycerski i  jego odmiany (Warszawa: 
PWN, 1973); Eadem, Normy moralne. Próba systematyzacji (Warszawa: 
Państwowe Wydawnictwo Naukowe, 1971), pp. 59–61.
13 Filozofia. Leksykon PWN, eds. Włodzimierz Łagodzki and 
Grzegorz Pyszczek (Warszawa: PWN, 2000). 
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Such a concept of dignity appears to be the most universal 
and neutral of all available. It informs not only the discourse 
of philosophy, but also that of social practices, which 
manifests itself most evidently in the character of European 
institutions. In this context, it should be mentioned that 
much is owed to Immanuel Kant’s philosophy, whose 
contribution to the development of thinking about dignity 
is hard to underestimate. To Kant, dignity is a  state in 
which Everyone is entitled to participate; it leads one to 
the concepts of Me and Us, who are all the same in our 
humanity.14 Likewise, dignity informs the development 
of the eighteenth-century egalitarian revolution, which 
not only appreciated the equality of Everyone, but also 
recognized the possibility of questioning Everyone by All, 
outside of the discourse of separate and subdivided spheres 
of culture. This is the period, in which the language of 
identity changes.15 
In the culture, thinking in terms of “Everyone dignified” 
marks the paths of globalization attained in consequence of 
the development of the concept of a common man attributed 
personal dignity. The world is a space of identical individualities 
sharing the same moral horizons and the same degree of 
responsibility. “Everyone dignified,” nonetheless, informs 
the development of individualization, since “Everyone” is not 
the homogenous “All.” And yet, at the same time, such an 
approach triggers communal thinking, which reconciliates 
individual freedom with individual’s being for him/herself and 
for others. Egalitarianism, after all, goes hand in hand with 
expressivist thinking: everyone dignified, everyone obliged, 
everyone potentially given to him/herself in order to become 
a  self -presencing I. Humanity defines Me, which has the 
power to both delineate, and to transcend limits.
The vein of thought based on the category of dignity 
gains key importance in the work of philosophers building 
14 Kant, Critique of Practical Reason.
15 See Charles Taylor, Sources of the Self: The Making of the Modern 
Identity (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1992). 
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their notions of humanity in relation to the concept of 
a person. Such a stance may be observed in the oeuvre 
of Max Scheler, Emmanuel Mounier, Jacques Maritaine, 
Karol Wojtyła – and many others. Modernist philosophy of 
humanity adopts dignity as its leitmotif – and yet, it is clear 
that the currency of the concept of dignity is not limited 
to modernism alone: it is easy to observe that dignity 
reverberates in the postmodernist reflection as well. 
Even though postmodernists do away with the concept 
of the person, give up the idea of the presence of a legible 
subject, they do not surrender Everyone: the Everyone, 
who simultaneously is individualized and identical in his/
her dignity, and who shares the same ethical claims and 
obligations with respect to him/herself and Everyone else.
A postmodernist view
What aspects of the postmodern identity does one 
encounter when referring to the concepts of shame, honour 
and dignity?
Honour, when referred to in the context of postmodern 
creeds, appears to be an unsuited notion. It is only through 
negation that the concept of honour finds its applicability 
in the postmodern discourse. Negation makes it possible 
to claim that postmodernity is not hierarchical (or, at least, 
the hierarchy is not founded upon any durable, culturally 
rooted order, but upon economic divisions – erected, 
altered and redone afresh). It does not rely upon any 
objective order of things, it does not trust honour which 
could be comprehended as a constant state that is to provide 
guarantees, decide, define and separate established order 
from disorder.16 No certain subject is present, there are no 
16 In the context of the discourse of the postmodern identity see 
also: Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari, Anti‑Oedipus. Capitalism and 
Schizophrenia, trans. Robert Hurley, Mark Seem and Helen R. Lane 
(London and New York: Continuum, 2004); Mike Featherstone, 
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concretizing attributes, legitimizing us “since the beginning 
of all time.” Nothing remains of the former attachment to 
the elitism, nothing is left of the reference to honour in 
terms of identity, whose relationship, formerly, used to be 
guarded with special care. Such statements, reductionist 
and simplistic as they may be, may be formulated in the 
course of an analysis of the identity of the postmodern self. 
The notion of honour does not have application in the 
times of egalitarianism and globality. And yet, if treated 
as an experimental methodological category, honour may 
help disclose empty spaces, crevices, and absences, which 
have ostentatiously been retained in the culture after the 
downfall of the dominance of values that gave rise to 
durable distinctions drawn with reference to the modernist 
concept of honour.
If we assume that continuity and constancy are 
important elements of culture, it is also possible to admit 
that postmodernity retains traces of the former type of 
reference to honour. Such instances, however, are remnant 
in character and aspectual at best, written out in the medial 
uprooting of former senses and cultural distinctions. It is 
certainly possible to encounter instances of reference to 
honour spectacularly blown -up or distorted for the purposes 
of some pragmatic goals or ideologies, but it does not mean 
at all that their momentary activity should promise the 
reinstating of the former, stable presence of resolutions 
based on honour. Hence, the postmodern identity proves 
not to lend itself to being disclosed by means of the key-
trope of honour. Reference to honour may serve as nothing 
more than a convenient tool to indicate discontinuities, 
cracks and metamorphoses within the discursive body of 
participation in the European tradition.
If honour does not apply, can the postmodern identity 
be read through the spectacles of shame? At first sight, 
Consumer Culture and Postmodernism (London: Sage Publications, 
1990); Christopher Lash, The Culture of Narcissism. American Life an 
Age of Diminishing Expectations (London: W.W. Norton & Company 
Ltd., 1991).
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such a  choice promises to be efficient. Shame discloses 
our emotionality and our sensual self -reference: I know 
that there is some I (even if it is deprived of some of its 
certainty), because my emotions disclose this fact to me. 
Moreover, shame indicates our engulfment in the social 
norms, in activities incessantly juxtaposed against accepted 
or rejected rules. This is what postmodernity frequently 
emphasized proposing the I  of a  player in a  game, the 
I of social roles, the aspectual I, the pragmatic I. In this 
sense, the emotional, socially controlled, pragmatic shame 
provides a favourable context to non -subjective resolutions. 
And yet, at the same time, shame, apparently helpful in 
deciphering postmodernity, may as well prove treacherous. 
Clearly, it no longer is the agent holding the reins; no longer 
does it control behaviour, no longer does it reinforce one’s 
compliance to norms, no longer is it a stabilizing factor, 
making one refer to one’s own “tame” self. It is so due to 
the fact that the very presence of borderlines grew to be 
somewhat rickety. Shame, indeed, is present in the culture; 
it is experienced in the instance of transgressing mental 
and behavioral limitations – but, as it seems, it no longer 
is capable of performing the function of an efficient tool 
which could set the world in order for the man of today. It 
fails to durably separate the spheres of the shameful and the 
shameless, it does not brand the transgressor, it does not 
“domesticate” morality. It is only used on a hic et nunc basis, 
incapable of leaving any enduring results of its action. It 
constitutes a presence in our culture, yet a presence devoid 
of the powers to legitimize our identity. 
The case is similar with shamelessness, the power 
of which appears to be faltering as well. The spaces of 
shamelessness seem to be common and – at the same time – 
expansive. By that token, shamelessness slowly ceases to 
function as a  sharp opposite of shame. Shamelessness 
embodies provocation (rooted in postmodern creeds) and 
yet, owing to its ostentatious character, it does not breach 
cultural taboos in any profound fashion. Shamelessness 
represents continuity – but not a substantial continuity, not 
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a continuity univocally marked with non -norms, powers 
of chaos, peril. 
Apparently, shamelessness, too, came to be functional- 
ized after the postmodern fashion: it is there, but it has no 
force of powerful communication. It represents modernist 
vestiges of the old game, played in a postmodern way.
Hence, it is possible to generalize that shame comes 
in handy when we investigate postmodern phenomena 
only indirectly, as it cannot do more than help to indicate 
tensions in the emotional map of contemporary culture 
or allow one to notice the weakening of the once powerful 
spheres of cultural continuity. The way to postmodernity 
leads through emotions – nevertheless these emotions are 
insufficiently concretized or, in other words, insufficiently 
defined in culture, and therefore incapable of becoming 
landmarks in one’s search for postmodern identity. These 
emotions become blurred as they mix together to translate 
themselves into mentally unstable acts of experiencing; 
they are both untheorized and untheorizing.
Having acknowledged the above, it is still hard to resist 
the question whether it is admissible to suspect that under 
the surface of behaviours pointing at the remnants of 
shame and shamelessness the durability of cultural values, 
the cultural continuity of norms of thought and of action 
might still be smoldering, prone to momentary disclosures.
Postmodernity warns one not to trust such questions; 
thinking in terms of surface and depth has proven to be 
burdened with fallacy. Yet, might it not be the case that, 
paradoxically, having questioned the value of invariants 
and durable “truths,” postmodernity keeps running 
into them time and again? Might it not be the case that, 
postulating the game of vestiges, postmodernity should call 
some unique presence of shame or dignity into existence, 
even if this presence should be a different quality than that 
of the times past?
Of the categories discussed so far, postmodernity seems 
to have invested most confidence in dignity, the concept 
compatible with our mentality. In the course of retracing 
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the postmodern understanding of dignity, it must be noted, 
as Charles Taylor claims, that the discovery of the importance 
of Everyone, the self -presencing of identity procedures based 
upon the moral dimension of equality, necessitates the 
appreciation of the importance of the individual creation, of 
the communal moral horizon, and of the social compromise, 
which consists in negotiating one’s own definition of oneself 
against concepts developed by others.17 In such a context, 
dignity, when applied for the purpose of the description of 
our reality, proves to be a notion of greater efficiency and 
markedly more neutral than others. It is not so much an 
“arbitrary” warrant of order, a “superordinate” mode of 
reference to a person or to oneself, as it is a moral, pragmatic 
necessity.18 And even though to many dignity may still be 
a habit of thought, which makes one refer events to general 
axioms (e.g. humanity),19 it nonetheless appears to have its 
place in the postmodern discourse.
However, the postmodern approval for the concept of 
dignity discloses some of the more complex traits of the 
general postmodern discourse. Beyond doubt, one of them 
is the postmodernist consent to acts of moral assessment 
of culture, in which the impotence of the revealed division 
of axiological space into truth and falsity, knowledge and 
ignorance, lawfulness and lawlessness is replaced with 
dignity possible to find at each end of each opposition. 
The concept of dignity may be used in reference to various 
activities as well as to the privacy of the constructed, 
functionalized, insubstantial I: the I no longer conceived 
of in terms of certainty, presencing itself in its own ethically 
or rationally disclosed Person. 
Thus dignity, formerly an agency of order, has been 
transformed into a tool designated to protect the weakened I. 
17 Charles Taylor, Sources of the Self: The Making of the Modern 
Identity (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1992).
18 See Zygmunt Bauman, Postmodern Ethics (Oxford: Blackwell 
Publishing, 1993).
19 See Richard Rorty, Contingency, Irony, and Solidarity (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1989). 
171On Europaen Epistemological and Ethical Tropes…
Dignity is no longer supposed to point to itself; rather, its 
task is to stand guard to all possible traces of individuality 
that might – for any reason – be exposed to danger. Such 
dignity, albeit impoverished in sense, testifies to the impasse 
of postmodernist identity. After all, the main concern of 
contemporary man is to retain what proves fleeting in the 
context of the experiences of absence, illegibility, disorder 
and instability: one’s own unstable, non -identical identity. 
Today, dignity – based on absence and non -subjectivity, 
discursively functionalized – becomes the master -key to 
the fears of postmodernity.
Summarizing these considerations, it is possible to 
conclude that the application of the concepts of shame, 
honour or dignity for the purpose of description of modern 
and postmodern identities may prove efficient. As tropes, 
they disclose discursive tendencies coinciding in their 
orientation with the paths of our own quest for the keys 
organizing the reading of the world – including, first and 
foremost, the perception of the self. The fates of the three 
concepts disclose the continuity and discontinuity in the 
discourse of culture, constancy and change, consistency and 
contingency of thought, apotheosis of the unifying whole 
and of the disjointed fragments, and, eventually, tendencies 
to stress the essence, the basis, or functionality of values in 
the context of the organization of the world. Most clearly 
of all, however, the functioning of the three concepts in 
the history of culture indicates epistemological problems 
inextricably bound with the process of “domesticating” 
oneself and the world: problems as old as hills, and yet ever-
returning, ever -green and always brand -new.
Maria Popczyk 
The Art Museum:  
The Space of Freedom and Violence*
The museum is a theater of anamorphic (and 
autoscopic) dramaturgy; a palace in which it is 
not so easy to tell which is the spider and which 
the web, which the machinery and which the 
operator.
Donald Preziosi
The museum of art embodies the Enlightenment ideas 
of reason, according to which knowledge, aesthetics and 
education work together towards the intellectual and 
moral formation of a  human being. These noble goals 
still constitute the mission of the museum, in which 
collections are exhibited for the dual purpose of education 
and entertainment. The concept of freedom, although 
not explicit in the definition of the museum, is expressed 
through the principle of the general public having free 
access to the artistic achievements of various historical 
eras and cultures. Museum collections are brought together 
and analysed by academics, since, as Hans Sedlmayer 
emphasizes, museums are fundamentally academic 
institutions and the spirit of knowledge permeates them 
to the core. And Jean -François Lyotard argues that in the 
museum the discourse of knowledge takes precedence over 
other – artistic, aesthetic or moral – discourses. It must 
* The chapter first published as: “The Art Museum: The Space of 
Freedom and Violence,” Art Inquiry (2010): 199–211.
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also be added that for Lyotard knowledge is the source of 
power. And although the viewers choose to see the works 
of ancient or contemporary art of their own free will, they 
are, in fact, introduced into the carefully arranged space, 
in which they become, in Preziosi’s words, the components 
of the machinery, listening, as Micke Bal points out, to the 
voice of the authoritative narrator who states categorical- 
ly: look, this is how it is.1 The viewer in the museum does 
not see works of art but exhibits, the objects characterized 
by high interpretative density which constitute the 
components of the larger whole: the exhibition. And the 
exhibition communicates messages going beyond the 
realm characterized by art: it promotes national values 
and the ideals of scientific progress, it conveys ideological 
contents and reinforces cultural stereotypes.
This explains why, since its beginnings, the museum has 
given rise to antagonistic views, strong emotions and heated 
debates, which have involved intellectuals and theoreticians 
as well as artists. The museum is not a homogeneous place, 
nor is it free of ambiguity. It is an environment in which 
a number of diverse practices interweave and frequently 
compete with one another. Museum -lovers appreciate the 
historical insights and aesthetic experience; the experience 
which, despite its public context, is profoundly personal. 
The opponents of the museum regard it predominantly 
as a place where works of art, artistic creativity and the 
public are violated. And it is not only the symbolic violence, 
identified by Pierre Bourdieu, but all sorts of manipulation 
to which works of art – which are supposed to be the 
expressions of creative freedom – are subjected. Paul Valéry 
comparing the museum to the salon, the school, the prison 
and the graveyard thinks of the aporia, in which both 
works and the public find themselves, as well as the aporia 
spread between freedom and enslavement. The dialogue of 
praise and criticism, which has its origins in the nineteenth 
1 Micke Bal, Double Exposures. The Subject of Cultural Analysis 
(New York and London: Routledge, 1996), p. 2. 
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century, has revealed the numerous dimensions of the 
museum and contributed to its transformation, in which 
artists have played the major role. At the end of the twentieth 
century, the museum underwent the transformation from 
the closed modernist model to the open postmodern one. 
It does not mean, however, that it has become the space 
of unrestrained freedom of artistic expression and public 
reception, but that the freedom and violence within the 
museum have assumed different forms. The museum is 
involved in the processes that are to rationalize reality. As 
such it combines entertainment with serious research and 
interpretative work aimed at investing cultural phenomena 
with meaning and intellectual expression.
The modernist model of museum (the nineteenth-
century concept of the temple of arts and the modernist 
white cube) creates the autonomous environment which is 
closed spatially as well as ideologically. In the space of the 
city it represents the elitist highbrow culture as opposed to 
the cheap entertainment of public spectacles or world fairs.2 
It displays the achievements of human genius and knowledge 
in the carefully arranged space, in which both exhibits and 
the public are subjected to strict discipline. It separates 
the acquisition of knowledge from the contemplation of 
beauty by splitting the collections and thereby the fields 
of knowledge. The linear order of exposition defines the 
historical narratives, which explain to the viewer the nature 
of art seen in the light of progress. Upon entering viewers 
are immediately exposed to the power of authority, which 
provides them with the binding definitions of reality supplied 
by intellectuals who, as Zygmunt Bauman points out, in the 
era of modernism, transform uncertainty into certainty, 
sort things out and classify them, and make authoritarian 
judgements.3 The history rationalized by means of 
2 Cf. Tony Bennett, The Birth of the Museum: History, Theory and 
Politics (London and New York: Routledge, 1995), pp. 18–21.
3 Zygmunt Bauman, “Prawodawcy i  tłumacze,” trans. Anna 
Tanalska, in Postmodernizm. Antologia przekładów, ed. Ryszard Nycz 
(Kraków: Wydawnictwo Baran i Suszyński, 1997), pp. 293–297.
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universalistic constructs is used to build the national and 
cultural identity. Additionally, such rationalization offers 
the public the sense of belonging to the higher order and the 
opportunity to participate in the experience of permanence 
within the aesthetic medium and in the atmosphere of 
a secular ritual.4 For Odo Marquard there is no doubt about 
the significance of the art museum in modern times, as it is 
the product of the process of self -regulation within culture 
aspiring to homeostasis. Museums are founded in the times 
when people become painfully aware of the pressure that 
the pace of development and modernization put on them, 
and when they lose their sense of belonging to the world 
ruled by the divine providence – in the times when nature 
becomes desacralized. That is when those places, separated 
from the everyday life and dedicated solely to the aesthetic 
experiences and the cultivation of historical consciousness, 
come to serve the function of an oasis in which an individual 
person can regain their sense of belonging. The art museum 
offers the break from tribunalization, an antidote to the 
sense of finite and fragmentary nature of human existence 
and access to the lost sense of unity – the experience which 
is not available any other way.5  There modern people 
can reclaim their freedom from stresses and strains of 
their everyday life and at the same time, being exposed 
to the multitude of aesthetics and histories, broaden their 
horizons. Underlying this belief is Kant’s understanding 
of the aesthetic experience as a disinterested, unrestrained 
play of imagination enabling a human being to transgress 
the inexorable laws of science and moral duty.
However, for the advocates of art works concerned with 
the conditions in which the exposition spaces place them, 
the museum itself is a symptom of the cultural decline. It 
transforms works of art into exhibition objects by removing 
4 Carol Duncan, Civilizing Rituals: Inside Public Art Museums 
(London and New York: Routledge, 1995), pp. 7–20. 
5 Odo Marquard, Aesthetica i anaesthetica. Rozważania filozoficzne, 
trans. Krystyna Krzemieniowa (Warszawa: Oficyna Naukowa, 2007), 
p. 7.
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them from their native artistic and cultural context and 
replacing their genuine value with the values and meanings 
developed by the history of art. This is what Quatremère de 
Quincy, who witnessed Napoleon’s plundering works of art 
subsequently acquired by the Louvre, finds lamentable. In his 
view, works of art removed from their context are deprived 
of their value, the social and moral role which they could 
have fulfilled in the places for which they were intended. The 
works, which used to constitute the integral components of 
the community life, once placed in the museum and classified 
by art historians according to artificial, abstract concepts, 
become fossilized caricatures, riddles with no solution.6 
Didier Maleuvre comments on the views of Quatremère de 
Quincy, who was the first to realize that works of art are 
objectified. Maleuvre bemoans “their becoming fetishes of 
alienated consciousness” and claims that
[t]he museum thereby testifies to modernity’s 
failure to preserve the past unmaimed. Abstracted 
from any context, stripped of living history and 
shrouded with scholarly history, artifacts lie in 
the museum as corpses in an ossuary. Culture 
becomes synonymous with preservation, not 
production. […] Art, as the expression of vital 
culture, is only there to be contemplated as 
a hollow shell of its former life.7
Contrary to what Enlightenment writers believed, the 
museum of art separating art works from life neither 
promotes education nor contributes to the development of 
human moral sense. It does not activate artistic creativity, 
either. These views are shared by Martin Heidegger, who 
criticizes the process of concealing the truth in the culture 
based on the subject -object paradigm. He believes that 
6 Antonie Ch. Quatremère de Quincy, Considération morales sur la 
destination des ouvrages de l’art (Fayard, 1989), pp. 47–48.
7 Didier Maleuvre, Museum Memories. History, Technology, Art 
(Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1996), pp. 16–17.
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Raphael’s Sistine Madonna torn from the sacred space and 
placed in the museum is uprooted, placeless, since in its 
essence it is a picture -altar (Altar ‑Bild) which belongs to 
the ritual.8 In the Dresden gallery, where it is exposed to the 
aesthetic consumption and transferred from one exhibition 
to another, it becomes nothing more than a  tool. Hans 
Georg Gadamer voices a similar sentiment when he says 
that in the museum works of art are desecrated: they say 
nothing about human life any longer and their significance 
is restricted to purely aesthetic.9
Here we can see a clash of two different positions on 
the rationalization of culture, and what follows, two diverse 
attitudes to history, aesthetic values and creativity. According 
to one of them, man is the creator of the world, both history 
and beauty are his creations, and the most exquisite works of 
humanity should be admired in the museum. The uprooting 
and preservation of art are two sides of the same process of 
emancipation.10 For the opponents of the museum, however, 
people participate in life and can obtain nothing from 
history but what is immanently inherent in themselves. 
People get to know themselves through participation rather 
than by means of any external conceptions. From this point 
of view, artistic works reveal what constitutes the potential 
for perfection in life itself. It is this, let us call it romantic, 
position which sees works of art detached from the flow of 
life as dead and worthless.11
 8 Martin Heidegger, “Über die Sixtina,” in Martin Heidegger, 
Aus der Erfahrung des Denkens 1910–1976 (Frankfurt am Main: 
Klostermann, 1983), p. 120.
 9 Hans -Georg Gadamer, Prawda i metoda. Zarys hermeneutyki 
filozoficznej, trans. Bogdan Baran (Kraków: Inter Esse, 1993), pp. 162, 
176. 
10 On uprooting as a fundamental feature of modern institutions, 
cf. Antony Giddens, Nowoczesność i tożsamość. „Ja” i społeczeństwo 
w  epoce późnej nowoczesności, trans. Alina Sułżycka (Warszawa: 
Wydawnictwo Naukowe PWN, 2001).
11 Adorno likens the museum to the mausoleum. Cf. Theodor 
W. Adorno, Muzeum Valéry Proust, trans. Andrzej Noras, in Muzeum 
sztuki. Antologia, ed. Maria Popczyk (Kraków: Universitas, 2005), p. 91. 
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The flourishing of art museums in the nineteenth 
century led to the question of the appropriate place for 
works of art – the place which would bring out their best 
qualities and give voice to the freedom in which they were 
created. Charles Baudelaire sees this place in the bourgeois 
drawing room, others in the artist’s own home, the house-
museum like this of Gustav Moreau’s, where the artist’s life 
is interwoven with their work, and which Andrzej Pieńkos 
calls “reliquaries of creativity or temples of the artist.”12 In 
the 1960s Daniel Buren still believes that it is in the artist’s 
studio that art has its proper place.13 The new practice was 
introduced by Curbert who chose the exhibition space 
for his works single-handedly, thus investing them with 
the context and at the same time freeing them from the 
Academia’s judgements. 
However, Gadamer concedes that even though the 
museum is far from being conducive to the hermeneutic 
insight, works of art still retain their source within them, 
which means that their inner truth can still be revealed.14 
In other words, as Walter Benjamin puts it, although 
in modern times works of art become the objects of 
exhibition and lose the aura they used to have at the time 
when they pertained to the religious ritual, the aura is not 
lost irrevocably, as the reception of the work varies from 
ritualistic to expositional.15 These remarks are significant, 
since the museum of art is gradually becoming the home 
to art: the only place with access to works, the only place 
where they can be appreciated by the public. And despite 
12 Andrzej Pieńkos, Dom sztuki. Siedziby artystów w nowoczesnej 
kulturze europejskiej (Warszawa: Wydawnictwo Uniwersytetu 
Warszawskiego, 2005), pp. 186–212. 
13 Daniel Buren, “Function of the Studio,” in Museums by Artists, 
eds. A.A. Bronson and Peggy Gale (Toronto: Art Metropole, 1983), 
pp. 61–68.
14 Gadamer, Prawda i metoda, p. 137.
15 Walter Benjamin, “Dzieło sztuki w dobie reprodukcji technicznej,” 
in Walter Benjamin, Anioł historii. Eseje, szkice, fragmenty, ed. Hubert 
Orłowski (Poznań: Wydawnictwo Poznańskie, 1996), pp. 212–213.
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the fact that the musealization of art works deprives them 
of their uniqueness and singularity, a great many artists 
take no notice of uprooting and classifications and still 
want their works to be placed there, in the vicinity of the 
works which are deemed immortal.
There is, however, one more important reason why 
museums are objected to: the political agenda behind the 
uprooting of works, the fact that the art museum is used for 
political purposes. John Dewey points out bitterly that the 
museum has its roots not in the nature of art itself but in the 
powers of politics and authority, which are fundamentally 
alien to art.16 It must be noted, however, that from the mid-
eighteenth-century museums had sprang up spontaneously, 
and it was not until the times of the French Revolution 
that the Louvre bound the museum and politics for good. 
All sorts of uprooting violate art, but the worst kind is 
undoubtedly the confiscation of art as a result of warfare, 
which makes them into spoils of war, loot of colonization. 
Such violation dates back to the times of Roman emperors 
who held the triumphal parades demonstrating their 
trophies. The museum exhibition serves a  similar role 
demonstrating the power of the conqueror through the 
exquisiteness of works and the splendour of the conquered 
culture. The moral aspect of uprooting demands that the 
question of ownership be resolved, as still only part of the 
stolen property has been recovered by its rightful owners. 
The debate concerning the Elgin Marbles demonstrates how 
thin the line between the preservation of ancient artefacts 
and common theft is. 
The most dangerous aspect of the alliance between art 
and politics is its concealment by which the exhibition is 
given the appearance of political neutrality. The key factor 
here is the arrangement of the exhibition space which gives 
the public the impression that art works are autonomous 
objects displayed only for their aesthetic value. This goal 
16 John Dewey, Sztuka jako doświadczenie, trans. Andrzej Potocki 
(Warszawa: Ossolineum, 1975), pp. 11–12.
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is achieved by the temple -like atmosphere of the vast 
celebratory spaces of the museum -temple of art whose 
architecture alludes to ancient temples and palaces, but 
also by the sterile white rooms of the modernist museum 
designed to neutralize any context. The strategy of 
removing works from their own context and investing 
them with the new aesthetic -historical one proves highly 
effective for the authority.17 This is why Micke Bal suggests 
that we ignore the aesthetic surface of the exhibition, which 
is the only way to disclose the scheme of the narrator 
operating behind it.
Upon taking on the role of the educator of the society, 
the museum inevitably becomes a  tool in the hands of 
the authority. And as such, it selects the works which will 
mould the society’s consciousness as required. The precise 
selection of those works which promote the revolutionary 
authority, national socialism, or communism is nothing 
else than censorship, and violation through exclusion. The 
political objectification differs from the academic one, its 
point being ideological rather then aesthetic. However, 
the academia is frequently in league with the political 
authority and validates its selection. It goes without saying 
that the violation of art is at its worst when it leads to the 
actual physical destruction of works. This includes all acts 
of iconoclasm conducted in the name of the matters of 
overriding importance.
Citing the examples of censorship and destruction of 
art in Germany, Walter Grasskamp states that it is barely 
hardly possible to maintain “the fiction of politically neutral 
museum.”18 Furthermore, he points out that selecting 
17 This is how Daniel Sherman interprets Adorno’s point about the 
similarity between the museum and the mausoleum, Daniel J. Sherman, 
“Quatremère/Benjamin/Marx: Art. Museums, Aura, and Commodity 
Fetishism,” in Daniel J. Sherman and Irit Rogoff, Museum Culture. 
History, Discourses, Spectacles (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota 
Press, 1994). 
18 Walter Grasskamp, Museumsgründer und Museumsstürmer 
(München: Verlag Beck, 1981), p. 42. 
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and displaying the selected works the political authority 
integrates the community, and describes the process as 
a community ritual which entails the transformation of “the 
viewing masses into the politically conscious individuals.”19 
The King of France’s collection appropriated by the 
revolutionary authorities unites the society as victors. And 
Napoleon’s spoils of war displayed in the Louvre allow the 
viewers to identify themselves with the emperor’s triumphs. 
Thus even though the exhibition creates the atmosphere of 
disinterestedness with the aim of concealing the underlying 
ideology, the act of viewing and admiring works of art is 
far from disinterested. The aesthetic rapture implies the 
approval of the authority and its principles, while the 
manifestation of disapproval equals the contempt for the 
excellence of art works, and this is how the beauty of works 
of art in the museum and the symbolic violence are secretly 
bound. The viewers are unaware that admiring art they 
approve of all the political agenda which made this art 
available to them.
For Maleuvre the crucial social ritual in the museum 
regards the fact that the identity is imposed on the public, 
as “Rightfully, it seems, the traditional museum has 
been compared with the disciplinary institutions of the 
bureaucratic nation state that enforce control over persons, 
spaces, and objects by pigeonholing them and curbing 
their nomadic tendency.”20 In this case the discipline is 
not imposed by the authority’s excessive demonstration 
of power, but it refers to the ordinary peaceful times, the 
holiday tourism when the renowned art museums open 
its splendid collections to the general public. Nevertheless, 
those classical historical displays of old masters, because 
it is basically the classical art which is in question here, 
position the public in the role of the passive observer 
who will receive approvingly both the collections and the 
ideology behind them.
19 Ibidem, p. 43.
20 Maleuvre, Museum Memories, p. 11.
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Thus the museum becomes the school which teaches 
the public the discipline with regard to the aesthetic taste 
so as to shape the social identity and retain the social 
divide between the art lovers and barbarians. The hidden 
mechanism of symbolic violence works with the full 
cooperation of the public, as Bourdieu proves.21 Despite 
the fact that people respond to art differently because of 
the educational inequalities, those who are instructed by 
culture as to what to look at and what to be moved by, see 
themselves as the elite established on the grounds of nature 
rather than culture. As Bourdieu observes, “museums betray 
their true function, which is to reinforce for some the feeling 
of belonging and for others the feeling of exclusion.”22 This 
practice results in the popular consent to the seizure of 
property and the manipulation of art works and collections, 
as well as investing them with arbitrary meanings.
Museums, especially the global ones, unite the public 
around a  given cultural identity. This is why Preziosi 
describes museums as the device for concentrating. And it 
is the museum that made it possible for Europe to construct 
and establish its own position as the standard by which the 
value of other cultures is judged and through which they 
are objectified.23 Jean Baudrillard in his turn argues that the 
museum is dominated by the violence of the production of 
exhibitions, which is not very much different to the turnover 
of goods, and in consequence, the complex processes taking 
place within museum are overlooked.24
21 Pierre Bourdieu, Alain Darbel and Dominique Schnapper, The 
Love of Art. European Art Museum and Their Public, trans. Caroline 
Beattie and Nick Merriman (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1991), p. 212. 
According to Bourdieu: “So that cultured people can believe in 
barbarism and persuade the barbarians of their own barbarity […].” 
22 Ibidem. 
23 Donald Preziosi, “Brain of the Earth’s Body: Museum and the 
Flaming of Modernity,” in The Rhetoric of the Frame. Essays on the 
Boundaries of the Artwork, ed. Paul Duro (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1996), pp. 106, 109.
24 On the Pompidou Centre, Jean Baudrillard, Symulakry 
i symulacja, trans. Sławomir Królak (Warszawa: Sic!, 2005), p. 92. 
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Babylon. Myth and Truth,25 the exhibition in Berlin, 
immensely popular with the public and the critics alike, 
exemplifies the issues mentioned above. It demonstrates how 
the exhibition based on clearly defined opposites explains 
cultural phenomena to the public, condemns vices and 
proposes to rectify the wrongs by means of education. The 
whole process is made more accessible to the public, since 
it is immersed in the aesthetic medium and the exhibition 
achieves its educational goals through the presentation of 
exquisite original works and artefacts of a foreign culture. 
On entering the viewer is first introduced to the scientific 
truth about the ancient Babylon, which is represented 
by the splendid collection of exhibits demonstrating the 
grandeur of its culture and civilization. The display includes 
its architecture, its legal and scientific achievements, the 
variety of cult objects and everyday items, and the gold of 
its rulers. This collection, prepared by a team of researchers, 
is juxtaposed with the myth, revealing the dark side of 
the soul of the European who tends to associate Babylon 
with the Whore of Babylon, the cruel Nebuchadnezzar 
and the Tower of Babel. The distorted image of Babylon 
can be found in some of the finest works of art, including 
those by Cranach, Dürer and William Blake, but also in 
Zbigniew Libera’s Lego Blocks, which are meant by the 
curators to demonstrate the totalitarian consequences of 
the popular consent to the myth. The exhibition claims 
that Europe has inherited the Babylonian myth from 
Judaism and Christianity and that the myth is still very 
much alive in the mass culture. Nonetheless, the exact sense 
of the myth is never clearly defined. There are definitions 
written on the staircase walls, including those by Eliade, 
Cassirer and Barthes, but brought together and removed 
from their theoretical background, they give contradictory 
25 The exhibition Babylon. Mythos und Wahrheit (Pergamon 
Museum, Berlin, June–October 2008), under the auspices of the 
minister Frank Walter Steinmeier, gathered the exhibits from a number 
of renowned museums, including the British Museum and Musée du 
Louvre. 
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explanations and make the actual message of the myth even 
more obscure.
The public are presented with the arbitrary picture 
of the truth and the caricature of the myth. In fact the 
myth serves an important function in the society, as it 
allows us to ask fundamental questions concerning the 
meaning of the physical world. It expresses the faith in the 
purposeful order of the universe and the lasting values of 
human culture. The myth and knowledge constitute two 
fundamental spheres of human existence: “the mythical 
arrangement of the world is always present in culture.”26 
And in spite of the fact that the myth and the truth merge 
even in empirical science, the Berlin exhibition assigns the 
responsibility for preservation and affirmation of eternal 
values solely to knowledge.27
There is a familiar story about the rational and irrational 
sides of European culture and the heroic struggle of 
knowledge guarding the truth. The moral of this story is 
to preserve the memory of other cultures, since the moral 
lessons based on them will be willingly accepted by people 
enthralled by the fabulous culture of Babylon. The need 
for knowledge is socially grounded, because in the light 
of knowledge we can openly acknowledge the existence of 
evil inside ourselves and deliver ourselves from this evil 
with the help of education and aesthetic therapy. All this 
is possible because the works which have been uprooted, 
divested of their own message and removed from their 
context have in turn been invested with the senses allowing 
for such a story.
Lyotard, like Bourdieu, is convinced that violence cannot 
be eradicated from the museum; he identifies it as injustice 
and locates it on the level of perception. He conducts the 
phenomenological analysis of the way the exhibition is 
26 Leszek Kołakowski, Obecność mitu (Wrocław: Wydawnictwo 
Dolnośląskie, 1994), p. 48.
27 As Leszek Kołakowski points out: “The world of values is the 
mythical reality.” Ibidem, p. 33.
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perceived28 and demonstrates that the origins of injustice 
lie in the very nature of seeing, and that they are primal in 
relation to the social practices of exhibition and prior to 
the mechanism of the symbolic violence. Lyotard’s position 
constitutes the theoretical basis for the critical activity of 
the artists who, since the 1960s, have been deconstructing 
the contexts and premises of the museum exhibition. 
According to Bourdieu, such criticism is utterly impossible, 
since there are no practices external in relation to the ones 
which have already been approved and permitted by the 
institutions: every exhibition sacralizes works and trains 
the public. Lyotard sees the matter differently. He maintains 
that the public prefer the simplicity of expression, the 
realism in painting and the frontal view of an exhibit, which 
guarantees the sense of reality, and the public, whether 
bourgeois or proletarian, needs such a guarantee. However, 
“the essence of exhibition is not obvious,”29 it is not free 
of assumptions, it is not homogeneous and a number of 
factors lie hidden in the visual, which follows from the 
nature of perception itself. We are incapable of grasping 
a visual object in its entirety: there is always something – 
the back, the sides – which is kept out of sight. 
The museum exposition exploits the imperfections of 
perception, which allow it, in the name of social mission, to 
determine the accepted conditions of seeing, both in terms 
of spatial arrangements and by pointing to the particular 
contents of works. Thus a work of art might always be used 
as a component of a wider format and lose its own message, 
which is the case of Libera’s Lego Blocs on the Berlin 
exhibition. In this sense the modernist character of the 
museum is inherent in its nature. Museum directors30 speak 
in the name of humanity, and their decisions are informed 
by the public interest. Thus, they speak in vague terms so as 
to prevent a political crisis or to maintain the status quo. In 
28 Jean -François Lyotard, Über Daniel Buren, ed. Patricia Schwarz, 
Stuttgart 1987, p. 34. 
29 Ibidem, p. 34.
30 On museum directors and artists, cf. ibidem, pp. 40–42. 
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other words, they methodically foster injustice. Their asset 
is the fact that they promote simple ideas, realism and the 
frontal exposition. Therefore, it is the artist’s task to develop 
a game which will reveal the ambiguity of the conditions of 
the exhibition itself and expose the rules of parergon logic, 
which constitutes the raison d’être of the academia and 
the museum. With regard to freedom and violence within 
the museum, which is the subject of this chapter, there 
are basically two major approaches adopted by the critical 
art: the conceptual and the narrative. The former entails 
the manipulation of the exhibition space, which leaves 
the public in certain discomfort (Daniel Buren, Joseph 
Kossuth). The artists adopting the latter approach take up 
certain subjects concerning politics, gender or colonialism 
and present them by means of suggestive – often ironic 
or graphic – scenes (Hans Haacke, Fred Wilson). The 
“museum” art of the second half of the twentieth century 
tried to protect the work from becoming an instrument in 
one of the discourses in the museum and, as a result, to 
enable it to establish the discourse of its own.31 
Interestingly, Lyotard associates the critical power with 
the first approach and is interested in the work by such artist 
as Daniel Buren, who “visibly” display “what is invisible 
in the exhibition itself in order to relentlessly follow and 
display the invisible.”32 His installations of the coloured 
stripes occupy the spaces which are normally not meant for 
art and left empty. The exposure of injustice follows in this 
case from the fact that the familiar exhibition conventions 
are disturbed by the artist unwilling to conform to the 
conventional display of a  work of art: a  picture on the 
wall. The dialogue between the works and the wall or the 
exhibition space leads to the transformation of the nature of 
the work itself and is aimed at the institutional framework 
31 On the museum as a place of critical discourses, see among others 
James Putnam, Art and Artifact: The Museum as Medium (London: 
Thames&Hudson, 2001). 
32 Lyotard, Über Daniel Buren, pp. 34, 42.
187The Art Museum: The Space of Freedom and Violence
of the museum.33 Such installations appear innocuous. 
Apart from the stripes, they include the display of the 
objects not normally meant for exhibition, such as boxes 
used for transport, empty containers, or picture frames. 
There are also doors leading to exhibition rooms which are 
boarded up or the gallery halls left empty. As there is no 
message, no content, it is impossible to manipulate the art 
work, but at the same time the artists make a political point: 
they do not act in anybody’s name, they do not seek to 
express any truth, but stand up against the establishment. 
Some of these environmental installations violently take 
possession of the site itself. Marcin Berdyszak (Fresh Fruit 
Table. Homage a Matta Clark, Cologne 1996) smashes 140 
kilograms of lemons with a chainsaw, marking the site for 
a long time, and as a result, makes it impossible to hold 
another exhibition there.
The departure from representation ultimately offers 
the public anaesthesia: lack of sensations allows artists to 
enter into the dialogue with the public, since they provide 
no pleasant experience as opposed to the modernist 
exhibition. The viewer is expected to engage into the work 
intellectually, to approach it critically, and frequently to 
make a  physical effort, while the habits formed by the 
traditional exhibition become useless. The role of the 
artist has changed, as they no longer educate or explain, 
serving as an extension of the authority of the institution, 
but instead they question the interpretations. It took time 
for the critical art to secure its place in the museum, but 
with time the space of the museum itself has undergone 
the transformation, and the postmodern museum is open 
to a variety of discourses, including the critical ones. Still 
there is no doubt that the institution exercises its control 
over the exhibition, so not all of the artists’ ideas are 
approved of.34
33 Brian O’Dohery, Inside the White Cube: The Ideology of the 
Gallery Space (San Francisco: The Lapis Press, 1986), p. 69. 
34 Cf. Piotr Piotrowski, Sztuka według polityki. Od melancholii do 
pasji (Kraków: Universitas, 2007). 
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As we can see, apart from the dialectic struggle between 
freedom and discipline, there are new elements emerging 
in the postmodern museum. Artists working directly in 
the exhibition space cannot complain about the uprooting, 
since the museum of modern art is becoming the laboratory 
open to a whole range of artistic experiments. However, 
the victim here is not only the neutral exhibition space 
conquered by installations, but, first and foremost, the 
public. Viewers are constantly forced to change their 
mental and perceptional habits and they are frequently 
ill -equipped to deal with the intellectual puzzles or, as it 
is the case of consumerist art, with the things apparently 
too obvious to be considered art. The awareness of the 
mechanisms imposed on artists and works as well as the 
public by the exhibition space gives a  potential viewer 
a certain advantage, so it might be a good idea to follow 
Adorno’s advice and only go to the museum to see one 
single work of art.
Aleksandra Kunce
University and Thinking*
What is the taste of thinking that is subject to university 
education? Does it have any taste at all? The issue concerns 
the thinking of students, lecturers/thinkers/poets, which 
is produced and supervised within the institution, within 
the mental space of the university. Let us therefore find out 
more about the taste of the university.
Universitas
Each university constitutes a  different reality, the 
very idea of the university remains however the same. 
Universitas doctorum et studentium is the overall 
framework bringing together those who teach and those 
who are taught. It is about different aspects of universality: 
universitas magistrorum, universitas scholarum, universitas 
scientarum. It is thus about the general idea of students, 
teachers and scholarship. The Latin universitas hints at the 
trope of comm -unity composed of various clues, of unity 
of the universe and also of the concrete place where both 
students and masters meet. In other words: the whole, 
the common, the universal, the unified, the versatile, the 
situated. The clues are of crucial importance as they set the 
path of thinking we are about to embark upon. 
* “University and Thinking,” International Journal of Learning, vol. 
12, issue 2 (2006) 131–136. 
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University is however irreducible to the Latin trope 
even though the latter constitutes the core of its meaning. 
It is essential to refer here to Plato’s Academy which was 
founded in 387 BC. But it is equally indispensable to take 
account of alternative cultural space. There is the Persian 
Academy of Gundishapur (founded in 271 AD) and the 
Al -Azhar University in Cairo (set up in 988 AD). There 
is also another important educational centre — Nalanda 
in Bilhar, India, established as early as the fifth century 
BC. The accurate presentation of educational universality is 
crucial if one wishes to illustrate the Latin idea of generality 
and versatility.
For the European tradition — presented here as central 
to the university ideology — two types of the university 
are of vital significance. They need to be mentioned 
here as they introduce a certain kind of dialogic tension 
into the relation of students vs scholars. The tension 
is detectable in the common notion of the lodges of 
legislators, hierarchies and university egalitarianism, and 
remains highly problematic. In the case of the medieval 
university it could be either an Italian -type corporation of 
students that elected a chancellor and was concerned with 
the proper functioning of the university and recruitment 
of the teaching staff (Bologna), or a  French -type elitist 
corporation of professors in charge of the whole university 
(Paris).1 These two poles represent some of the important 
European standards determining the range of authority 
and cooperation within a  given university. One of the 
crucial issues affecting the image of the university has 
been the very transition to the modern type of university. 
It involved a project of Wilhelm von Humboldt, who in the 
years 1809–1810 created a modern model of the university in 
Berlin where the value of scholarship for its own sake were 
to become a stimulus to the development of thinking and 
1 Etienne Gilson, A History of Christian Philosophy in the Middle 
Ages (London: Sheed & Ward Ltd., 1995); Georges Duby, The Age of 
the Cathedrals. Art and Society 980–1420, trans. Eleanor Levieux and 
Barbara Thompson (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1981).
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education. The project shows an obvious correlation with 
a speculative metanarrative, but at the same time a conflict 
with another grand narrative which portrays modernity 
as reliant on the French tradition of relating knowledge 
not only to the spirit but also to the Enlightenment 
emancipation of mankind.2 
Duty to the reason or duty to the mankind? 
These are two standards of modern mentality, but 
simultaneously of a modern university, that originated in 
Europe. 
In writing about modernity we have departed from our 
subject, i.e. the medieval organization of the university. The 
first idea of a single community of masters and students gave 
way to a modernist organization which was actually a series 
of communities and actions under a common name and with 
common aims. We should also mention here the distinct 
character of new universities set up in America which were 
to create a novel type of an institution described by Kerr as 
one that “is not really private and […] not really public.”3 It is 
these universities that much more often have had to grapple 
with the problems of duty and service, commercialism, 
and the question of how to work out a proper compromise 
between the pragmatic needs of modern society and the 
concern for autonomy of scholarship and research. The idea 
of university and its autonomy is endangered.4 There arises 
a problem of how to strike the right balance between the 
profitability of a given institution, its public financing and 
the value of independent research. This is also a question 
2 Jean -François Lyotard, The Postmodern Condition. A Raport on 
Knowledge, trans. Geoff Bennington and Brian Massumi (University 
of Minessota Press, 1984).
3 Clark Kerr, The Uses of the University (Harvard University Press, 
2001), chapter “The Idea of Multiversity,” p. 1.
4 Cf. Jaroslav Pelikan, The Idea of University. A Reexamination (Yale 
University Press, 1994), pp. 3–10.
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of an existing disproportion between the humanities and 
sciences with regard to their social significance.5 As James 
Duderstadt points out, the major challenge for the twenty-
first-century university is developing an awareness of the 
conglomerate of economic, social and technological forces 
shaping the image of the institution.6 Following the global 
tendencies of conscious commercialization, we can observe 
a gradual transformation of universities into corporations 
with a number of technical institutions around, cooperating 
in business enterprises and technology transfer in all 
countries including those of Europe. This is a huge problem 
in terms of the autonomy of university and thinking. 
However, it is not just the differences between American, 
European, Asian, Australian and African universities that 
are at stake here. The issue concerns a certain whole which, 
while being heterogeneous — here we need to go back to 
the idea of universitas — manages to save the spirit of unity 
and versatility supposed to be autonomous and thus typical 
of the university. 
Preoccupation with the problem of higher education 
and the mission of university is clearly noticeable and 
common nowadays. The considerations are haunted by 
a sense of university crisis and attempts at remedying the 
status quo. As an example one could cite the situation 
of the Old Continent and Magna Charta Universitatum 
signed in Bologna, on 18th of March of 1988 by chancellors 
of European universities. Magna Charta is a proclamation 
of basic principles that are binding on universities. It 
stresses the significance of the university as an autonomous 
institution amidst burgeoning social life and the importance 
of both research and education in supporting culture. On 
the one hand, university should keep up with the changes 
and demands of modern society; on the other, it should 
5 Derek Bok, University in the Marketplace. The Commercialization 
of Higher Education (Princeton University Press, 2003), chapter “The 
Benefits and Costs of Commercialization,” pp. 99–121.
6 James J. Duderstadt, A  University for the 21st Century (The 
University of Michigan Press, 2000).
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protect the freedom of scientific research and education. 
Furthermore, university is both to sustain the European 
humanist tradition and to transcend the political and 
geographical borders in order to emphasize the necessity 
of exploring other cultures. Finally, and more concretely, 
it should have at its disposal effective means to achieve 
intended ends. The latter resolution has translated into 
the system of clear and universally comparable university 
degrees, system of credits within ECTS, undergraduate 
and graduate programs of study, and promotion of the 
European mobility and cooperation. All the aims of 
university education were further underlined in the 
Sorbonian declaration signed on 25th of May 1998, which 
stressed the need for the mobility of citizens and creation 
of new opportunities on the labor marker. In anticipation 
of the nearing enlargement of European Union, another 
Bolognian declaration passed on 19th of June 1999 tried 
to define the potential problems facing Europe as the 
“community of knowledge” which strives to meet the 
challenges of the new millennium.
These institutional efforts have led to certain decisions, 
actions and reflections on the university but they have 
not touched upon the issue of the very thinking that is 
characteristic of the university and makes it different from 
an academy or technical school. The potential crisis of 
scholarship and higher education seems to reside not so 
much in the social praxis as in university thinking. And it 
is a kind of thinking that cannot be constrained by being 
simply defined through a vision of exchange, competition 
and cooperation with others. The very mobility is no solution 
to all the problems of thinking and ideological attitudes 
that actually determine the rank of a given university and 
are not easily translated into any rating criteria.
One should therefore repeat the initial remark: What is 
the taste of thinking that is subject to university education? 
Does it have any taste at all?
Such “educated” thinking has great prospects but it 
also faces dangers associated with institutional knowledge. 
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The following text is an attempt at presenting briefly the 
most sensitive issues bound up with its existence.
System
University thinking is systematic and directed by 
a certain agenda; consequently, it faces the necessity of 
constantly working out new formulas which would erode 
the already existing structures and allow individuals to 
cross barriers. The very recognition of the necessity proves 
extremely difficult. It requires a  gesture of “beneficial 
destruction” which both purges and re -constructs. The 
system is what guarantees the university its stability and 
secure existence. However, it is also a burden which must 
be constantly displaced so as to avoid the production of 
repetitive, fossilized, schematic or methodical thinking 
that is finally contained in a handbook. Thinking “by the 
book” or inherited canon is a danger to the university, 
which while setting standards needs to make room 
for enough flexibility to change and erode the system. 
Systematic thinking is limited in that it works to the 
advantage of the system but is unable to go beyond the 
established horizon. Shortcomings of this kind of thinking 
such is the necessary condition of the university existence 
are compensated by the freedom of interpretation and 
ideological attitudes. First and foremost, however, by the 
freedom of Weltanschauung.
Scholarship
University thinking is connected with scholarship 
treated here as a great European achievement. By scholar- 
ship we mean a  systemized worldview that is socially 
legitimate, normalized through the application of 
methods and instruments and permeated by the discourse 
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of confidence in modern deduction, induction and 
countability. Above all, however, European scholarship 
is about the desire to explore, to discover the essence of 
things, to search for the Truth, to have trust in intellectual 
and social progress. It thus stems from a certain project 
of emancipation and expansion, which is tantamount to 
mythologization and hyperbolization. This takes place 
irrespective of the profound anthropological awareness 
which makes us humbly contrast various kinds of symbolic 
human activity, various objects, ways of conduct and orders 
of knowledge, beside which scholarship emerges as just one 
of many forms of activity in the world. Furthermore, as one 
which is legitimized only for a certain group of people who 
find it clear, patent and crucial. University thinking does 
well when it is conscious of its contingency, but also of the 
unique character of scholarly activity. It does well when 
it appreciates the spirit of scientism without overrating it, 
so that it is still able to take a fresh look at the artistic, 
religious, mythological and magical ways of perceiving the 
world. It seems that it is not only a sense of contingency 
but also of one’s own creativity that reinvigorates the 
service in the name of scholarship. One needs to view 
university thinking as one of many ways of reflecting 
which leads to the construction of a possible world – not 
the only conceivable, and by no means privileged way. 
The recognition of artificiality, an awareness that what we 
create is a theoretical surrogate for intellectual experience 
and understanding of the world lends scientism an artistic 
quality. Bearing in mind that university thinking resembles 
artistic one we refer to the art of scholarship, art of research, 
art of discourse, art of education, art of tolerance, art of 
responsibility and art of the encounter with the Other.
The aura of the community
Such thinking has an air of communality which trans- 
lates into the common concern for knowledge not always 
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accompanied by the concern for freedom of thinking. 
That is why a striving after freedom of thinking within 
academic space should be given top priority. It corresponds 
to the solidarity of social community which while giving 
moral support to the solemnity of actions admits difference 
and encourages the freedom of thinking. The aura of the 
university should be imbued with enthusiasm so that 
freedom and creativity are not outweighed by a penchant 
for administering and classifying as well as caution. 
A welcoming atmosphere is conducive to such thinking as 
it determines it in intellectual and moral terms. 
The aura does not yield a uniform ideology. 
The concern for the aura of community is the concern for 
a welcoming, hospitable ground – the Derridean Différance7 
which is not the Same. The academic community cannot be 
too homogeneous, a mechanism working with monotonous 
efficiency. It cannot trust routine procedures which produce 
uniform people. The university is a place which should 
provide shelter to people of radically different worldviews 
and orientations. To put it metaphorically, within the 
same mental space there should be room for lifestyles 
and ideological attitudes as different as those of Kant – 
who confines himself in a fortress to create in solitude – 
and of Socrates – who goes out, knocks down the walls 
and limits of education, and is eager to confront others. 
There should also be place for the multifaceted attitudes of 
modern scholars who following the idea of mobility travel 
from one institution to another lecturing and teaching, and 
thus distance themselves from the very idea of attachment. 
But it is equally vital to mention the other scholars who 
prize allegiance to one’s own locum. The university needs 
to protect variety and diversity. What it should expect 
from the diversity is eminence. It is necessary to protect 
all the weirdness, alternative worldviews, petty ideas and 
controversial actions in the name of greatness that must 
7 Jacques Derrida, Writing and Difference, trans. Alan Bass 
(Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1980).
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be saved for the sake of community. The greatness works 
both for the societal ethic and for the cognitively gifted 
community which is concerned about scholarly achievement 
irrespective of the ways it is brought about. The aura of the 
university cannot overwhelm or be a hindrance. It should 
give a boost and provide assistance to those searching for 
their identities, but it cannot set intellectual principles. It 
should rather act as light, dispersed matter.
Archive and the correctness of knowledge
It is not good when the effort of university thinking gets 
reduced to memorizing a compendium of facts and ideas, 
when it resembles an archive which only accumulates and 
at most processes information. That thinking embedded 
in the tradition and subordinated to the narrative of the 
history of ideas is both advantageous and formative. It is 
well -known that the continued existence of an institution 
is part of its strength, while a scholastic necessity of giving 
an account of the predecessors’ achievements is also widely 
accepted. However, laying too much emphasis on the idea 
of the edifice of accumulated knowledge is burdensome 
and impedes creativity. While it is possible to produce 
something novel, the very necessity of reproducing the past, 
of documenting and classifying what is officially accepted, 
deprives the individual of the fresh perspective which 
should be part of the university potential. To learn and to 
inculcate in others the excessive correctness of thinking 
is to breed attachment to “lingering” knowledge and to 
develop a sense of duty to ill-conceived authority.
Authority
This is another issue the university has to tackle. 
Authority is a guarantee of hierarchy and legitimization 
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of knowledge, but it is simultaneously a static and limiting 
factor. If well -conceived, authority furthers creation, entails 
variety, wisely controls the thinking of others, does not 
force them to follow established procedures, allows freedom 
of choice, and finally welcomes their refusal to slavishly 
obey the master. True authority derives strength and joy 
from the students’ open -mindedness, from their gesture of 
subversive renewal. It encourages action. As Nietzsche would 
say – it tempts.8 It infects people with a type of thinking and 
ideological attitude. Intellectual and moral authority does 
not care about submissive postures, it emanates charisma. 
There is also a kind of harmful, pretentious authority which 
usurps the right of precedence due to its assigned rank. It 
demands recognition and subservience while identifying 
with its social role. It is a form that imposes obligations 
in the name of hierarchy, that decrees a certain order of 
thinking and subservient behaviour. However, it does not 
instill an impulse to create which is able to terrify. It does 
not constitute a responsible individual. All it does is involve 
in an institutional order and manipulate while playing 
down moral courage.
Established knowledge, nomadic thought
The university cannot play down the courage of those 
who wish to present their own points of view even if 
politically incorrect or considered heresies in relation to 
official truths of science defined by Kuhn as one that works 
to confirm the established paradigm.9 Confidence in what 
is acquired, revised, learned and confirmed as an accepted 
way of verifying or falsifying knowledge cannot become 
the major concern in our investigations. The solidarity of 
8 Friedrich Nietzsche, Thus Spoke Zarathustra (Mineola, NY: Dover 
Publications, 1999).
9 Thomas Kuhn, The Structure of Scientific Revolutions (Chicago: 
University of Chicago Press, 1996).
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academic community resides in other regions than that of 
observing procedures of recognition, admittance, inclusion 
or exclusion. The very idea of receiving a university degree 
and cultivating a traditional, feudal order is an important 
European legacy since it brings back the memory of 
a  strong continent, the Europe of cathedrals. But it is 
meaningful inasmuch as it proves to be a form that does 
not limit and restrict but gives rise to thinking and open-
mindedness, keeps searching, at times subverts existing 
orders and is responsible rather than fearful. A  strong 
university cultivates the system without allowing it to 
petrify. The university cannot be a community that lacks 
dynamism, which, however, does not mean a  frantic 
scramble, a corporate sequence of momentary meetings, 
of international involvements which while expanding 
the curriculum vitae do not expand thinking. A dynamic 
community presupposes economic stability, but at the 
most crucial level it involves the possibility of creating 
such mental space that has soft and flexible procedures of 
including and recognizing something as momentous, of 
absorbing the new, of sublating and reconstructing itself. 
The production of open -minded attitudes is about bridging 
the gap between the established and nomadic, “uprooted” 
forms of knowledge.
Humility and nonchalance
Paradoxically, in the world of universities characterized 
by stability, evidence, verifiability, one’s thinking should 
be marked with nonchalance. Despite a sense of humility 
instilled by the university, what supplements best 
education and research is a  but of daring necessary to 
harbour subversive thoughts. Confidence in dispersal, in 
revolt against the recognized and accepted is a guarantee 
of continued existence of the university – no less. It 
reinvigorates, revives and follows the other while managing 
to sustain its identity. This is hospitality of the place, the 
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university’s genius loci. It is the guarding spirit of the 
place that makes us trust nonchalance so that forging, 
cultivating, fostering, rapid growth, transplantation and 
final separation of thoughts could be both a stimulus to 
constant feverish activity and a  guarantee of dignified 
calm. Nonchalance in the space of the university does not 
indicate lack of dignity. It is a luxury that only intellectually 
potent academic centers can afford. 
Interdisciplinarity
It is a great challenge and also problem to the university. 
Interdisciplinarity is not just about the disciplinary or 
disciplined separation of certain areas of knowledge, 
methodologies, and metalanguages. It does not boil down 
to an attempt at making everything within one structure 
work for the sake of unity, so that constituent parts would 
add up. There is nothing like the total sum of knowledge 
about the human being, while the confidence in connecting 
what we know and thus arriving at the semblance of unity 
has been steadily eroded over time.
Interdisciplinarity is concerned with transplanting 
and mediating between various ways of thinking, 
between various languages of self -presentation. It is about 
overcoming one’s own narcissism which plagues each form 
of creativity, especially within the university. It provides 
us with the means of communication not only within one 
discipline, which just seeks to apply other methods and 
refers to related disciplines in order to better handle or fully 
interpret the subject of its investigation. What is needed 
is some kind of alternative space within the university 
discourse, one which stems from the very idea of the 
university. The space is localized somehow beyond (meta) 
particular disciplines, but it is at the same time inside, since 
it lies at the very heart of university thinking. The space 
concerns and embraces all the humanities as it deliberates 
in general on the crucial aspects of human existence in the 
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world. This is a kind of perspectivism which absorbs and 
wants to express despite differences and barriers between 
academic languages. What it trusts is experience. One of the 
discursively mediating disciplines that may substantially 
contribute to the making of such intermediary space is 
undoubtedly anthropology and philosophy of culture. 
The garden of university thinking
The kind of thinking which is grafted, cultivated, 
tended, gathered (all the life -giving metaphors are used here 
deliberately) must be embedded in what belongs to culture, 
what is one’s own. The garden of university thinking is 
always one’s own garden. It is small – in the positive sense. 
It cannot deny its own character, its own rhythm and type 
of thinking. It cannot be unrelated to the motherland, its 
people and objects. Academic thinking must be identical 
with the place it originates from. But it also needs to be 
crosscultural, translatable, ready to confront the others. 
Furthermore, what serves as a context must not hamper 
thinking in universal terms and commitments this 
entails. The kind of thinking must be general, universal, 
comprehensive, it must simply belong to the university. 
The aim is to notice and appreciate the small, minute and 
local, applying theories that universalize without erasing 
the contextual, instead of erecting a monstrous edifice of 
universal abstractions that may stifle it. 
Knowledge, wisdom, vitality
University thinking faces a  special task of acquiring 
a combination of knowledge, ability of efficient ordering, and 
trust in wisdom. How to furnish knowledge with wisdom? 
This is a challenge that the university is best equipped to 
meet as an institution spanning different methodological 
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orders, demanding versatility, transcending the usual role 
of intelligence and knowledge which deal with wisdom only 
discursively. It is not just a place to learn one’s profession, 
but one that requires enlightenment, open -mindedness 
and responsibility. The concern for knowledge furnished 
with wisdom requires also another complement. It calls 
for vitality whose significance was earlier stressed by 
José Ortega y Gasset10 when he wrote about the need 
for linking rationalism with philosophy of everyday 
life, as well as ideological attitudes, both individual and 
communal. Vitality of thinking means its rapid growth, 
richness, unrestricted flow, fluency, and dynamism. It is 
about its beneficial renewal. What it also requires is the 
attention of the poet regarded by Nietzsche as superior to 
the scholar, because the latter is able to kill a flying bird 
with its ruthless inspecting eye.11 The poet, concerned 
about his or her intimacy with being and awareness of 
the seductive power of language, rejects cramped space 
which becomes prison and invites insignificant thoughts. 
Therefore, university thinking should protect itself against 
“lingering” knowledge and be armed with lyricism to 
adequately control the production of the discourse on the 
human being. And it is to the consideration of the human 
being that each academic discourse can be reduced, as each 
discipline formulates its views and judgments through the 
prism of the human and related categories. The university 
is in need of poets, thinkers–seducers who create the space 
for thinking as well as the space of university sensitivity, 
who infect but do not demand slavish obedience. 
It must be a kind of thinking which provides a challenge, 
which gives an expected boost of the creativity of individuals 
and of community. 
10 José Ortega y Gasset, What is Philosophy? (W.W. Norton & 
Company, 1960), pp. 47–70.
11 Nietzsche, Thus Spoke Zarathustra.
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Taste
Such is the taste of thinking whose task is to transfigure, 
to bridge, to cultivate and not to suppress passion. It must 
confide in the idea of education equipped with a system. 
What it needs to transform is only those commonsensical 
epistemologies that do not admit difference, do not allow 
one to focus on suspicious issues and repudiate the very 
possibility of pondering on the supposedly obvious, socially 
established categories. University thinking subverts the 
discourse of unquestionable common sense by inviting 
other discourses. But it also trusts simplicity and basic 
feelings. Sometimes after following the path of universal 
doubt, as it was in the case of Descartes, it goes back to 
the idea of everyday reality which imposes a natural and 
sensible order on the world.12 But this is another kind of 
simplicity and common sense, one that has accepted its 
own destruction through the mechanism of self -negation. 
This is openness. This is the taste of institutionalization 
which due to the system has to grapple with the dangers of 
being an institution, which cannot be merely a school, an 
institute, a research centre, an association, a corporation, 
but needs to have a distinct quality. A quality that through 
its ideological stance yields a certain educational profile. 
A quality that once again has its taste and poses a challenge. 
So in the end the thought which is institutionalized and 
moulded by the university may have its own taste. 
12 René Descartes, Discourse on Method and Meditations on First 
Philosophy, trans. Donald A. Cress (Indianapolis: Hacket Publishing 
Company, 1999). 
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The Secrets of the House Ur*
Analysing the concept of deception it seems vital to 
indicate in the first place its peculiar function within the 
realms of art which, it might be said, distinguishes art from 
the variety of human cultural activities. It predominantly 
concerns the pure art, which is neither utilitarian nor 
is it a  test of artist’s creative skills. In case of fine art 
misleading is the element of the game which demands 
higher skills from a participant. Gorgias points out that 
art deludes a conscious person, so according to him the 
one who misleads is fairer than the one who does not as 
well as the one who agrees to be misled is wiser than the 
one who does not.1 There is a question, however, whether it 
is better to deceive or to be deceived. Since Gorgias values 
the deception in art so high, it seems that we deal with 
an issue much more serious than an innocent game. It 
requires the participant’s wisdom which allows him or her 
to take the risk and solve its principles.
One of the most familiar ways of misleading is the 
deception of the senses. It is interesting that the ancient 
found the proof of the convincing power of the optic 
illusion in the behaviour of the animals bereft of reason, 
which were not able to see through the nature of deception. 
* The chapter first published as: “The Secrets of the House Ur,” Outis 
Deception, vol. 1, ed. Paul Majkut (San Diego: Publication of the Society 
for Phenomenology and Media, 2004), pp. 73–78.
1 Plutarch, De glor. Ath. 5, 348 c; frg. B 23 Diels.
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Erich Gombrich – following Gorgias – claims that the 
magic of performance does not lie in the resemblance 
of the picture and its object but rather in the suggestion 
that the presented possesses the causative power. What is 
significant here, however, is not the animation, such as in 
the Pygmalion myth, which is determined by the art of 
seducing and the power of desire, but the artist’s advantage 
over a spectator who will regard the lifeless object as real. At 
first, we are disoriented and it takes time before we realize 
that the object, picture or view which seemed to be the 
element of the reality does not follow the rules of sight and 
only then we are able to recognize the duality of the world: 
the illusion and reality. The exposure of the deception needs 
time; it is a process of interpretation accompanied with the 
strong emotional reaction. However, when we learn how 
our senses were misled, we are willing to be deceived again 
so as to consciously experience the incongruity in the world 
of phenomena. The deception of the senses assumes that the 
clear distinction can be drawn between the world where the 
rules and references are relatively stable and the illusion 
which contradicts them.
Contemporary variations of illusionism are holograms 
of the spatial objects displayed in the specially designed 
exhibition halls. What we are interested in, however, are 
the phenomena which can be seen on the streets and 
squares of big cities. A person who travels between two 
buildings in Miami Beach can see the hotel overlooking 
the sea in the background (Richard Hass, Miami Beach, 
USA, 1985). Seen from a car the impression of the depth is 
so realistic that only the close inspection lets us distinguish 
the gigantic painting from the real architecture. The tricks 
with perspective in architecture and painting, which have 
been known since the antiquity, are meant to bewilder us; 
they go contrary to our perceptive habits so as to introduce 
the sense of disorientation. And although in time we will 
realize that our senses have been deluded, it is the power of 
the experience itself which is fundamental in this case. In 
1999, the sculptures resembling ordinary passersbies were 
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set up on the squares and streets of Berlin. The silhouette 
of a man crouching to take a photograph of the charming 
passage on the Savigny Square (Fig. 11), the fiddler with 
the open case full of bills and coins on Unter den Linden. 
At the first glance the lifeless figures do not stand out 
from its surroundings, but after a while they arrest the 
attention of a perceptive observer. A passerby who realizes 
that the figure inscribed in the cityscape is a sculpture is 
Fig. 11. A photographer on Savigny Square, Berlin 1999 
(photo by Maria Popczyk)
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surprised and amazed how easily it blends with the urban 
environment. Encouraged by its authenticity we join the 
game of real/fictional and toss a coin into the fiddler’s case 
or the box at the photographer’s feet. 
This kind of deception stirs the spectator’s imagination 
and skillfully blurs the borders between the phenomena not 
only to shock but also to provoke action. It is characteristic 
of the art which encourages us to consciously join the game 
and participate in illusion. It also proves that the important 
element of the deception is exhibition. Especially when 
a work is installed in the city area where the spatial distance 
introduced by the gallery hall is removed.
Another type of deception concerns the soul. The artist 
introduces us into a fictional deceptive world and makes us 
feel as if we were its participants. The three -dimensional 
film which lets us experience the ride on the Ferris wheel is 
a relatively innocent even if exciting experience. However, 
there are situations in which the spectators’ involvement 
results in the consequences that are more serious and 
triggers them to act in a way shocking even for themselves. 
Opening to the charm of theatrical fiction unexpectedly 
enables the audience to discover their own desires and fears. 
Shakespeare’s Hamlet in his soliloquy about the magic of 
art demonstrates its enormous influence on the spectator’s 
soul. The actor’s performance of a crime makes the spectator 
confess his own crimes in public.2 According to Gorgias, art 
deludes imagination and is capable of misleading the soul: 
it captivates it, seduces and alters it with its charm. Only the 
one who will trust art and absorb its contents can undergo the 
alteration. Only when we agree to be led by appearances will 
we find in ourselves something we have never noticed before. 
In this case the art of deception has a cognitive character. 
2 – I have heard
That guilty creatures sitting at a play
Have, by the very cunning of that presently
They have proclaim’d their malefactions.
William Shakespeare, Hamlet
(London and New York: Methuen, 1982), p.272
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A certain variation of the deception of the soul is when 
the spectator goes through the profound and moving 
experiences but without the satisfaction of being altered, as 
he or she can recognize neither the purpose nor the principles 
of the deception. What we deal with here is neither optical 
illusion nor the expression of response. Spectators start to 
recognize familiar issues and situations in a world of fiction 
but their inability to solve the problems presented makes 
them face the mystery. At this point it seems worthwhile 
to have a closer look at the works of Gregor Schneider. 
Schneider constantly rebuilds his family home in Rheydt,
Fig. 12. Totes Haus ur, Rheydt 1989–1993 (after: Gregor Schneider, 
Totes Haus ur, La Biennale di Venezia 2001, ed. Udo Kittelman 
(Bonn: Hatje Cantz Verlag,  2001), p. 7)
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which he shares with his parents and brother (House ur). 
The fragments of the house carefully reconstructed are 
presented on the number of exhibitions. The considerable 
part of the house ur interior were reassembled at the 
Biennale di Venezia (Venice, 2001, Dead House ur, Fig. 12). 
Each visitor enters alone and only after the previous person 
has left the pavilion so that there are no more than five 
people inside. Opening the door immediately transports us 
into the interior of a house with the flight of stairs leading 
upward and the door in the hallway.
The innocent trick: blurring the border between an 
exhibition pavilion and an installation throws the visitor 
into the intimacy of the artist’s home. Schneider takes 
an advantage of the formal and anachronistic mode of 
exhibition in separate national pavilions in order to make 
us experience the abolition of borders between art and 
the surrounding: the moment we enter the building, we 
find ourselves in its typical scenery. And although there is 
a sharp distinction between the interior and the walls of the 
pavilion, both of them are related to each other and form 
the entity associated with the home. By this simple trick the 
artist with no interference in the structure of the pavilion 
makes the visitor participate and share in the secrets hidden 
in the sphere of a dead house, the dead house of the artist.
Following the route of their choice, walking through 
the succession of rooms visitors are impressed by the 
places they encounter. Forced to open the doors, to climb 
the stairs and going downstairs they encounter the traces: 
the arrangements of furniture, tunnel -like passages with 
low ceilings, bright or dim light. This movement makes 
the places visited arrange into the unclear and disturbing 
history of the house. The visitor forgets about the others: 
the sounds they make only intensify the growing anxiety. 
Unexpectedly we are introduced into the sphere of events 
whose meaning cannot be determined as they are only 
suggested: the descent into the dark cellar, the mattress 
torn in half in the middle of the room or the bathtub next 
to the bed in the quasi -bedroom (Fig. 13).
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Fig. 13. Liebeslaube, Rheydt 1995–1996 (after: Gregor Schneider, 
Totes Haus ur, La Biennale di Venezia 2001, ed. Udo Kittelman 
(Bonn: Hatje Cantz Verlag,  2001, p. 59) 
These pictures stir the memory, evoke the forgotten 
emotions which are usually associated with the atmosphere 
of the kitchen, the cellar, and the bedroom. The experiences 
impose the questions about the house inhabitants and the 
supposed events which happened there. The visitor is truly 
deceived as leaving the house he or she has no solution, 
no answer. The secrets of the house cannot be solved 
and the necessity of accepting this fact results in a sense 
of insufficiency, leaves the participant in the state of the 
cognitive discomfort.
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Thus we reach the issue of the exhibition of the artist’s 
house, which certainly is the unusual one. Imbued with the 
extreme intensity of being, it retains the traces of the person 
and the creator; it is a testimony of the dramatic dialogue 
between the artist and the personae of his or her imagination. 
The houses of such artists as Walter Scott, Pablo Picasso or 
Henry Moore, which are open to public, are places where the 
familiar works were born. They constitute the environments 
of creativity, the areas in ‑between the person and his or her 
creation. The visits to such houses allow us to compare and 
confront the image of the artist we know from his or her 
works and biography with the interior of the house. It is also 
known that such writers as Victor Hugo or Honoré de Balzac 
would create their own public image and make their tastes 
visible in the sophisticated way their houses were furnished. 
Others only realized their ideas of the beautiful and perfect 
interior in texts, like Edgar Allan Poe in his Philosophy of 
Furniture. In each case, however, it is easy to draw the border 
between the artists’ house and their works, at least on the 
spatial level. The house can give us plenty of information 
about the author’s personality and put some light in his or 
her works, as the theoreticians with the psychoanalytical 
approach claim, nevertheless it is the separate tangible 
world which cannot be directly identified with the artist’s 
psyche and personality. Such houses -museums, the places 
where the objects and works froze in the static numbness 
cannot give rise to strong emotions. Schneider’s house is 
not a complete and finished work. On the contrary, it is an 
inhabited work of art under construction.
The process of building a house is completely different. 
Carl Gustaw Jung considered the building of the house in 
Bollingen as the integral part of the long -lasting process 
of achieving maturity and identity. The work on the house 
was imposed by the strong self -conscious impulse which 
urged him to build the second floor as well as the tower.3 
3 Memories, Dreams, Reflections, recorded and edited by Jolande 
Jacobi (New York and London: Panteon, 1962), pp. 223–237.
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The house under construction turned out to be the sphere 
where the process of the self integration and the extension 
of the encounter with the ancestors materialized. The 
ancestors’ names and pictures engraved on the wall boards 
added new dimensions to the house they peopled. Jung 
reconstructed his link with the past, with the generations 
of his close ancestors. At the same time he erased the sense 
of uprooting so characteristic of the contemporary people 
dissatisfied with the culture they happen to inhabit and he 
released himself from the civilizational pressure to head 
towards the new. Jung’s house proved to be the medium of 
the universe which can be rebuilt. From this perspective he 
looked at life which manifested itself in its entire greatness 
which becomes and passes. Thus building and rebuilding 
the house was the process of integration of various elements 
of the psyche which emerged following its own internal 
dynamics. In contrast, Schneider turns building into the 
endless process of lasting in disintegration and shows life as 
infinite unsettlement. Whatever alterations are made there 
is no advance as the changes direct neither toward the past 
nor toward the future. His stance contradicts both Jung’s 
hope of building the universe and Gaston Bachelard’s faith 
in possible retrieval of the original idea of the house as the 
safe shelter. According to Bachelard, dreaming makes the 
original intimacy of home capable of restoring continuity 
to a human being and protecting us from the pressure of 
randomness of the existence. Home prevents a  human 
from getting dispersed. The pictures of home are arranged 
according to the logic of dream and emotion. They evoke 
the memories of the dark and disturbing cellar and the 
mysteries of the attic, at the same time, however, they 
always lead us to the experience of the home as the cradle, 
the protective place of our birth.4 
The issue of the crisis of getting settled at home brings to 
mind Martin Heidegger, for whom art as well as the artist’s 
4 Gaston Bachelard, The Poetry of space (Toronto: Beacon Press, 
1969).
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existence allows the truth (aletheia) to happen.5 The artist is 
the one who experiences being in the womb of the ontological 
difference, who constantly puts his life at danger and who is 
rather an exile than a settler, but this enables a work of art 
to reveal the access to the truth. Schneider challenges the 
conviction that art opens the sphere of the truth. Instead 
he proposes the existence based on the straying between 
short -lasting temporary dwellings. A human appears as 
a homeless creature. Feeling at home is an illusion which 
is shown through the impossibility of building the house. 
The house under construction demonstrates the nomadic 
character of the human condition and human existence. 
Schneider demystifies the idea of the safe dwelling; his 
work cannot be placed in any familiar context of order. 
The artist deceives the spectator who is introduced into 
the situation requiring motory, emotional and intellectual 
activity but denied a solution. Deprived of the conclusion or 
explanation the spectator is left in suspension. The sense of 
being deceived is the consequence of the fact that the nature 
of life cannot be made accessible to general public. The act of 
exhibition is the act of killing one’s own creation. In case of 
the work under construction, each transfer of the elements 
from the artist’s original family home involves cloning one 
of its part or even the whole house. Only the House ur in 
Rheydt is a work of art. The house exhibited is the dead one 
because it is cut off from the living organism. Schneider, 
however, makes efforts to display its corpse knowing at the 
same time that according to his own words “Exhibiting is 
always a killing off the works.”6 He does not criticize the act 
of exhibiting but makes a persuasive statement to make us 
realize what it really means for a work of art: exhibiting and 
5 Martin Heidegger, Holzwege (Frankfurt am Main: Vittorio 
Klostermann, 1950); see William J. Richardson, “Working, Dwelling, 
Thinking,” in Heidegger. Through Phenomenology to Thought, prefaced 
by Martin Heidegger (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1963), pp. 583–588. 
6 Udo Kittelmann, Haus ur, Rheydet versus Totes Haus ur, Venice, 
in Gregor Schneider, Totes Haus ur, La Biennale di Venezia 2001 (Bonn: 
Hatje Cantz Verlag, 2001), p. 17.
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watching destroy the vitality of a work which is cut from the 
real life. The only advantages of the exposition of the dead 
house are that it is a work in the realms of the institution, 
in the realms of the prepared and neutral gallery halls. The 
warmth of home, the pulse of life when exhibited turn into 
the illegible empty traces.
In the traditional sense, following Gorgias, deception is 
an important element which belongs to art as a distinctly 
human domain linking experience and cognition. In the 
first place art shows the borders of sensory cognition, then 
it leads the spectator to the self -knowledge or provokes 
action. The situation when spectators overcome with shock 
or excitement temporarily lose control over their senses 
or emotions can ultimately be embraced by cognition, 
even though it remains beyond the realm of discourse. In 
aesthetics this idea can be found in Aristotelian theory of 
tragedy as well as in the category of sublime described by 
Edmund Burke which was reinterpreted by Immanuel Kant 
who however, did not alter its basic sense: the experience of 
negative pleasure indicates the ideas of reason.7
As far as modern art is concerned, the example of 
which we find in the works by Schneider as well as Bill 
Viola, Jannis Kounellis or Mark Wallinger, deception 
is a unique feature of art which is beyond the control of 
general principles. The deluded spectators are left to their 
own emotions and speculations. Schneider provoking the 
spectators’ experience gives them no explanatory context 
which places him in the privileged position: he is the one 
who misleads and has the access to the inexpressible. He 
admits the spectator to the intimacy of his house but at 
the same time indicates that the artist’s authentic existence 
cannot be presented. Thus the communicative function of 
deception is challenged.
7 The relation between deception and sublime needs a  more 
thorough analysis, especially taking into consideration the fact that 
Lyotard applies the term sublime to the avant -garde art freely using 
deception. 
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Aleksandra Kunce, Maria Popczyk
Into the Noise. Dyskursy antropologiczne i estetyczne w sferze publicznej
St re sz cz en ie
Into the Noise… to zbiór esejów autorstwa Aleksandry Kunce 
i Marii Popczyk. Są one poprzedzone wstępem napisanym przez Marię 
Korusiewicz, który porusza problematykę estetyki codzienności, 
stanowiącej przeciwwagę dla dyskursów instytucjonalnych. 
Rozważania autorek są efektem antropologicznych i estetycznych 
eksploracji przestrzeni publicznej. Autorki  analizują dyskursy, które 
nadają kształt wspólnotom przestrzennym. W centrum uwagi znalazły 
się problemy opisu antropologii punktów, perspektyw antropologii 
integralnej, instytucji uniwersytetu, tożsamości europejskiej, figur 
zdziwienia i humanistyki, a także zakorzenienia epistemologicznego. 
Kluczowe są rozważania estetyczne dotyczące miejsca dzieła sztuki 
w przestrzeniach publicznych miast (na przykładzie Berlina) oraz 
zorganizowanych instytucjonalnie wystawach muzealnych. 
Autorki analizują działania artystyczne będące rodzajem dialogu 
z zasadami organizacji przestrzeni publicznej. Estetyka jest tu 
pojmowana jako dziedzina krytyczna nawiązująca do osiągnięć nowej 
muzeologii i kultury wizualnej, a nie jako filozofia sztuki. Perspektywa 
antropologiczna i estetyczna uzupełniają się, oświetlając z odmiennych 
punktów widzenia debaty toczone na temat przestrzeni publicznej. 
Aleksandra Kunce, Maria Popczyk
Into the Noise. Anthropologische und ästhetische Diskurse im öffentlichen Raum
Zu s a m men fa s su ng
Into the Noise… ist eine Sammlung von Essays, die von Aleksandra 
Kunce und Maria Popczyk veröffentlicht und von Maria Korusiewicz 
eingeleitet wurde. Das Buch hat zum Thema die Ästhetik der 
Alltäglichkeit als eines Ausgleichs für institutionelle Diskurse. 
Das Buch ist das Ergebnis der anthropologischen und ästhetischen 
Erforschung des öffentlichen Raumes. Die Verfasserinnen analysieren 
die den räumlichen Gemeinschaften Gestalt gebenden Diskurse 
und die damit verbundenen Probleme mit der  Darstellung von: der 
Anthropologie der Punkte, Perspektiven der integralen Anthropologie, 
der Institution – Universität,  der europäischen Identität, den Figuren: 
Verwunderung und Geisteswissenschaft und epistemologischer 
Verwurzelung. Die wichtigsten ästhetischen Betrachtungen betreffen 
die Stelle des Kunstwerkes im öffentlichen Raum der Städte (am Beispiel 
Berlins) und auf den von den Museen veranstalteten Ausstellungen.  
Die Verfasserinnen untersuchen die künstlerische Tätigkeit als eine 
Art Dialog mit den Regeln nach denen der öffentliche Raum organisiert 
wird. Ästhetik erscheint hier als ein sich auf die  Errungenschaften der 
neuen Museologie und der virtuellen Kultur beziehender Kritikbereich 
und nicht als Kunstphilosophie. Anthropologische und ästhetische 
Betrachtungsweise ergänzen sich und beleuchten aus verschiedenem 
Blickwinkel die Diskussionen über den öffentlichen Raum. 
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